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ABSTRACT
The study addresses issues of audit independence, in particular behavioural and ethical aspects of individual
judgement and decision-making in external auditing. The study examines how the auditor's sensitivity to the
possibility of fraud, to management representations, and to management services opportunities impacts upon
individual audit judgement embedded in a structured audit environment. A phenomenon of management
services opportunism is perceived as a form of power exertion by the client over the auditor's judgement and
his/her recognition of material fraud. Further, auditing is perceived as hermeneutic practice, that is, the
auditor on the job strives to understand and interpret evidence of client's operations embedded in the wider
context of social institutions and structural conditions. By doing so, he/she produces assurance to the public
that these interpretations are trustworthy. This relates to the notion of operational independence (Power,
1997), that is, the auditor's freedom and capacity to understand and interpret the 'economic text' narrated in
the client's financial statements. However, the profession and consequently audit firms, propagate a symbol
for the 'ideal of service' objectified by the abstraction of the professional standards and guidance and
executed in conformity to routines of operational approaches. As a result, the structured methodologies of
'risk-based' auditing mediate independent judgement, in particular in its operational sense.
The study seeks to unveil whether the auditor is capable of transcending the structure of the audit process
and client's influence so as to enable independent judgement and fraud recognition. The study consists of
questionnaires incorporating a real-life construct case study (i.e. given the characteristics of the client, the
subjects were asked to compose audit planning memorandum, assess the risk and estimate the budget of
hours for audit testing) and interviews. Qualitative and quantitative methods are employed: narrative analysis
and statistical testing.
What emerges is evidence that auditors respond to the (changing) circumstances of the client's environment
in two different ways consistent with their attitudes to structure: transcending and non-transcending. The
former, being less constrained by the structured audit approach, represents a 'big-picture' perspective. For
these auditors the threat of loss of independence may be associated with the judgement restrictions with
regard to amount of work assigned for audit testing. In the latter group of more conventional auditors,
structure 'bands' the 'big-picture' judgmental orientation; hence, these auditors tend to take to the
codification more readily and that results in 'black box' oriented judgements (the 'orthodoxy' of
risk/materiality assessments). In other words, structure restrictions affect their operational independence: the
ability to determine freely a scope of judgement. These auditors may recognise the problem (of fraud) but
not be able to label it. Thus, the evidence reveals that a structured approach is overused in audit and forms an
obstacle to the recognition of material fraud. This is an enduring concern since fraud experience is not easily
codified to facilitate structured inquiry. Further, the mutual exclusivity of fraud and Non-Audit Services
(NAS) recognition was found, i.e. auditors do not consider a fraud flag and a NAS opportunity
simultaneously. Whilst one aspect of the study has its origins in concerns that the existence of NAS
opportunism diverts attention from fraud recognition, the results reveal only limited evidence to support this.
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The importance of the audit function rests on the independence of auditors in carrying out their
work; that is, the essence of the profession is that a high degree of judgement is required in its
practice. In the British tradition a distinguishing feature of the underlying philosophy of auditing is
the connection between independent judgement and the concepts of accountability and integrity.
These concepts go beyond a 'true and fair view' and the agenda of compliance with auditing
standards.
'Audit is about seeking the truth...[Judgement] is, in the final analysis personal and derives from
business understanding and experience as well as incisive knowledge of financial reporting and
business life.. .an expert view with personal accountability' (APB, 1994, p. 2 and 5).
Audit judgement is an independent process of deriving understanding and meanings from generic
principles by their application in specific contexts of clients' economic reality. Exercising
judgement is an integral part of audit, evidenced by the numerous references to professional
judgement in auditing standards. In this regard, the auditor relies on standards, but also interprets
those standards in conjunction with the client's characteristics and environment. If auditors are to
continue to play a vital role in adding credibility to the interpretations of the economic reality of
the client hidden in the financial statements, it is essential to address in auditing research the risks
and pressures they face in the course of the audit process. The auditor's independent judgement is
a focal point for those challenges.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The following section provides a
background to the problem of audit independence, in particular issues addressing the independence
of judgement and decision making. The nature of the study, the research question, research design
and the methodologies employed to explore this question are then outlined. The subsequent section
discusses the findings of the study. Then limitations of the study are briefly discussed. Finally, the
organisation of the thesis is presented.
1.2 Background to the problem and the research question
The environment in which audit exists is constantly evolving in relation to the demands placed on
it. The credibility of auditors is increasingly being questioned and criticised due to widespread
litigation directed towards auditors worldwide (Porter, 1993). In the context of this turbulent
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reality, it is worth asking whether the profession is evolving in response to, and keeping pace with,
these external changes.
This study addresses the concept of audit independence, in particular behavioural and ethical
aspects of independent judgement and decision-making in external auditing. Policy issues in
auditing practice, in particular with regard to structural conditions and power relations associated
with audit independence are examined. The independence of audit judgement is assumed to consist
of two components; that is, independence of thought and independence from the client.
Independence of thought is derivative of Power's (1997) definition of operational independence
while independence from the client relates to apparent independence (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961).
Operational independence refers to the individual capacity of the auditor to freely determine the
scope of audit procedures in the process of interpreting the client's operations and financial
statements. The standard format of the audit operational approaches (i.e. structure of 'risk-based'
auditing), propagated by the audit firms, moderates this individual capacity of the auditor.
Apparent independence addresses the nature of the auditor-client relationship. The factors
associated with the impairment of apparent independence relate to the forms of the client's power
exertion over the audit fees, i.e. in particular the provision of non-audit services to audit clients
(hereafter NAS), long audit tenures, and overall high competition on audit services market. The
need for audit independence has been recognised by professional bodies, and as a result guidelines
restricting specific auditor-client relationships which may impair apparent audit independence
have been issued. However, there was no guidance on auditor performance (judgement) associated
with impairment of operational independence.
Three highly topical issues are brought together into a single research design. The study explores
how the auditor's sensitivity to (1) the client's management (mis)representations, (2) to the
possibility of fraud, (3) and to a management (non-audit) services opportunity in the client's
environment impacts upon individual audit judgement embedded in a structured audit. This study
is the first empirical work which addresses the operational independence of audit judgement in the
context of NAS and material fraud. In this study, individual judgement is envisaged as operating
within a certain structure of materiality and risk concerns. This structure may provide a threat to
the operational independence of judgement. The focus of analysis is applied audit approaches
among senior auditors and audit managers. Therefore, the study seeks to unveil whether the
auditor's frame of reference goes beyond the structure of the audit process and the client's
influence, so as to ensure independent judgement and enhance fraud recognition. The study
provides insights into the understanding of the auditor's (lack of) performance in recognising
fraud. Because fraud awareness is embedded implicitly in audit judgement processes, the auditor
requires a better understanding of the complex range of influencing factors which may result in
fraud. Further, a related argument is that the attitudinal stance, personal characteristics and self-
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critical awareness of the auditor can be envisaged as significant, predisposing factors in the
capacity to achieve penetrative insights into the reality of the client.
The research question is whether or not the auditor is capable of transcending the structure of the
audit process and the client's economic power so as to enable a 'big-picture' judgmental
orientation; that is, whether he/she is capable of seeing and labelling particular characteristics of
the client's environment as determined by the micro-structure of material misstatements and
provision ofmanagement services. Thus, the issue of fraud is embedded in independence tensions
and considered in wider social contexts.
1.3 Literature review as a term of reference
The thesis provides a broad scope review of auditing literature, covering in particular the areas of
audit independence, audit judgement and decision making, client's economic power over the
auditor, and issues of fraud. This comprehensive overview of literature forms an informative base
to the issues of the micro-structure of audit independent judgement under investigation; that is, the
case ofmaterial misstatements and NAS opportunism embedded in a structured audit environment.
On the whole, there are tendencies in the auditing literature to look at audit independence issues
separately. In other words, the literature on audit independence consists of compartments where
much of the on-going debate is focused on organisational independence, in particular
independence in appearance addressing the auditor-client relationship, i.e. tendering issues,
competitive pricing and fee-related issues. The genesis of organisational independence research
was initiated by Mautz and Sharaf (1961) who for the first time introduced the concept of audit
independence as a postulate of auditing. There has been, however, much less research on the
operational sense of independence (Power, 1997). Literature addressing forms of client's power
exertion over the auditor is very broad and undecided as to whether the provision of management
services to audit clients impair audit independence, and whether the auditor trusts (is able to trust)
the client's representations in the context of the provision of NAS. Further, auditing literature
evokes the need for fraud awareness to be a part of audit judgement process. For this awareness to
be present in judgement requires from the auditor a better understanding of the exposures he/she
may come across in the decision-making processes and of their implications. By activating
independent 'way of seeing' the auditor will be able to transcend the structure of the audit process.
The interpretive framework for professional judgement in the auditing milieu emerges as a result
of integrating audit independence and audit judgement literature.
1.4 Research design
The empirical work of this thesis is constructed so as to integrate insights from auditing literature
with a real-life construct case study. The case study used in the research design is based upon an
actual fraud case. The research was designed using abstracted frameworks from an actual case and
3
with the advice of a technical partner from one of the Big Five auditing firms. Over the course of
the consultation, the micro-structure of independent judgement was identified; that is,
independence tensions between management consulting service opportunities and fraud
possibilities implicit in the overall client's environment and in the client's management
representations. Situations were constructed which could be read by the auditor as a potential fraud
risk, a non-audit service opportunity, or both. These situations represent the generic independence
issue of auditors' 'willingness' to accept client management representations that deflect the
auditors' attention from existing fraud problems in cases when NAS opportunities arise. Based on
these situations, an experiment was designed so as to examine the auditor's response to the
potential duality of interpretations; that is, a deconstruction of how the auditor reads the client's
case was undertaken. The phenomenon of management services opportunism is perceived as a
form of power exertion by the client over the appointed auditor, in particular over independent
audit judgement and the auditor's recognition of material fraud. The auditor may accept given
explanations without sufficient facts due to the fear of being replaced, not wanting to challenge
and/or to upset the client's management. The study seeks to understand whether the auditor is
tenacious in the audit task; not being influenced by economic powers within the structured audit
environment. The main purpose of concern with regard to independence of judgement is whether
(early) NAS recognition in the client's environment would prejudice (subsequent) fraud risk
recognition.
Auditing practice is perceived as hermeneutic practice; that is, the auditor on the job strives to
understand and interpret evidence of the client's operations and representations embedded in the
context of social institutions and structural conditions, and by doing, so he/she produces assurance
in society that these interpretations are trustworthy (Pentland, 1993). This relates to the auditor's
operational freedom and capacity to understand and interpret the 'economic text' that is narrated in
and behind the client's financial statements (i.e. notion of operational independence). The
profession and audit firms, however, propagate a symbol of the 'ideal of audit services' which is
objectified by the abstraction of professional standards and guidance and executed in conformity to
the routines of operational approaches. Structured methodologies and audit approaches (pre-
established structured plans and checklists) are expressions of striving for standardised and
legitimate services (Francis, 1994). As a result, structured methodologies for the audit process
mediate independence of judgement, in particular in its operational sense.
This research is novel in the sense that there has been no similar judgement study which combined
fraud awareness, management services opportunities and management (mis)representations in a
single experimental design. Secondly, the experimental studies undertaken to date on audit
judgement and decision-making are limited in research design, in that, they have relied entirely on
quantitative modelling and data. The methodology used in this study, which is fully discussed in
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chapter 5, combines both quantitative and qualitative data. Further, this study provides an
explanatory component to judgement performance in audit praxis, acknowledges and explores the
embeddedness of professional judgement in wider social and organisational milieu.
This study has both broad and narrow dimensions and is designed between and within subjects.
The study is broad in the sense that it embodies a real construct scenario. The experiment is
deliberately designed to engage with a number of issues so as to reflect different strengths of fraud
flags, different levels of NAS opportunities in the client's environment and of credibility attached
to the client's management representations. To provide an authentic setting in the research design,
it was necessary to engage with a wide range of literature on audit independence and on audit
judgement. A hermeneutic dimension places applied judgement strategies in wider social and
organisational contexts. The study has a narrow dimension in the sense that it refers to a single
case with a particular construct; the case of the micro-structure of fraud and NAS opportunism.
Hence, the research design enables both narrative and statistical analyses of the auditors' responses
to changing circumstances of possibility of fraud and NAS opportunities in the client's
environment. A two year time span is introduced within the case study to examine how the
auditor's cumulative knowledge and experience of the client impacts upon his/her judgements in
the audit process. The research was conducted among audit seniors and audit managers from Big
Five auditing firms across the UK. The structure of 'risk-based' auditing was deliberately
implemented in the construct since that structure was operationalised at the time research was
being conducted (Bowrin, 1998). Strategic audit methodologies were in the processes of
implementation within the Big Five audit firms. The experiment was piloted and tested in
association with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland.
1.5 Scope and methodology of the study
The review ofprevious studies suggested a number of methods that might be applied to investigate
the effects of the client's economic power and the standardisation of audit process on the
independence of audit judgement and fraud recognition. The methods are quantitative and
qualitative, with quantitative methods being predominant. The different methodologies used in
these previous studies indicate that both qualitative and quantitative methods have their own
strengths and weaknesses, and no single method used in isolation is likely to be completely
successful. Studies that use only one method are on the whole more vulnerable to errors in
comparison with the use of dual or multiple method design in which different types of data provide
cross-data validity checks. Thus, in this study qualitative and quantitative methods are employed;
that is, narrative analysis and statistical testing. The methodological mix allows the capturing of
aspects of the phenomenon under investigation in a more complete and holistic manner.
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The study consists of questionnaires incorporating a real-life scenario and interviews incorporating
a process tracing exercise. In the case scenario (given the characteristics of the client) the subjects
were asked to compose an audit-planning memorandum, and subsequently to assess the audit risk
and to estimate the budget of audit hours for audit testing. The process tracing exercise allowed the
examination of the judgement formulations over the client's case and validated the categorisation
of the questionnaire respondents. Interviews enabled the location of the study in wider socio-
organisational contexts and provided some insights into the affective and cognitive aspects of
operationalised judgement strategies, in particular relating to auditors' background and experience.
1.6 Results of the study
The results offer indicative evidence of the relevance of different learning styles in the recognition
of fraud in a structured audit environment. What emerges is evidence that auditors respond to the
changing circumstances of the client's environment in different ways consistent with their attitudes
to structure; that is, transcending and non-transcending practitioners. The former being less
constrained by the structured audit approach, represent a 'big-picture' perspective (into this
category fall those auditors who recognise either fraud or NAS opportunity). These auditors are
able to go beyond the structure of operational approaches and 'see' the particular micro-context of
the client's environment. For these auditors the threat of loss of independence may be associated
with judgement restrictions with regard to the amount of work assigned for audit testing. In the
latter group of more conventional auditors, structure 'bands' the 'big-picture' judgmental
orientation; hence, these auditors tend to take to the codification more readily and that results in
'black box' oriented judgements (the 'orthodoxy' of risk and materiality assessments). That is,
these auditors tend to read the case in terms of audit (non fraud) risk and materiality, without
addressing either fraud or non audit services. These auditors may recognise the problem of fraud
whilst not being able to label it. This group emerges as highly structured thinkers treating the audit
more as a technical activity. In other words, in this group, structure restrictions affect operational
independence; that is, the ability to freely determine the scope ofjudgement.
Whilst one aspect of the study had its origins in concerns that the existence of NAS opportunism
diverts attention from fraud recognition, the results reveal only limited evidence to support this.
The mutual exclusivity of fraud and NAS recognition was found since auditors did not consider a
fraud flag and an NAS opportunity simultaneously. However, the findings suggest that early NAS
recognisers are also fraud recognisers (in second year of treatment). There are a significant number
of auditors able to switch their judgement focus from NAS recognition in year one of treatment to
fraud recognition in the second year. Those versatile auditors (within 'big-pictured' category) by
thinking more broadly are capable of responding to both the NAS and fraud dimensions,
depending on the circumstances. Further, some conventional auditors in the first year (i.e. who did
not recognise fraud or NAS) become 'big-pictured' in the second year of treatment, recognising
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fraud or NAS in that year. In short, different patterns of judgement performance emerged; that is,
conventional (non-transcending of structure) and 'big-picture' orientations (with versatile sub¬
category). The latter represents auditors capable of transcending the structured audit approach. The
statistical testing explored whether and to what extent these different groups of auditors perform
differently under the format of 'risk based' auditing.
Overall, the 'non-recognisers' group remains significant. These did not recognise fraud or NAS in
either year. Thus, the tentative conclusion is that a formal structured approach to auditing is a
possible threat to fraud discovery (i.e. operational independence threat) whilst a pressure on audit
staff to recognise and to pursue NAS opportunities for the firm is not. However, the latter
statement has to be moderated in the sense that the experiment provides some evidence that NAS
recognisers did not increase audit work in response to fraud recognition; that is, despite awareness
of higher risk, they tended not to increase the budget of hours for audit testing or some even
lowered the budget (i.e. an apparent independence threat). Thus, the evidence reveals that a
structured approach is overused in audit and forms an obstacle to performance in fraud
recognition. This is an enduring concern since fraud experience is not easily codified to facilitate
structured inquiry. In other words, the concept of fraud is not easily codified as audit knowledge
within a structured audit framework. It requires auditors' creative and critical thinking within a
highly diffused and flexible environment. The results of statistical analysis are indicative and
auditors' performance was further explored through narrative analysis.
Since auditors responded differently to the changing circumstances of the client environment
consistent with their different attitudes to structure, which affected their judgement performance,
mixed teams could be built in audit in order to increase fraud recognition. That is, the audit teams
should consist of those auditors who see 'big-picture' and those who are able to translate such a
picture into a structured inquiry. Further, to activate critical, independent reasoning in the audit
judgement process and to broaden individual thinking capacities within underlying frameworks,
holistic approaches to auditors' education might be promoted.
1.7 Limitations of the study
The limitations of the study, which are discussed in chapter 5, are related in particular to subject
variation and the partiality of interpretations. A related limitation common to all experimental
research is the question of external validity. Can the results of the study be generalised to a whole
population of senior auditors and audit managers or has the firm a particular culture which has
influenced subject responses (Trotman, 1997)? Is there a common culture throughout the auditing
profession or do respondents adapt to the culture of the particular audit firm? The demographic
component of the questionnaire ascertained subjects' experience profiles. Interviews allowed the
researcher to gain insights into auditors' personal traits in relation to their responses in the case
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study. Interviews also helped to situate the research results in the contextual setting. Although the
partiality of representations related to subject selection and to incompleteness of interpretations
needs to be addressed as a limitation of the study affecting its external validity, on the other hand,
the in-depth analysis stemming from interviewees' narratives simultaneously strengthens the
study, and allows the possibility of assessing inter-linkages between the socio-organisational
context and the dynamics between judgement and structure categories in the audit processes.
1.8 Organisation of the study
The thesis is organised so as to provide a comprehensive discussion on issues of independent audit
judgement. Further, the study explores the auditor-client relationship in the context of the
provision of NAS and fraud recognition. This is further illustrated by citing empirical instances of
how the structure of 'risk-based' auditing mediates individual audit judgement. The thesis consists
of eight chapters.
This (first) chapter presents a broad overview of the research, its objectives and background to the
problem of audit independence. Research methods and findings of the study are also discussed.
The second chapter on audit independence and the client's power discusses issues of audit
independence in the context of the client's economic influence over the appointed auditor, in
particular associated with the individual auditor's ability to withstand the client's pressure. The
nature of audit independence is first discussed. Then, the chapter presents dimensions of the
client's power affecting audit performance, including the client's financial condition and related
issues of the joint provisions of NAS and audit, the practise of low-balling, tendering issues,
auditor switching and opinion shopping. The literature on management representations is implicit
and therefore translated into the dynamics of the client's economic influence. A consensus has not
been reached as to whether or not severe competition on audit market services and thus, the
client's bargaining power, and related issues of joint provision of NAS and audit, lead to an
impairment of audit independence and/or have a deleterious effect on the quality of the audit
performed. Issues of management fraud and audit judgement in that context are also discussed in
this chapter.
The third chapter presents an overview of the professional judgement and decision-making
literature and places individual judgement in the structured audit environment. The systematisation
of knowledge in auditing is also presented. Most studies on judgement and decision-making have
focused heavily on quantitative assessments of the auditor's performance, lacking a conceptual
framework of the auditing milieu in which judgement performance is formed and transmuted.
Drawing upon the concept of auditing practice as a social construct and locating the audit
judgement milieu as being embedded in the wider structural and organisational contexts, a
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theoretical framework for the study was developed. This conceptual framework encompasses a
widely defined environment comprising of: (1) the auditing profession with its body of knowledge,
legitimacy claims and standardisation processes, (2) government and its laws, (3) audit firms with
their cultures and politics, (4) competitors and pressures to retain clients and pressures for NAS
provisions, (5) clients with their economic powers, (6) financial statements' users evoking their
reporting needs and quality requirements, and (7) a widely defined society with its values and
opinions. In the context of this milieu, the aspects of standardisation towards more efficient and
controllable audits and legitimacy processes over auditors' liability are discussed. Thus, this
chapter unveils background to tensions between structure and judgement metaphors in audit
process.
The fourth chapter presents the insights into interpretive dimensions of auditing practice. Drawing
upon phenomenological hermeneutics, the study explains that the auditor on the job creates
judgements and simultaneously shares, replicates and mediates structures. That is, the objective
conditions of the audit firms are integrated with subjective understandings that simultaneously
enable and constrain individual audit endeavour. Dynamics between the auditor and 'reading' of
evidence as economic text are embedded in the context of the interrelation between anticipated
components of the audit judgement milieu and research findings. The debasement of critical
reasoning in auditing practice through tensions between structure and judgement metaphors is here
discussed.
The fifth chapter is devoted to the presentation of research design and discusses the research
methodological mix; that is, qualitative and quantitative approaches. A combination of methods
was used in the study since both qualitative and quantitative approaches have their strengths and
weaknesses. This chapter discusses the two-stage process of data collection, being a case study
survey based on questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with a process tracing exercise.
This twofold strategy increased the likelihood that the picture emerging from the research
represents a reasonable cross-section of insights into judgement strategies in relation to the
structure of the audit process in the context of fraud and NAS opportunity. The limitations of the
study are also discussed.
The sixth chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis of questionnaire data. This chapter
presents evidence relating to auditors' different performance in judgement strategies within the
structure of 'risk-based' auditing. The main part of this chapter reports on the effects of client's
management representations, NAS opportunism and the structured audit process on the
independence of audit judgement and decision making at the planning stage of the audit process.
Firstly, the incidence of the auditor's scope in judgement performance is discussed. Secondly, the
incidence of anchorage of the auditors' responses (concerns) is presented and explored. Finally,
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the incidence of auditors' consistencies with regard to the structure of 'risk-based' auditing are
discussed; that is (1) consistency with regard to the direction of risk and the hours for audit testing
applied in year 1 and year 2 of treatment, and (2) consistency with regard to the value of the
assessed risk. What emerged from the study is evidence that auditors respond differently to the
changing circumstances of the client's environment consistent with their different attitudes to the
structure of the audit process; that is, transcending ('big-pictured') and non-transcending
(conventional) individuals.
The seventh chapter is devoted to the presentation of the auditor's story of the 'realm of the real'
of audit operational practice. This chapter discusses the ways in which professionals perceive
themselves as the members of a distinct profession, and as the members of the audit firms they
work for, and seeks to unveil whether they value the independence of their individual judgements.
To find out whether audit independence is threatened in the organisational context, in particular in
its operational sense, there is a need to investigate individual perceptions and awareness of the
capacity for provision of the audit services, and how this awareness manifests itself in patterns of
judgement and decision-making. Further, as audit firms promote certain ways of being; that is,
certain behaviours, the question of whether the firm promotes awareness for additional services
(NAS opportunism) was raised. Hence, this chapter provides insights based on the interview data
into individual experiences of the dynamics between audit judgement and the structure of the audit
process within the audit firm in form of the auditors' stories. Within the story of the 'realm of the
real' auditors themselves present their experiences of socialisation processes within the firm and
the role of the audit firms in the formation of awareness of how to deal with judgement-structure
tensions, i.e. predisposition to audit. The story is told with the application of symbolic language
where dynamics between judgement and structure metaphors are revealed in the hermeneutic
context of practice. The auditors' strategies for judgement and decision making seemed to be
influenced by their family background and education and then reformed and deformed by the
socialisation processes within the audit firm and professional training. What emerges from the
story is the unfolding of organisational change and associated concerns related to the introduction
of new audit methodologies. This chapter confirms the existence of two different attitudes to
structure of the audit process; that is, existence of transcending and non-transcending practitioners.
The eighth chapter presents a summary of the findings and draws conclusions based on the
research data presented in the study. Implications for future research are also discussed.
1.9 Summary
In this chapter, it was emphasised that although the auditing profession recognises the problem of
audit independence by issuing guidelines which restrict specific client-auditor relationships, threats
associated with independence of audit judgement, i.e. operational independence, have not been
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extensively addressed. This study, which is both descriptive and experimental in nature, seeks to
address this issue by examination of audit operational approaches in judgement strategies within a
structured audit environment in the context of the client-auditor relationship. In addition, it
attempts to explore further how judgements are formulated in the wider contexts of structural
conditions and organisational relations and looks at the auditor's background and experiential
factors. The research methodology employed to meet these objectives was outlined and its
relevance and limitations discussed. The chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
Audit independence and the client's power
2.1 Introduction
Auditor independence has always been a fundamental concept to the auditing profession and
the essence of its philosophical structure (APB, 1994). The dilemma the profession currently
faces is one of maintaining auditor independence from the management of the audit clients.
Immense competition on audit market services creates a particular type of pressure, related to
the acquisition and maintenance of audit clients. This pressure is very likely to have an
adverse impact on the quality of the audit performed. Since the client's management is
frequently able to exert pressure on the appointment, the remuneration and the removal of the
auditor to an extent which causes tensions and incentives for collusive and non-independent
activity, it is important for the profession to identify the causes of these pressures and to
assess the extent to which the auditor is able to resist these pressures.
This study intends to contribute to a better comprehension of auditor independence by the
examination of the interactive influences between the level of the auditor's scepticism
applied in the audit judgement and of the client management's economic power over these
judgement processes (especially in the context of provision of NAS). An objective of this
chapter is to discuss the means by which an audit client exerts a coercive power over the
independent judgement processes of the auditor. Firstly, the nature and concepts of
independence in the auditing profession are discussed with reference to relevant literature on
audit independence. Much of prior auditing research has focused on the profession's
assertion of independence, i.e. apparent independence. Secondly, dimensions of the client's
economic power affecting audit behaviour are presented. These dimensions include: client's
financial condition, audit fee tendering, the practice of low-balling, auditor switching and
client's opinion shopping. A consensus has not been reached in prior research as to whether
or not such severe competition leads to impairment of audit independence and has a
deteriorating effect on the quality of audit performed. Thirdly, a literature review on the
provision of NAS is presented, in particular regarding the joint provision of audit and NAS.
Some studies suggest the impairment of audit independence occurs in cases of the joint
provision of audit and NAS, while other studies indicate the positive effect of such provision
due to the existence of knowledge spillovers form the joint provision, i.e. an enhancement of
the audit firm's knowledge concerning the client and its business. The following section
discusses the nature of fraud, its meaning for the auditing profession and the main research
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on fraud. Finally, a discussion of the organisational reality of the individual auditor in the
context of fraud is presented. This section discusses the importance of the auditor's
scepticism in independent judgement processes and in the recognition of material fraud.
2.2 The nature of independence, objectivity and integrity
Since the Companies Act 1900 the auditor in the UK has been required by law to be
independent of his/her clients. The legal requirement for independence came almost half a
century before any requirement for the professional qualifications. The importance of
independence lies in the role society expects of the auditor. Since ownership and control of
the companies are vested in the shareholders and management, and there has been over time
increasing separation of the two, the auditor acts so as to give assurance to the shareholders
on information provided by management in their stewardship role. To fulfil this role the
auditor has a fundamental responsibility to exercise the highest standard of professional
judgement, which is based on three interrelated concepts of independence, objectivity and
integrity. The concept of auditor independence is integral to the professional code of ethics
and the auditing standards. In the UK the Auditor's Code to Professional Ethics (ICAS, 1996)
provides a definition of independence incorporating the concepts of objectivity and integrity:
'Professional independence is a concept fundamental to the profession. It is essentially an
attitude of mind characterised by an objective approach to professional work and integrity
which implies not merely honesty, but fair dealing and truthfulness' (Statement 1, ICAS,
1996).
The notion that independence is an attitude of mind is only tangible for individuals who hold
a deontological view of life, perceiving certain actions as morally obligatory, regardless of
the consequences that may result from these actions (Moizer, 1991). As the auditor is
assumed to have no incentive associated with financial statements to be dishonest, he/she is
presumed to be independent of both the company being audited and of its managers.
Philosophically, auditors are supposed to serve society. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) define
auditor independence as a lack of bias in forming judgements, and so the auditor can be
employed to report on the truthfulness of the managers' financial statements. They further
state that there is a 'social contract' between the auditing profession and the rest of the
society, which establishes the reasons for the auditor to remain independent. The auditing
profession recognises a dual connotation in the concept of audit independence; independence
in fact and independence in appearance (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). For the auditor to be
independent implies a capability to think and to act independently, whilst simultaneously
being seen by third parties as independent (Flint, 1988). Independence in fact has been
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defined in terms of honesty, objectivity and a mental attitude. Shuetze (1994) argued that
independence is an abstract concept, being defined by a state of mind partly synonymous
with honesty, integrity, courage and character. He further stated that the cynical world
requires more from the auditor than mere declarations of independence. Accordingly, the
auditor is expected to tell the truth as he/she sees it being capable to resist any influence
either financial or sentimental, which could potentially turn him/her from that course. In
other words, the auditor has to have 'inner strength' to report difficult issues1.
'It is the inner strength that when you enter a room and smell damp, you look under the
floorboards, rather than close the door and go to the management and ask somebody else to do
the job for you' (Percy, 1999, p. 4).
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, hereafter AICPA, stated that to be
independent, the auditor must be intellectually honest (AICPA, 1991). The European
Commission in its Green Paper defined independence as the state of mind which has regard
for all considerations relevant to the task in hand (European Commission, 1996).
Independence in appearance has been defined by professional bodies as a state of being free
of interest in and/or relationship with clients. The Chartered Accountants Joint Ethics
Committee stressed the importance of being free of any obligation with the client, in order
that the auditor may appear to be independent (CAJEC, 1995). The auditing profession is
organised around a central ethical conflict. The client 'hires' the auditor and pays the fees but
the auditor is supposed to conduct the audit in an independent fashion adhering to the
profession's 'covenant with society' (Briloff, 1966) to audit in the interest of society. The
appearance of independence is maintained by a number of detailed rules about forbidden
commercial and familiar relationships between the auditor and the client (Reiter, 1997).
Some researchers, who were concentrating on independence in fact, defined independence in
terms similar to those used by the professional bodies. For instance Bartlett (1993) defined
independence as an unbiased mental attitude in making decisions about audit work and
financial reporting. Other researchers have operationalised the definition of independence.
DeAngelo (1981) defined independence as a conditional probability that, given a breach is
discovered, the auditor will report that breach. Simunic (1984) argued that any situation
which increases the probability that the auditor will not truthfully report the results of his/her
investigations can be viewed as a threat to independence.
1 A concept of 'inner strength' derives form Hatherly (1996).
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Independence can be envisaged in terms of duality of organisational and operational concepts
(Power, 1997). Organisational independence relates to the individual auditor and the
profession, whereas operational independence is linked to the audit process itself.
'There are two senses of independence: organisational and operational... Arrangements for
the organisational independence concern the manner in which the auditor is appointed, the
development of ethical rules to ensure impartiality and the questions over the compromise of
the auditor's role by the provision of NAS... Compared to organisational independence,
operational independence has more to do with the audit process itself. Here the concern is
more with [auditors'] capability' (Power, 1997, p. 132, emphasised in the original).
In operational independence the concern is less to do with the auditor's willingness to be
independent as with the question of his/her capacity to do so. Power's (1997) discussion of
the operational independence is set out in terms of the interrelationship with the information
subject to audit and the existence of a separate body of knowledge available to the auditor.
Operational independence is segregated in informational independence and epistemic
independence. Informational independence concerns the problem with auditing fundamental
dependence on information supplied by the client.
'The informational independence refers to the problems of information asymmetry between
regulator and regulated. The auditor is always informationally dependent, trusting at least
some of the representations of senior management' (Power, 1997, p. 133)
In epistemic independence, knowledge upon which the conclusions of the audit is built must
be independent. No matter how independent the auditor is in fact or in appearance, a
knowledge base that is biased towards serving the interests of the client may jeopardise this.
Knapp (1985) observed that independence of audit task is associated with an act of
persuading the client's management to do what they sometimes do not want to do. Epistemic
independence is consequently about having a knowledge base that is independent of interests
in the client. The knowledge base in auditing is biased towards the client by the focus on
adding value to the audit, being aggravated by the direct involvement of the client and in
choosing the areas to be audited. Where clear rules of the client's conduct and techniques for
determining compliance with these rules exist, the audit process is epistemically independent
of the client. Epistemic independence is linked to the possession of a knowledge base, which
is independent from the client. With epistemic independence being compromised, the
independence of the individual auditor, as well as the profession, are compromised in turn.
The social and political requirements for accountability and control demand that auditing
firms redefine the nature of audit and have a fresh look at concepts of independence, in
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particular the notion of operational independence, in a way that legitimises this change
towards the public trust in audit independent judgement.
In this study, operational independence, derivative of Power's (1997) concept, relates to the
auditor's capacity to determine the scope of the audit process, and the freedom to understand
and interpret the 'economic text' of the client's financial statements. Hence, the operational
sense of independence relates to the interrelation between the nature of the audit process
itself and the auditor's personal traits. First, the auditor must have programming
independence, i.e. the freedom to decide the character and the scope of the audit procedures
and techniques. Secondly, the auditor must have investigative independence, i.e. access to
legitimate sources of information regarding the organisational areas and managerial polices
to be examined on the audit engagement. Finally, the auditor must have reporting
independence, being the freedom from outside control or influence in the expression and
recommendations with regard to the audit opinion (Power, 1997, p. 133). Hence, the means
of producing the audit and the end-product of the audit process (an audit opinion) depend on
the auditor's judgmental and mediating capacities.
In the early stages of audit independence research, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) discussed two
aspects of organisational independence, namely the individual auditor independence - in fact,
and the apparent independence of the auditors as a professional group. However, they did not
discuss independence of the audit process. Further, legitimacy of the profession depends
upon its perceived independence. Professional standards appear to be bound up in the
profession's private interest whilst being couched in terms of societal interests (Willmott,
1993).
In other words, the profession creates narratives of legitimacy from the values of the
surrounding society2. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) referred to independence of the profession;
the necessity to create and maintain the general public's trust in the independence and
integrity of the auditing profession (Parker et al., 1989). Hence, the research tradition
emphasises the necessity to create and maintain the trust of the general public in the
independence and integrity of the profession.
2 For example, in the US, the 1917 code of ethics of the auditing profession embedded themes from
Protestantism, Victorian idealism, and pragmatism. The 1988 code reflected the values of
contemporary culture, such as the primacy of the individual, and the reliance on calculative rationality
(Preston et ah, 1995).
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In practice, audit firms directly influence programming, investigative and reporting
judgements in structuring the audit processes; that is, propagate a standard format in the
audit. Structure in the form of procedures and methodologies restricts the options of the
auditor concerning the conduct and reporting of the audit, thereby reducing his/her
independence (Cushing and Loebbecke, 1986). In other words, a lack of operational
independence implies in practice that structured audits are conducted, regardless of whether
or not it is appropriate.
Much on-going debate relates to the concepts of apparent independence and addresses the
nature of the auditor-client relationship. The professional standards require the auditor to
have reasonable knowledge of the client's business; hence these auditor-client relationships
seem to be implicitly fostered by practice. Setting a close professional relationship may
facilitate impairment of independence. Hence, audit independence can be threatened by the
nature of this relationship when the knowledge base is biased towards the client (Lee, 1988).
The client exerts certain power over the auditor and this can be reflected in the budget
pressures faced by auditors (Windsor and Ashkanasy, 1995; Bartlett, 1993; Lee, 1988),
tender threats (Moizer, 1995), and competitive pricing of audit services (Kilcommins, 1997;
ICAEW, 1995). Knapp (1985) argued that the ways in which the ability of the auditor to
resist management pressure is perceived relates to the perceived independence of the auditor.
The factors associated with the impairment of audit independence with its detrimental effects
on audit quality include: the highly competitive audit market, the provision of NAS to the
audit clients3, long audit tenures, and a lack of an audit committee (Beattie et al., 1997).
Company legislation too recognised the difficulty of maintaining the appearance of
independence in situations in which the auditor is verifying the representations of a
management who have the power to appoint the auditor. Such legislation requires that the
auditor is appointed by the shareholders. Although, it is the shareholders' responsibility to
appoint and remunerate the company's auditor, in practice it is unlikely that they will
disapprove of the recommendations of the directors (Gwilliam, 1987).
Regarding auditor appointments in the UK, the majority of shareholders are institutional ones
who are principally interested in achieving portfolio returns. The auditor, therefore, is
effectively paid by the directors of the company and, hence, this fosters an economic
3
Clearly, the provision of NAS increases the economic bond between the auditor and the client,
however joint provision may be beneficial due to knowledge spillovers. There is no direct evidence
that NAS provision by the auditor impairs audit independence, this does not however preclude an
impact upon perceived independence due to decline in the monitoring value of the audit.
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incentive for the auditor not to offend the client while verifying management representations.
Furthermore, the auditor may have some incentives not to report truthfully.
The majority of the previous studies on auditor independence examined perceived audit
independence and these were mostly US based. The development of auditor independence in
the US in comparison with the UK has differed. In the US the professional bodies were
slower than regulatory agencies to adopt the more stringent independence rules in a
comparison with the UK (Kilcommins, 1997). Hence, it is not certain whether the results
from the non-UK studies can be directly applied to the British context. Further, the effects of
audit market competition and especially the provision ofNAS on auditor independence have
not been investigated extensively in the UK (Mitchell et al., 1993; Sikka and Willmott, 1993;
Gwilliam, 1988; Boys, 1986). Based upon British law cases, Gwilliam (1988) identified the
instances when auditor independence was impaired having adverse effects on quality of
audit. Factors which contributed to these compromises included: the auditor having financial
interest in, or personal links with the clients, and the over-reliance on dominant directors for
audit evidence. The instances when the auditor was insufficiently critical in their acceptance
of representations from dominant client's management were analysed in past Department of
Trade and Industry Inspectors' reports (Boys, 1986). Sikka and Willmott (1993) and Mitchell
et al. (1993), based on the reviews of these DTI Inspectors' reports, identified instances
where auditor independence has been compromised by the provision of NAS to the audit
clients4.
Much prior research on auditor independence was focused on the profession's assertion of
independence. Shaub et. al. (1993) argued this is because the auditing profession tends to rely
on the structure of authoritative codes of ethical conduct and professional standards as
constituting the professional knowledge base. Further, the codification of professional ethics
and bureaucratisation of professional knowledge facilitate the processes of professional self-
control (Parker, 1994) and self-regulation (Willmott, 1993).
4 Davidson and Emby (1996), and Kilcommins (1997) summarised studies which looked at the
perceptions of both financial statements users and auditors themselves with regard to issue of the audit
firm offering NAS services to their clients. These studies provide contradictory results as to the
impairment of independence by the joint provisions of audit and NAS.
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'We live in the world where whenever something goes wrong, politicians believe it can be
sorted by another dose of legislation and regulation. Lengths of the rulebooks and the length
of the acts of Parliament suggest that nobody can follow all laid down rules; it would be
impossible to keep them in the head. Nowadays there are many rulebooks and checklists and
the auditor looks to the completion of that checklist as the completion of the audit'
(Percy, 1999, p. 7).
Jeppesen (1998) examined the ways in which the Big Five audit firms have in the recent
years redesigned their audit product as a result of the competition. The audit has become a
client-driven; 'adding value' commodity, where the apparent independence premise that the
auditor should not make managerial decisions is threatened. However, it could be argued that
there is a threat that the auditor may become predominantly commercially-oriented,
concerned with selling NAS to clients.
In this study, the emphasis is put on the nature of the audit process as a factor which
influences the auditor's operational independence. The argument is that standardisation of
operational audit approaches may inhibit the ability of the auditor to make appropriate
judgements. Essentially, if the auditor becomes process driven, the quality of audit, in respect
of fraud recognition may fall. That is, the capacity of the auditor to be vigilant to potential
fraud may be undermined by process-orientation.
The preoccupation with apparent independence precludes academic debate related to
operational independence and runs the risk of prejudicing the ability of the profession to
discover fraud. Until recently, little research has focused specifically on operational
independence as related to affective aspects of independent judgement and the audit process
itself.
2.3 The impact of competition on the audit services market
The relaxation of ethical guidelines concerning advertising and solicitation has led to
additional competitive pressures on the British audit market, that is indicated by an increased
instability of the auditor-client relationship. There is a constant pressure applied upon the
audit firms to acquire new, and maintain existing clients (Beattie et al., 1997). As the
traditional audit service is not a growth industry, its low profitability produces concomitant
pressure on the audit firms to provide value to their clients in other ways which include
consulting, management advisory services and contracting to perform corporate functions
(e.g. internal audit) (Reiter, 1997). Subject to the competition in the British audit market,
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economic pressures are attributed to the tendering bids, the aggressive fee negotiations, the
practices of opinion shopping and of low-balling. Similarly, in North America the profession
attributed audit market competition to intensive pricing practices, and time and budget
pressures (Cohen Commission in US, 1978; Adams Committee in Canada, 1978). Windsor
and Ashkanasy (1995) claimed that the situational factors which exert pressure on the
auditor, and accordingly influence his/her behaviour being reflected in the quality of audit
performed, include the following dimensions of client's management powers: the client's
financial condition, the level of the audit fees and the tendering processes. Among the factors
identified in the literature which might threaten auditor independence and have a deleterious
effect upon the quality of audit performed, the provision ofNAS to the audit clients has been
the subject of the most extensive debate (Beattie et al., 1997). In some circumstances
management may use the NAS income as a lever to obtain a more compliant auditor
particularly in instances when NAS are perceived as profitable contracts for the audit firm
(Kilocommins, 1997). The impact of the provision for NAS on auditor independence and
his/her individual judgement is discussed further in a following section of this chapter.
The following dimensions of client's management power having an impact on auditor
behaviour have been identified in the literature: (1) the client's financial condition, (2) size of
the audit fees, (3) the practices of low-balling and whether or not the client calls for tenders
for the audit work, (4) auditor's switching, and (5) the client's opinion shopping.
(1) Client financial condition
The auditor dealing with the client in a poor financial position is likely to face a higher level
of legal liability than when the client is in a good financial condition (Palmrose, 1987). It
follows that the auditor would be more likely to exercise a greater amount of caution in
instances when he/she deals with the client in a poorer financial state. Anderson and Zeghal
(1994) stated that the financial condition of the client is reflected in the charges of the audit
fees since it is the auditor who bears the risk of legal liability to third parties for any losses
attributable to misrepresentations in the audited financial statements. The auditor deals with
the risk of litigation either through an increase of time spent on the audit to ensure that no
material misstatements exist or through the charges of a premium to compensate the risk
associated with the audit. In either instance higher audit fees would be charged. Further, a
poorly performing client might be in a need ofmanagement consulting service. In that sense,
the auditor may deal with pressures associated with the provision of NAS, i.e. pressures to
recover audit losses through NAS.
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(2) Size of the audit fees
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) perceived the problem of the auditor's dependence on the client's
fees as an economic factor that could affect auditor independence. They argued that the
client's management has an inherent bargaining advantage over the auditor because the
auditor depends upon these fees for their livelihood. Beattie and Fearnley (1995) explored
factors which motivate the management of the UK listed companies to change the auditor.
They found that the level of audit fees were the main reasons cited by the client's
management for auditor change. They further found that of those companies that considered
a change in the auditor, 73% did not actually do so due to audit fee reduction. Thus, the level
of the audit fees is likely to be perceived as both a key precipitation of the auditor change and
a key factor in retaining the auditor. Knapp (1985) and Gul (1991) argued that the auditor is
more responsive to client's management power in instances when the client provides a
significant portion of the audit firm's income.
The size of audit fees is closely related to time budget pressure, since audits are controlled by
means of time budgets for different phases of the work. The audit fees are a function of time
spent on the audit where time budgets are set as targets for the auditor. Close to reporting
deadlines the auditor may reduce time assigned for tasks by taking unapproved short cuts, for
example by rejecting the problematic items from the samples, by testing fewer items than
reported or simply by ignoring errors. Otley (1996) argued that the auditor's reaction to a
shortfall in the time budget has an important implication on the quality of audit being
performed through the cost-quality dilemma. While the level of cost is related to the number
of hours being assigned for audit, the client's management, being concerned with short term
profitability, is likely to insist on a decrease of costs. The quality of audit, however, is a long-
term issue.
(3) Low-balling and tendering
Since excessive competition in the audit market affects the pricing of audit services, it has
been argued that it may encourage practices of low-balling and tendering. The practice of
setting the audit fees below the costs on the initial audit engagement, known in the literature
as low-balling, is cited as a factor being likely to impair audit independence. DeAngelo
(1981) argued that low-balling itself does not constitute a threat to auditor independence,
since the initial fee reductions are sunk costs and they have no effect on either the magnitude
of future rents or on audit independence. Thus, they seem to be irrelevant for future decision
making. She further argued that the practice of low-balling lessens the competition in the
audit market for expected future rents. Simon and Francis (1988) suggested that contrary to
the prediction from economic theory, the sunk costs do significantly affect subsequent
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decision making. They argued that since a considerable investment is made to obtain the new
client, this could motivate the audit firm not to lose the client, even in the presence of serious
disagreement between the client's management and the auditor. Consistent with Kunitake
and White (1986) who argued that over a period of investment recovery, i.e. the recoupment
of the audit fees, an initiative to please the client may motivate the auditor to go beyond
ethical boundaries of practice. Simon and Francis (1988) and Trupen (1990) found evidence
of price cutting on initial audit engagements that persists through the first three years of the
audit engagement. Simon and Francis estimated that the discount to be 24% in the initial year
and 15% in the next two years. Yardley et al. (1992) argued that empirical evidence of
persisting low-balling indicates that price competition may be the dominant feature of audit
market behaviour.
The problem of the low-balling practice has recently increased in importance in the UK since
a great number of companies seek to contain audit costs by putting the provision of audit
services out to tender. An ostensible aim of the tendering process is a reduction of the audit
fees. Such reasoning may be as well a way of making the removal of the auditor more
acceptable to the public. Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995) argued that, in instances where the
client firm invites the prospective auditors to tender for audit at the competitive costs, there is
a risk that the auditor may experience a difficulty in remaining independent. This is because
the client's management can threaten to replace the auditor. In other words, client
management can use the tendering process to place more of an economic pressure on the
auditor's behaviour, and accordingly to impair auditor independence.
(4) Auditor switching
The ability of the auditor to resist management pressure has also been associated with severe
competition of audit services. Sterling (1973) noted that in conflict situations the audit firm
lacks the power to convince the client to accept the auditor's viewpoints. According to
Sterling (1973), both a resistance from the client and the auditor's lack of power threaten the
independence of the auditor. Shockley (1982) and Mitchell et al. (1993) argued that high
competition leads to auditor's switching (the existing audit firm is replaced by a new firm,
more compliant with the client's wishes). The effects of audit market competition on
perceptions concerning the auditor's ability to resist client's management pressure was
undertaken by Gul (1991). In his experiment where the level of the market competition was
manipulated, he found that, in instances when the competition has been set as high the
auditor was perceived as being more likely to resolve the conflict in favour of the client,
compared with the instances with low levels of competition. Gul (1991) concluded that this
result may have been caused by beliefs that the client may be tempted to replace the existing
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auditor with a more complaint auditor. In the context of the audit firm being concerned with
the threat of a replacement, the auditor seems to be less willing to resist management
pressure and more likely to compromise his/her behaviour. Contrasting results were provided
by Kirshnan (1994) who found that the auditor, realising a possibility of being replaced, is
likely to treat the client-switchers more conservatively in issuing the audit opinion. Chow and
Rice (1982), Mangold (1988), Kirshnan and Stephens (1996) found a positive association
between the issuing of a qualified opinion and a tendency to 'switching' practices. The client
receiving a qualified opinion was more likely to switch to another audit firm. Kirshan and
Stephens (1996) further claimed that the auditor, having realised the threat of being replaced,
was more likely to issue a qualified opinion to client-switchers. Chow and Rice (1982) found
a significant association between a receipt of a qualified opinion and a tendency to switch to
another audit firm within a year. Mangold (1988) found that companies switching auditors
had received significantly more qualified opinions in the two years prior to and in the second
year following a switch than companies that did not switch. Having established an
association between switching practices and a receipt of a qualified opinion, Chow and Rice
(1982) investigated whether client-switchers seemed to choose the audit firm which gives
fewer qualified opinions and whether clients who switch after receiving a qualified opinion
tend not to receive a qualified opinion from the subsequent firm. They however found little
evidence in support of either proposition.
Levinthal and Fichman (1988) examined the effect of the duration of an auditor-client
relationship on the client's propensity to switch the firm. They found that the rate of
switching was relatively low, but increasing, during the first three years of the auditor-client
relationship and highest during the fourth year, and declined thereafter. Similarly to findings
by Chow and Rice (1982), Mangold (1988) and Kirshnan and Stephens (1996), Levinthal and
Fichman (1988) also reported on the positive association between the clients receiving a
qualified opinion and a tendency to 'switching' practices.
(5) Opinion shopping
Another feature of the competitive audit environment is the practice of opinion shopping.
This practice, more common in the US, refers to the search for an auditor who seems to be
willing to support a proposed accounting treatment designed to help the client to achieve its
reporting objectives, even in instances, when that treatment might frustrate reliable reporting
(SEC, 1988). For example, the client's management may contact various audit firms asking
their opinions on a particular aspect of its company financial statements. Moizer (1991)
argued the effect of such practice is to weaken the position and the prestige of the existing
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auditor, once the client's management can say that another audit firm would act differently in
a particular case.
The nature of the highly competitive audit market results in intensive pricing practices, in
time and budget pressures, and accordingly has an impact on the quality of audit work.
Previous studies have investigated the effect of time and budget pressures on the impairment
of audit independence. Pearson (1980a) and Ryans and Pearson (1982) found that the
auditors are aware of the existence of a price competition in the auditing profession which
exposes time pressure on audits. They further argued that if, as a result of the strong pressure
being effectively exerted, the auditor places significant emphasis on the subjective
representations of the client's management; that is likely to result in an independence
conflict. In particular, the audit partners considered the price competition to be excessive.
This is consistent with the findings of the Cohen Commission (1978), Adams Committee
(1978) and Pearson (1980b) arguing that a highly competitive market for audit services
places time and budget pressure on the auditor to the extent that the auditor is being tempted
to omit the audit procedures to be performed and he/she may subjectively rely on the client's
management representations without alternative evidence. Otley (1996) argued that such
practice results in a lower quality of audit. When the budget seems unattainable the auditor
has an inclination to perform the audit at a lower standard which is reflected in premature
signing off, in the failure to follow accounting principles and accordingly, in the acceptance
of 'weak' explanations from the client's management. Further, Willett and Page (1996)
argued that time budget pressure might produce irregular short cuts in the audit procedures,
for example by the auditor's rejection of problematic samples or by reduction of time spent
on testing the transactions and balances. These findings suggest that an incidence of irregular
auditing reflected in the audit procedures' short cuts is associated with time budget pressures
and a particular audit firm culture, a culture which implicitly accepts the irregular short cuts
in the audit procedures. Kilcommins (1997) examined auditors' perceptions of auditor
independence in the UK and found, on the contrary, that the majority of respondents did not
perceive the competitive audit market as having an adverse impact on the audit quality. The
auditors highlighted the level of importance the audit firms attach to their reputation as a
factor ensuring that audit standards would not be compromised as a result of competition.
Some auditors argued that the provision of NAS encourages auditors not to reduce a high
standard of audit since a poor quality audit could result in the loss of both the audit
engagement and contracts for NAS.
In summary, the results from prior studies with regard to the effects of audit market
competition provide conflicting results on whether or not such competition leads to the
24
impairment of audit independence, and whether such competition affects the quality of audit
performed. Further, a consensus as to the impact of time and budget pressures on the quality
of audit has not been reached.
2.4 The provision of non-audit services
The scale and extent of management services or non-audit services (NAS) has increased
substantially over the last decade to the point where now they form the substantial proportion
of the Big Five revenues. In 1993-94 the proportion of total fee income of the Big Five audit
firms from services other than audit ranged between 55% and 81% (Accountancy, July 1994,
pp. 15). Commercial pressures push the audit firms to expand to new areas, since survival on
the market means finding new value-added products to sell to their clients. Barkess and
Simnett (1994) examined the pricing issues associated with the provision of non-audit
services and argued that an increasing number of the audit clients are purchasing other
services from their audit firm, including consulting, managerial advise, and corporate
functions.
Among the factors identified in the literature which might threaten the auditor's independent
judgement, the provision ofNAS to the audit client has been the subject of extensive debate.
The literature, however, is divided as to whether or not the provision of NAS does impair
auditor independence and whether it influences independent audit judgement. In particular,
the question surrounding the audit firms providing NAS to their audit clients focuses on the
ability of the audit firm to objectively evaluate the client's financial statements while the firm
simultaneously provides management services to this client (Ezzamel et al., 1996). Mautz
and Sharaf (1961) and Shockley (1982) argued that in cases when the auditor tries to fulfil
both roles, audit and consulting, independence may become impaired as the result of the
consultant becoming effectively a decision maker, an employee of the client or a client's
advocate. On the contrary, Carey and Doherty (1966) argued that if the auditor does not
participate in any final decisions of the client's decision making process and if he/she
confines management services to advice, auditor independence is not affected.
'There is no objection to a firm providing advisory services to a company which is additional
to the audit, but care must be taken to ensure not to perform management functions or to make
management decisions. It is economic in terms of skill and effort for the [auditor] to be able to
provide other services to their clients since they have already good knowledge of their
business. Many companies ...would be adversely affected if they were denied the right to
obtain other services from their audit firms' (CAJEC, 1995).
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'The auditor must ensure that his/her firm is not involved in the decision making process of
client's management' (European Commission, 1996).
A number of studies have investigated the impact of the provision ofNAS on the perception
of audit independence. In instances when audit independence is in danger of being impaired,
it may have an impact on the auditor's scepticism and his/her objectivity and accordingly,
individual judgement with regard to the need for detailed checking of controls and
transactions may be moderated by such awareness. Some of the previous studies indicated
the provision of NAS causing an impairment of auditor independence (Beattie et al., 1997).
In the early stages of independence research, Briloff (1966) asked the members of the
accounting profession to express their views on the provision of specific management
services by the auditor as to whether or not their performance would adversely affect auditor
independence (not specifying whether NAS was performed by personnel separate to those
performing the audit, or the same personnel). He found that a majority of respondents
perceived a duality of the auditor's function as being incompatible with the auditor's tradition
and his/her independence; some respondents claimed that such a duality should be restricted
and discouraged5. Similarly, Shockley (1981) studied perceptions with respect to auditor
independence and found that audit firms which provided NAS to audit clients were
considered to lose independence at a higher rate than those which did not. Shockley (1981)
limited the definition of NAS to the design and installation of accounting systems. Pany and
Reckers (1987) examined whether the audit performance of NAS affected loan officers' and
financial analysts' perceptions of auditor independence. In their study NAS was defined as
the design of internal controls and services for the purpose of improving the existing controls
conducted by audit firm, but not those involved in audits (a clear distinction between
personnel providing NAS and those involved in the audit was made). They used between and
within subject designs. In the within-subject design, the subjects were asked to indicate their
beliefs that the audit firm was independent when various levels ofNAS were performed, not
providing any financial or other information about the client or about the audit firm. In the
between-subject design, the subjects were required to review a loan application or equity
investment form and to evaluate the audit firm's independence under one of four levels of
NAS performance (i.e. no NAS, NAS income set at 25%, 60%, 90% of audit fees).
5 The results of this study should be interpreted with caution since Briloff (1966) did not indicate how
many questionnaires were initially distributed and therefore, it is difficult to calculate the response rate
for that study.
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The results of the study indicated that in the within-subject design, subjects perceived that
NAS performance impaired auditor independence. However, in the between-subject design,
the mean responses as to perceived independence did not differ regardless of whether or not
NAS had been performed6. More recent studies also indicated that provision of NAS impairs
auditor independence. Mitchell et al. (1993) argued that the provision ofNAS leads to unfair
competition because it abuses the monopoly of the audit function. They recommended that
the auditor should exclusively provide audit services and be prohibited from providing NAS
to its audit clients.
Finally, two studies which investigated the provision of NAS, examined the impact of non-
audit services on the auditor's ability to resist management pressures in conflict situations.
The first study was that undertaken by Knapp (1985). He tested whether bankers perceived
management to be more likely to obtain its preferred resolution of the conflict situation when
the audit firm provided a significant amount of NAS (the level of 40% of the audit fees), as
opposed to the audit firm providing no NAS. NAS was defined as a management consulting
project on the client's cost accounting system. The results of the study showed that the
provision of NAS at the level of at least 40 % of the audit fees by the audit firm slightly
increased the likelihood of a conflict being resolved in favour of the client, meaning the
auditor's judgement was at risk of being compromised. The second study was that
undertaken by Gul (1991) who evaluated the impact of NAS on bankers' perceptions of the
auditor's ability to resist management pressure in the conflict situation (NAS was defined as
the design and installation of a new financial and cost accounting system). Gul (1991) found
stronger evidence that the auditor from the audit firm providing NAS were perceived to be
more likely to resolve a conflict situation in favour of the client than auditors not providing
such services. Gul (1991) argued that it is so due to the concern that the auditor from the
audit firm may, in effect, become an employee of the client, or be placed in the position of
auditing his/her own decisions. Gul (1991) further suggested that the subjects of his study
believed that the audit client may attempt to replace the existing audit firm with a more
compliant auditor, and therefore the auditor who is concerned about being replaced is seen as
less likely to resist management pressure.
6 The results were questioned due to the suspicion of demand effects occurrence of which might negate
some of the conclusions that certain variables have a significant impact on auditor behaviour. Pany and
Reckers (1987) explained the notion of demand effects by the subjects awareness that they were
involved in the experiment; in the 'real construct' situation they might have replied differently.
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While the results of studies described above indicate an impairment of auditor independence
in cases when the audit firm provides NAS to its audit clients, other studies show no such
impairment. McKinley et al. (1985) examined bank officers' perceptions with regard to audit
independence, provision of NAS and the reliability of financial statements. They found that
respondents had more confidence that audited financial statements were free from material
misstatements where the same audit firm also provided NAS. The respondents believed that
NAS performance led to tighter controls. In effect, the provision ofNAS did not significantly
affect respondents' perceptions regarding impairment of audit independence. Similar results
were provided by Pany and Reckers (1988) who investigated the effects ofNAS provision on
perceptions of the financial statements' reliability. They concluded that the auditor's
performance of NAS exerts little, if any effect on the perceptions of the financial statements'
reliability or on auditor independence. Lindsay et al. (1987) examined auditor-client
relationships, and some of them dealt with the provision of NAS. They found, similarly to
McKinley et al. (1985) and to Pany and Reckers (1988), that the independence of the auditor
was not impaired when the audit firm was involved in NAS to the audit clients. However,
they further identified that when the performance ofNAS generated fee income between 25-
30% of the total fees, the users of financial statements considered that the auditor-client
relationship might impair audit independence.
A few studies have indicated the provision ofNAS as enhancing auditor independence. In the
study undertaken by Gul (1989) where bankers' perceptions of audit independence were
examined, the findings indicated a positive relationship between the perceptions of auditor
independence and the provision of NAS. The bankers had more confidence in the audit firm
providing NAS to the client (the provision ofNAS was defined as a design and installation of
cost accounting systems; budget and inventory control systems were provided by a separate
department within the audit firm). Similarly, the results of Goldman and Barlev's (1974)
study indicated that the provision of NAS enhances auditor independence. They examined
client-auditor conflict and argued that conflict was likely to arise due to the client's
management pressure to present favourable results of the firm's performance to third parties.
Goldman and Barlev (1974) asserted that, due to the fact that most of the consulting type
services are not routine, the provision ofNAS increases the audit firm's 'bargaining power',
and therefore the auditor is better equipped to resist management pressure in the performance
of audit duties, and he/she is more likely to retain independence.
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Further, it has been argued that the provision of NAS by audit firms can be beneficial,
because it might increase the auditor's knowledge about the client and thus allow him/her to
perform a better audit.
'The provision of some NAS by the auditor will often assist the auditor to perform the
task effectively, by adding to his/her knowledge of relevant aspects of the business
affairs and given that objective of the independence requirements is to support the quality
of audit services provided.. .a ban on the provision of other services could, therefore,
be counter-productive' (ICAEW, 1995).
This positive effect of the provision of NAS to audit clients is known in the literature as
knowledge spillovers. The phenomenon of knowledge spillovers is often quoted in the
literature as a defence of the provision ofNAS by the audit firm since it voluntarily enhances
the audit firm's knowledge concerning the client's business and its management. If
knowledge gained on the audit can also be used for advising client's management, the
resulting knowledge spillovers increase the value of the audit and the audit fee.
Antle and Demski (1991) examined conditions affecting joint performance of NAS and the
audit services. The knowledge spillover was information regarding the cost of performing
audit and NAS for a particular client. Such information may have given rise to economies of
scope. Support for the knowledge spillovers' assertion is provided by prior empirical
research. Simunic (1984) and Beck et al. (1988a; 1988b) argued that knowledge acquired
while providing NAS may 'spill over' to the audit and thus may generate productive
efficiencies. In the study undertaken by Pearson (1980a), the audit firms' partners argued that
NAS had a positive impact on the effectiveness of audit performance because the knowledge
obtained from NAS aided the auditor in a better understanding of the clients' businesses, in
making judgements concerning internal control systems, and in determining whether the
financial statements were fairly presented. The findings by Kilcommins (1997) also indicated
the beneficial effects of knowledge spillovers. The respondents of her study believed that by
providing NAS to the audit clients, the audit firm's experience and knowledge results in the
provision of better advice and that ensures a higher standard being applied to the audit; thus
ensuring a more appropriate audit opinion. Beck et al. (1988a, 1988b) claimed that part of the
demand for certain NAS is attributable to knowledge spillovers and to the auditor-provided
economic incentives, such as the fee discounts, that represent cost savings from knowledge
spillovers in joint engagements. The authors provided evidence of a positive association
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between the length of the auditor's tenure and the effect of knowledge spillovers. They
suggested that in a competitive market the audit firm uses a 'limit' pricing strategy and offers
a fee discount so it seems unlikely that the client obtains NAS from competitors. Beck et al.
(1988a, 1988b) made a distinction between recurring and non-recurring NAS; the auditor-
client bonding between the audit firm and the client is associated with the recurring type of
NAS. In other words, the auditor-client bonding goes beyond an individual audit
engagement. They further claimed that such a bonding is perceived as an impairment of audit
independence and that it could motivate the client to avoid the provision of NAS. However,
the potential cost savings from knowledge spillovers are likely to mitigate the level of
bonding in a competitive market since the audit firm has an incentive to pass on some of the
savings to the client; the auditor offers a fee discount which represents a portion of the cost
savings from anticipated knowledge spillovers in a joint engagement. Because the audit firm
offers a discount, the client's decision involves a trade off between the reduction in fees and
the agency costs associated with outside investment concentration, leverage etc. That trade
off results from a perceived reduction in the quality of the independent audit. On the other
hand, non-recurring NAS generally are single engagements. Beck et al. (1988a, 1988b)
predicted that a bonding effect of non-recurring NAS is likely to be minimal or non existent
since future knowledge spillovers can be heavily discounted by a future period's uncertainty.
In these cases, a fee negotiation occurs as needed, separately from the continuing, jointly
negotiated contracts. Similarly, Parkash and Venable (1993) examined the impact ofNAS on
the level of economic bonding between the audit firm and the client and accordingly on
perceived impairment to auditor independence. The results of their study suggest that the
client recognises the potential for impairment of audit independence while NAS is provided
on a perpetual (recurring) basis and therefore the client voluntarily seems to manage the
amount of recurring NAS that are purchased from the audit firm. The results also support the
implications of knowledge spillovers from joint engagements noted by Beck et al. (1988a,
1988b).
Simunic (1984) found the interdependencies between audit and non-audit services and
interpreted these interdependencies as evidence
'[Consistent with the hypothesis that the cost functions for NAS and audit are significantly
interdependent. Specifically (...) the observed relationship would arise if the production of
NAS reduced the marginal cost of auditing and audit demand was relatively elastic' (Simunic,
1984).
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This interpretation suggests that audit firms can provide audit and/or NAS more efficiently,
applying less effort for non-audit and/or audit purchasers, and thereby, the audit firms can
earn economic rents.
Simunic (1984) argued that in practice the theory of beneficial knowledge spillovers remains
problematic, since knowledge spillovers vary according to the nature of NAS being
undertaken. The work on systems of control, for instance, may result in the improved
systems and the possible audit costs savings, but on the other hand, work on an acquisition is
only likely to have a spillover effect if the acquisition proceeds. Therefore, it is important to
specify the precise definition ofNAS since the prior research is characterised by a divergence
of opinions as to what exactly the provision ofNAS does incorporate. Similar results to the
effects of beneficial knowledge spillovers to those attained by Parkash and Venable (1993),
Beck et al. (1988a, 1988b) and Simunic (1984) were also obtained by Barkess and Simnett
(1994) who investigated the pricing issues of knowledge spillovers, and argued that the
potential cost advantages to the client are likely to occur when the total costs of the audit firm
jointly performing both NAS and the audit services are less than the sum of the costs when
each service is performed by a different firm. These findings are supported by Ezzamel et al.
(1996) who argued that the overlap in the supply ofNAS and audit services by the same audit
firm should ensure economies of scale and thus should affect the fee levels of joint service.
Palmrose (1986) however, found a positive relationship between audit fees and NAS fees
paid both to incumbent and non-incumbent audit firms (i.e. a firm other than the one
performing the audit). Her findings for non-incumbent firms weaken the argument for
knowledge spillovers. Since it seems unlikely that knowledge obtained by a non-incumbent
audit firm from NAS would spill over to the incumbent audit firm providing the audit, she
speculated that higher audit fees paid by the client who also purchases NAS might be driven
by additional audit effort, since, for instance, NAS may have audit implications. Consistent
with the findings by Davis et al. (1993), who suggested that although purchasers ofNAS pay
higher audit fees then non-purchasers, the higher fees are associated with a proportional
increase in the audit effort, measured in their study as the number of audit hours.
Abdelkhalik (1990) reported that he was unable to detect interdependencies between audit
and non-audit fees. These results seem to directly contrast the findings by Simunic (1984)
and by Palmrose(1986). Abdelkhalik (1990) characterised the positive relation between audit
and non-audit fees as counterintuitive, noting that
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'[I]t is difficult to think of economic incentives that could exist a priori for clients to pay more
for the joint acquisition of two products than for the sum of acquiring them separately'
(Abdelkhalik, 1990).
In short, many of the previous studies focusing on the joint provisions of audit and NAS
(Kilcommins, 1997; Trupen, 1990; Palmrose, 1986; Simon, 1985; Simunic, 1984) have
reported a positive association between audit and non-audit fees, suggesting that the audit
fees paid by the client who also purchase non-audit services are significantly higher than
those paid by the non-purchasers. They suggested that the joint provision of audit and NAS
may give rise to knowledge spillovers that could lead to economic rents. Abdelkhalik (1990)
however reported that he was unable to detect interdependencies between audit and non-audit
fees. Further, Palmrose (1986) reported a positive relationship between audit fees and non-
audit fees paid to non-incumbent auditor, these findings weaken the argument for knowledge
spillovers. Thus, the empirical results as to the impact ofNAS on audit fees and whether it is
the audit firm or the client who benefits from knowledge spillovers are mixed.
A consensus as to the impairment of audit independence by the joint provision of audit and
NAS has not been reached in prior research. Thus, presumably, knowledge spillovers may
not be ofmuch benefit on audit. However, what is consistent is the finding that the risk of an
impairment of audit independence decreases when personnel providing NAS and audit
services come from separate divisions in the audit firm. Pany and Reckers (1984) surveyed
financial analysts and shareholders' perceptions with regard to audit independence in
circumstances when NAS had been performed either by a member of the audit or by a
separate division of the audit firm not involved in the audit. The results of that study indicate
that for various types of NAS, such as recruiting, actuarial services, acquisitions assistance
and redesign of accounting system, independence concerns decreased when NAS was
provided by a separate division of the audit firm, and in particular when the accounting-
oriented services were provided. These findings are similar to those obtained earlier by
Mautz and Sharaf (1961). Effectively, Hillison and Kennelley (1988) recommended the
'spinning off of NAS to a separate division of the audit firm to avoid impairment of audit
independence. A similar recommendation was made by CAJEC (1995).
'If the firm has designed or recommended any part of the system of control on which
the audit relies, it may be advisable to arrange for a little or no common membership
between the systems work and the audit team' (CAJEC, 1995).
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These findings are supported by a recent empirical study undertaken by Kilcommins (1997).
The majority of respondents to her questionnaire study perceived a reduction in auditor
independence when NAS were provided by audit personnel to the audit clients. The
respondents associated their lack of confidence in auditor independence with the audit firm's
dependency on such services due to the fee income. However, the threat to audit
independence was significantly less when NAS were provided by a separate department of
the audit firm to audit clients or to non-audit clients only. The respondents emphasised the
importance of such separation as a means of ensuring that audit independence was not
compromised, as well as that the reliability of financial statements was assured. In addition,
the results of prior studies on the provision ofNAS indicate that as the level ofNAS provided
decreases, the threat to auditor independence decreases too (Reckers and Stagliano, 1981).
This is consistent with the later results obtained by Pany and Reckers (1983) who found that
the number of cases that resulted in a total lack of confidence in auditor independence was
relatively high where the provision ofNAS exceeded 50% of the audit fees.
In short, prior empirical research concerning the provision of NAS has produced conflicting
evidence as to the effects of the provision of NAS on the perceptions of auditor
independence. Some studies indicated an impairment of audit independence (e.g. Mitchell et
ah, 1993; Gul, 1991). Some studies showed that the provisions ofNAS to audit clients had no
impact on audit independence (e.g. Pany and Reckers, 1988; Lindsay et al., 1987). Other
studies demonstrated an increase in auditor independence where NAS was provided due to
tighter controls (McKinley et al., 1985), increased 'bargaining power' of the audit firm
(Goldman and Barlev, 1974), and knowledge spillovers (e.g. Kilcommins, 1997; Barkess and
Simnett, 1994). What is consistent is the finding that the risk of an impairment of audit
independence decreases when personnel providing NAS and audit services come from
separate divisions in the audit firm.
2.5 The nature of material fraud and its significance for the auditing profession
Fraud in business is a growing phenomenon. Estimates suggest that on average companies
suffer from fraud losses of 3% of their total turnover. KPMG Barometer (1995) shows that
those charged with frauds over £100,000 between 1990-1995 fall into the following
categories: 40 % are management, 44 % are external fraudsters, 12 % are employees, and 4
% fall into other categories. Other surveys suggest that the level of employee frauds is much
higher, up to 60 % of the total fraud concealment, but smaller in value than management
fraud (Albrecht, 1996; Thompson, 1998). Ernst & Young's survey of 100 leading British
33
companies has shown that 54% reported fraud over a two year period and a further 33% had
experienced an unreported fraud (Ernst & Young, 1998).
Factors which have evoked changes in the business environment in the last decade in which
fraud is likely to be committed include: (1) the increased sophistication and the
internationalisation of commerce, (2) the consequences of the 'paperless office' where
transactions are only evidenced within the computer systems, and (3) changes in
management philosophy, in the business culture and in ethical standards. The
internationalisation of commerce includes more sophisticated derivatives being the subject of
trade through more complex financial services. Extensive use of computers introduced to
some extent an abandonment of document trails which facilitate the process of money
transfer, and thus makes it easier to move money quickly and/or without trace. Further, office
technology enables one to forge apparently convincing evidence. The changes in
management philosophy over the last decade have encouraged companies to downsize and to
empower their employees, which has led to an increased vulnerability of business to fraud,
and at the same time increased the incentives to individuals to act fraudulently. The principal
causalities of downsizing and empowering are middle management who are highly
experienced and possess the key competencies for financial control. Other consequences of
the changes to the business culture are: the increased workloads, less security of employment
and fewer opportunities for advancement in the new organisational structures have led to
lower levels of commitment among the employees. In such a changing environment, internal
controls tends to stay behind the business developments.
There is a general perception of a decline in ethical values and standards in business which
has contributed to a blurring between an acceptable and an unacceptable practice for both
management and employees. The decline in ethical values impacts on the auditor-client
relationship since the auditor, or at least the audit engagement partner, strongly depends on
the fees from the client. The balance between the auditor and the client's management seems
to be 'uneven' in such a competitive market. In cases when the auditor may have suspicions
about transactions, he/she seems to find it difficult to challenge management without
sufficient facts due to the fear of being replaced. The client's management may, thus, provide
facts which could have been fabricated over a long period of time and which put
management in a strong position to deceive the auditor and to commit fraud. Against this
background it seems to be increasingly important for the auditor to be alert to fraud within
the client's firm and to the ways his/her clients endorse, communicate and ensure the
compliance with ethical standards.
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Recent surveys have shown that over 50% of the public and approximately 60% of
companies' directors expect auditors to detect fraud. Estimations have suggested that
between 1989 and 1994 reported fraud cost British business £2.2 billion (KPMG, 1995). In
1992, The Big Five audit firms spent in excess of % of their audit revenues on audit related
litigation expenditures (KPMG, 1997). Highly publicised 'audit failures' have led to a re¬
examination of the auditor's role. The responsibility for fraud detection has been extended
among auditors world-wide7. As a result of notorious failures to detect fraud, litigation has
had a dramatic effect on the profession, especially on the perceived quality of the audit,
which seems to be rapidly decreasing. Increasing pressure to reduce fraudulent reporting has
recently resulted in new laws and standards (Percy, 1999).
In the UK, in 1995 the Auditing Practices Board issued the Statement of Accounting
Standards SAS No. 110 entitled Fraud and Error (hereafter SAS 110) which requires the
auditor to plan and conduct the audit so as to provide a reasonable expectation of detecting
material misstatements caused by both fraud and error. In either case, the auditor is required
to plan and perform his/her work with an attitude of professional scepticism. SAS 110 states
precisely
'[AJuditors should plan and perform their audit procedures and evaluate and report the results
thereof, recognising that fraud or error may materially affect the financial statements'
(SAS 110, para 1).
Early in the planning stage of an audit, the auditor looks for the circumstances or the
combinations of circumstances that make fraudulent reporting more likely (Finney et al.,
1994). When such situations are found to exist, the auditor should design the audit
programme to detect potential material misstatements. In other words, when the auditor
determines that material misstatements could occur, the audit plan should reflect an increased
level of professional scepticism. Under such conditions, the auditor is very likely to demand
more competent evidence and/or a greater amount of evidence. Further, SAS 110 states that
an audit cannot be expected to detect all errors or instances of fraudulent or dishonest
conduct. SAS 110 states clearly that it is for the court to determine whether or not fraud has
occurred in a particular instance. It seems to be very difficult for auditors, against this
background, to distinguish unintentional mistakes in financial statements from those which
7 In the US, Statements on Accounting Standards SAS No. 82: Consideration of Fraud in Financial
Statements, 1997 and SAS No. 53: The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and
Irregularities, 1988, AICPA. In Canada, CICA Members Handbook, Auditing Recommendation Section
5300, 1988, and Section 5315, 1991.
35
arise from the intention to mislead and from any unethical conduct. SAS 110 provides a
broad definition of fraud.
'Fraud comprises both the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal financial advantage
and intentional misrepresentations affecting the financial statements by one or more
individuals among management, employees, or third parties and it may involve:
- falsification or alteration of accounting records or other documents,
- misappropriation of assets or theft,
- suppression or omission of the effects of transactions from records or documents,
- recording of transactions without substance,
- intentional misapplications of transactions or of the entity's state of affairs' (SAS 110).
Since there is no legal definition of fraud, it may be defined as any behaviour by which one
person intends to gain a dishonest advantage over the others (Abdelkhalik and Salomon,
1983). Fraud, being a generic term, embraces a variety of dishonest actions ranging from a
concealment to a deception and a false accounting. Drawing upon SAS 110, Porter (1997)
defines fraud to mean one of the following
'(1) [T]he use of deception, such as manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting
records or other documents, in order to obtain an unjust or illegal financial advantage,
(2) intentional misstatement in, omission of amounts or disclosures from accounting records
or financial statements,
(3) intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts, classification,
manner of presentation or disclosure,
(4) misappropriation of asset or theft' (Porter, 1997).
SAS 110 also identifies certain conditions or events that are likely to increase the incidence
of fraudulent financial reporting.
'Conditions or events which increase the risk of fraud and error include:
- previous experience or incidents which call into question the integrity or competence of
management or other staff,
- particular financial or reporting pressures within the entity,
- weakness in the design and operation of the accounting and internal control systems,
- unusual transactions,
- problems in obtaining sufficient appropriate evidence,
- inadequate control over data in an information system environment' (SAS 110).
36
These factors, referred to as red flags, are likely to cause the auditor under the conditions of
increased inherent risk to exercise more cautious judgements (Reckers and Schultz, 1993).
Red flags consists of potential symptoms (conditions and events) existing within the
company's business environment that would indicate a higher risk of an intentional
misstatement of financial statements. Examples of these conditions and events are provided
in Appendix 1 of SAS 110.
It could be argued that SAS 110 acts as the guidance document, significant for the auditor
because it does not deny that the auditor has a duty to detect fraud. But this duty is qualified
by the concept of a 'reasonable expectation of detection'.
'The detection of management fraud is neither ruled out of the audit process, because this
would lower expectations and cause that audit might lose its value, nor clearly ruled in, since
it would burden the auditor and would make audits very expensive' (Power, 1997, p. 25).
Fraud often goes undetected partly because of an inability to specify what it means to have
'reasonable' expectation to detect potentially material misstatements.
The unique position ofmanagement in the company often tempts managers to be engaged in
fraudulent activity. Fraud committed by management is particularly difficult to detect,
because the client's management is in a strong position to conceal it. The auditors'
understanding of the motivations for committing fraud is an important factor in the
identification of fraud. It is important to distinguish that not all fraud has a financial
statement affect. The APB Working Party examined 28 most recent serious fraud cases
brought before the British courts in the period 1994 to 1997. In half of the examined cases
there was evidence to show that the fraud was likely to be material in the context of the
client's financial statements. In all of these cases there was evidence that the client's
management deliberately seemed to manipulate the company's financial results (APB,
1997b). In cases with non serious fraud examined by the APB working party, the lifestyle
factors and the theft of the company's or the client's liquid assets seemed to be more
important in the identification of fraud. In other circumstances, where evidence of an intent
to deceive was not a consequence of individual greed, a common feature ofmajor fraud was
the client's management manipulation of accounting records to conceal a disadvantageous
position at the end of the financial year. It is usually the management's expectation that any
false accounting can be undone once the underlying operating problems are overcome and
trading improves.
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Examples of techniques applied by management to conceal fraud include:
- introducing complexity into the internal control system, the group structure, and/or
transactions,
- engaging in collusive acts with employees or third parties,
- overriding internal controls,
- manipulating evidence available to the auditor,
- making untruthful representations to the auditor,
- changing the auditor sufficiently frequently, so that the auditor never gets to know the client
(i.e. the auditor switching),
- influencing accounting policies, accounting estimates, and financial statements
presentations,
- including unaudited entities in the group structure, so that the auditor is unable to follow
transactions and cash flows around the group,
- appointing different auditors to different parts of the group to impair the auditor's
understanding of the entity as a whole (APB, 1997a).
There are different theories which assist in an understanding of fraud: (1) differential of
opportunity theory, (2) theory of concealment, (3) theory of deviation, and (4) theory of
minimal and general collusion (Comer, 1998). The differential of opportunity theory suggests
that individuals have the opportunity to commit fraud against the employer, third party or
government. This opportunity is governed by three factors: the access to accounts/assets or
computer systems, skill to identify the opportunity, and time to commit the fraud. Theory of
concealment suggests that in order to conceal or assist a theft, the fraudster deliberately
introduces confusion. This confusion may divert attention from any shortage, disguise,
confuse or delay the discovery or prevent identification of the theft. The fraud flows an
incremental pattern, and is limited only to the fraudster's greed, and accidental or contrived
opportunities. Theory of deviation implies that fraud being a deviant behaviour, places the
fraudster under considerable strain to conceal his/her guilt which results in plausible
deviations from acceptable behaviour and underlying procedures. These changes of
behaviour are a first sign of fraud concealment. Theory of collusion suggests that collusion
occurs under two conditions: the provision of necessary opportunities, resources and skills to
commit fraud (minimum collusion), or share of the benefits of low skill frauds among
maximum number of individuals (institutionalised fraud or general collusion).
Due to liability issues, there is pressure on audit firms to find the ways to improve the
effectiveness and the quality of audit with a respect to fraud discovery. Audit firms have been
concerned with the developments of internal procedures for detecting fraud. There were early
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attempts made to develop red flags and risk analysis. (Bologna, 1993; Sorensen et al., 1982).
Further, audit firms frequently advertise and promote their forensic audit capabilities. It
appears therefore that the techniques and expertise to detect corporate fraud are available
within the audit firm, but rather than using them to satisfy the public's expectations of the
auditor establishing either absence or presence of fraud as part of financial audit, this
expertise is offered to management as an additional service, as the provision of NAS.
Currently the Big Five audit firms provide additional, chargeable special fraud audits, extra
to the normal statutory audits. While the financial audit is intended to uncover deviations and
variances from accounting standards, the fraud audit is looking behind and beyond the
transactions. Auditing for fraud, in comparison with financial audit, requires more of an
intuitive process than an analytical method.
'A particular process to look for the exceptions and oddities, the things that do not seem to
fit in an organised scheme of things because they seem too large, too small, too frequent, too
rare, too high, too low, too good to be true, too extraordinary, too many, too few; it involves
odd times, odd places, odd hours, odd people, and odd combinations' (Bologna, 1993).
Some techniques of forensic auditing include: (1) critical point auditing, (2) job sensitivity
analysis, (3) vulnerability charts, (4) invigilation and created checks, (5) observation, (6)
undercover investigations and informants, (7) business intelligence, (8) spot checking, and
(9) criminal targeting (Comer, 1998). Critical point auditing, through the examination of
accounts and records, can identify the symptoms of manipulations. The most common of
examination methods include analysis of trends8 and specific tests9. Job sensitivity analysis
identifies all job positions in the client's company with the objective of preparing report
showing approved access to accounts, inventories, computer systems via organisational
charts, job description, and authority schedules. This analysis highlights high-risk jobs with
regard to concealment of fraud. Vulnerability charts is a schedule of risks arranged in order
of probability, it involves identification of assets at risk, effectiveness of controls, possible
methods of fraud and possibilities for conversion. Invigilation and created checks are used to
detect or measure the impact of fraud and to establish genuine operating losses. Invigilation
can be carried out in any business, but is expensive and requires staff with a high level of
s
Historical, proportional and inter-company analysis concentrates on examining reasonabless of
entries in accounts and involve comparison in performance between branches and over time. Filters are
based on final accounts, trial balances and budgetary records. These tests are subjective (Comer, 1998).
9 These tests focus on high risk areas of fraud, such as purchases, disbursement cheques, sales,
marketing, incoming cheques, stock, asset, inventories, payroll, statistical records etc (Comer, 1998).
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expertise. Invigilation needs to concentrate on physical movement of goods or assets.
Observation involves monitoring physical behaviour and performance and comparisons with
records. Undercover investigations and informants are aimed to gain by covert means
information that can be used and proved in a conventional open investigation. Business
intelligence refers to all legal methods of obtaining information on competitors and
competitive intentions to ensure that supplies and sales are not prejudiced by dishonest
competitive practices. Spot-checking is a special management verification of particular
commercial circumstances or transactions (Comer, 1998). Thus, to 'see' potential fraud the
auditor needs to be capable of transcending the traditional structure of 'risk-based' auditing.
Bologna (1993) claimed that the fraud audit is more of an art than a science. The question
therefore arises to what extent the fraud detection function is currently provided through the
statutory audit? As Humphrey at al. (1993) noted, the auditor's obligations to fraud detection
are increasingly appearing to be framed by the audit firms as a service to the client's
management rather than a check on the client's management. They pointed out the need for a
legal clarification of auditing responsibilities with regard to fraud since currently the auditor
may not be sufficiently remunerated to either detect major frauds or to accept the
responsibilities with this regard under the existing framework of 'a reasonable expectation'
of detecting material misstatements resulting from fraud and error.
The time and costs involved in unravelling fraud and in interpreting the 'economic text' of all
transactions are enormous. Therefore, for the financial audit, the question is what level of
work can be performed before the costs outweigh the benefits derived from additional audit
hours prescribed in order to reveal fraud, and what is the cost-benefit optimum point in the
cost-benefit equation? All audits involve judgements about the extent of work to be carried
out. One of the important factors in those judgements are the audit fees. The fees affect the
number and the value of transactions and balances that can be tested. Accordingly, the
auditor cannot always be expected to find (immaterial) fraud where fraud is not of sufficient
size to attract the attention of sample tests.
While conducting an audit, the auditor must be aware of a right balance between the use of
analytical procedures and the control assessment. Analytical procedures can often mislead
the auditor and give a false assurance in cases when the client's management is engaged in
fraud, where the financial results are likely to be manipulated to bring them into line with
expectations or to cover up the losses in order to avoid more detailed scrutiny by the auditor
(APB, 1997b). Aside from the substantive verification of transactions and balances which
puts emphasis on gaining evidence directly from external sources, there is a need to focus an
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audit on the assessment of the client's control environment and on a review of the client's
anti-fraud policies. The auditor considers a controls reliance approach to consider the types
of anti-fraud controls being followed by the client and to assess their adequacy. It also allows
the auditor to draw attention to the risks of fraud and any weaknesses in mitigating existing
controls. There are certain dangers the auditor is exposed to in the control approach; one of
the main difficulties is that fraud is often prescribed to a breakdown in the systems, but in
fact systems only work as far as they envisage fraud. The first time fraud occurs, it is likely
to break through the system of controls if the fraud concerned was not contemplated when
the control systems were designed. Another important limitation of the systems of control in
relation to fraud arises from the ability of the client's management to override control
procedures. The auditor's reliance on controls is most likely to be misplaced in cases where
the client's management is dishonest and/or committed to fraud. Kinney and Felix (1993)
claimed that current practice in assessing the control environment consists of an
overemphasis on management's representations.
The main research effort with regard to fraud audit has been directed to the red flags
approach, to the identification of the circumstances in which fraudulent activity is more
likely to take place, and to the indicators themselves suggestive of such activity. Heiman-
Hoffman et al. (1996) examined the perceptions of practising auditors concerning the relative
importance of common fraud flags. In a survey, auditors were asked to rank thirty most
important warning signs concerning fraud. The auditors ranked client's management
dishonesty as the most important factor with respect to risk assessment concerning fraud.
They also viewed as particularly risky those clients who placed an emphasis on meeting the
quantitative targets and those who were engaged in the practices of opinion shopping.
Further, auditors perceived a weak control environment to be another very important sign
with respect to potential fraud. On the whole, auditors perceived the attitude factors to be
more important warnings signals of fraud than the situational factors. Thus, dishonest,
aggressive and unreasonable attitudes of the client's management were considered more
significant fraud signals than economic and environmental conditions of the client's
company.
Albrecht et al. (1980) examined the fraud perpetrators in the US and Canada. The results of
this study were partially reported by Albrecht and Romney (1981) who suggested two types
of auditor reactions to the increasing problem of management fraud. One way of preventing
additional exposure to clients with fraudulent activities was to screen new clients intensively.
The second proposed approach was to pay much closer attention to situational pressures and
opportunities experienced by management at both the work place and in their personal lives,
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by for instance the means of a red flags checklist. This validates the studies undertaken by
Pincus (1994) and Krull et al. (1994) who concluded that insensitivity to red flags is a
common reason why fraud goes undetected. Similar findings resulted from the study of
Sorensen et al. (1982) suggesting that in order to increase the likelihood of detection of
management fraud, the formal and integrated approach of fraud flags usage should be
adopted. However, they did not concentrate on the integrated model, but instead upon one
specific group of red flags, those associated with audit problems relating to economic and
financial pressures. By means of ratio analysis the authors attempted to identify those ratios
which are the best indicators of fraudulent behaviour. Wallace (1991), commenting on
Sorensen et al.'s study (1982), pointed out the particular weakness of relying on ratio
analysis to detect cases of financial distress as an indicator of situations in which fraud is
likely to occur arguing that fraud may result in the manipulation of ratios to make them
appear healthier. Pincus (1989) examined the efficacy of a red flags questionnaire for
assessing the risk of material fraud by the Big Five audit firms. Two variables were
manipulated in the experiment - the evaluation of a fraudulent case or a non-fraudulent case
and the use or non-use of the red flags questionnaire. The findings suggest that the red flags
questionnaire users demonstrated increased comprehension and uniformity in the acquisition
of indicators of potential fraud in comparison to those who did not use a questionnaire.
However, there was no significant difference in the assessed risk of fraud by the
questionnaire users and non-users for a non-fraud case. Further, the red flags questionnaire
was dysfunctional in the fraudulent case. The source of dysfunction considered the possible
failure of the red flags questionnaire users to assess all relevant clues and an overemphasis on
one set of information clues over another set. Pincus (1989) concluded that the red flags
questionnaire did not significantly improve fraud risk assessment.
Although previous studies indicated limitations of the red flags approach in fraud detection,
the lack of awareness of the warning signs was frequently cited as a cause of audit failure
with respect to fraud discovery (Heiman-Hoffman et al., 1996; Krull et al., 1994, and Pincus,
1994, 1990). There are certain costs associated with extended audits especially in instances
when they are conducted due to significant red flags' presence which suggest fraud existence.
However, the planning of an extended audit when fraud does not exist reduces audit
efficiency and results in over-auditing. This suggests that it may not always be in the audit's
firm best interest that the auditor 'over-react' to certain fraud flags, since they are seen as
merely indicative of potential problems (Krull et al., 1994).
Prior research in auditing has recognised the importance of judgement, in partiular at the
planning stage of the audit. The following chapter is devoted to a discussion on audit
42
judgement and decision making. In the planning stage of the audit, the analytical review
procedures involve mental representations, hypotheses generation, and information search
and hypotheses evaluation; critical steps in the identification of potential fraud existence
(Koonce, 1993). In this stage, there is a need for the auditor to assess specifically the risk of
misstatement arising from fraud and to distinguish that from the risk of misstatement arising
from error (SAS 110)'°.
Since the auditor's primary concern is with material misstatement, rather than with fraud,
much of prior research focused on error. There were few previous studies on the
improvement of the auditor's judgement with respect to fraud detection. Bernardi (1994)
examined the influence of the client's integrity and competence, as well as the cognitive
styles and moral development of the auditor on fraud detection. He found that, in general, the
auditor is insensitive to the initial information provided by the client being concerned with
the client's integrity and competence. He further claimed the significance of the ethical
beliefs of the auditor as well as the significance of the prior beliefs concerning fraud
existence in fraud detection. Peow Ng et al. (1996) examined the factors which impact on the
auditor's ability to generate hypotheses concerning fraud in the planning stage of the audit.
The factors they investigated included the level of fraud risk, the availability of the client's
management representations, the auditor's experience and the auditor's prior beliefs of fraud.
The experiment consisted of a case study where the subjects were asked to list potential
causes which could explain the changes in two years' financial ratios. Two factors were
manipulated; the level of fraud risk by varying the client description in the case material
across the groups and the availability of the client's management representations. Over-
reliance on the client's management representations was one of the major reasons the auditor
failed to detect fraud in the experiment. The authors suggest that it could be attributed to the
interference effects of inherited hypotheses based on representations received from client's
management in the hypothesis generation process". The interference effects are likely to
occur when a focus on the explanations results in the failure to consider other alternative
explanations. The previous studies generally indicate that auditors are susceptible to
interference effects (Asare and Wright, 1995; Church and Schneider, 1993; Anderson et al.,
1992; Bedard and Biggs, 1991).
10 In the US, Auditing Standards already require this assessment (SAS 82, SAS 53, AICPA).
11 A phenomenon identified in psychology by Manning (Roediger et al., 1992; Nisbett and Ross, 1990);
there were few studies on hypotheses generation in auditing (Asare and Wright, 1995; Koonce, 1993;
Libby and Frederick, 1990).
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For instance, Asare and Wright (1995) found that the receipt of non-misstatement
management representations received by the auditor significantly reduces the number of
plausible hypotheses generated. This is consistent with the finding by Koonce (1993)
suggesting that the auditor tends to overweight an inherited hypotheses so as his/her ability to
consider alternative hypotheses is inhibited. Prior research suggests that the interference
effects of an inherited hypothesis seem to be contingent on the nature of an inherited
representation (misstatement or non-misstatement), as well as on its source (representation
obtained from the audit superior or the client's management) (Koonce, 1993). Peow Ng et al.
(1996) examined whether or not the auditor's ability to generate fraud hypotheses is affected
by the interference effect of the client's management representations when the risk of fraud is
increased. In cases where management fraud is involved, the risk of receiving untruthful
information is increased. In such instances, the ability to overcome the interference effects of
an incorrect inherited hypothesis is particularly crucial to audit effectiveness.
Peow Ng et al. (1996) found that the auditors were more likely to generate fraud hypotheses
when the fraud risk was increased, with 33% of the subjects generating fraud hypotheses
compared to only 9% for the lower fraud risk treatment groups. Peow Ng et al. (1996)
claimed that the generation of fraud hypotheses might lead to an inefficient audit when there
is no evidence to suggest that the potential fraud exists. However, the finding concerning the
auditor's ability to generate fraud hypotheses being sensitive to the level of fraud risk remain
arguable, since 67% of the subjects in the higher risk fraud treatment group failed to generate
fraud hypotheses despite the presence of fraud indicators. In addition, the authors found that
the ability to generate fraud hypotheses was positively associated with the auditor's prior
beliefs of fraud. These findings suggest that the auditor's effectiveness in fraud detection
could be improved by increasing his/her alertness and sensitivity to the existence of fraud
indicators.
Concerned with the need to improve the quality of audit with respect to fraud detection,
Davidson (1994) suggested a change in the audit approach. He suggested a switch from post-
fraud identification, such as documenting a proof of fraud to a concentration on prior beliefs
concerning fraud existence. Based on the postulate regarding an emphasis on prior beliefs
concerning fraud in the audit, Sullivan (1993) pointed out two directions for change in an
audit approach, that is frontal assault and approach from the side. A frontal assault approach
claims the need for more detailed testing and larger samples of transactions and balances in
cases when a prior suspicion of fraud exists. This strategy focuses on finding the suggestive
evidence of potential malpractice. That approach, however, causes a significant increase in
the cost of audit. The approach from the side is based on the processing of information in the
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manipulated environment of the client and emphasises the use of perception and knowledge
in the evaluation of the risk of fraud. Johnson and Grazioli (1993), following the same
argument, invoke methods based on cognitive science's success in fraud detection, in other
words solving problems through reasoning rather than through experience (e.g. make use of
the behaviour of the client's management to recognise their intentions and their goals).
Huckenbrack (1993) suggested the development of fraud risk engagement tools to allow a
firm's cumulative expertise to be available to the auditor at the initial stage of the audit.
Power (1995) however argued that the use of expert systems based on aggregated expertise
causes a preoccupation with the tools themselves and leads to an underestimation of the
subjective judgement of the individual auditor.
On the whole, the previous studies on fraud have emphasised the importance of subjective
reasoning in the audit judgement processes and decision making.
2.6 The auditor in the context of fraud recognition
Through the auditor's use of subjective probabilities, trust of the client is built explicitly into
the audit risk assessment. The level of the audit risk assists in a determination of the amount
of time spent on the audit, while inherent and control risks (and by default detection risk) are
used to govern the distribution of time among tests of controls, analytical procedures and
other substantive tests. Trust, however, appears to go beyond cognitive calculations of risk.
There is an affective, unidentified component to trust that potentially influences the auditor's
evaluation of both inherent and control risk and thereby determines the audit procedures.
This unidentified portion of audit judgement is associated with the auditor's scepticism. The
auditor should be inclined to exhibit an increased level of professional scepticism when
evidence suggests a higher level of fraud risk. There is no substitute for healthy scepticism
and alertness on the part of the auditor when it comes to possible material fraud situations
(Ziegler, 1980).
The mentality of being dependent on the client through fees is one of the most significant
perceived factors which leads the auditor to exercise an insufficient level of scepticism. An
APB survey (APB, 1997b) resulted in possible explanations of how the individual scepticism
of the auditor is undermined; these include circumstances when:
- the auditor wants to assume that things are right and prefers to put fraud out ofmind,
- there is a close client-auditor relationship,
- financial audits are treated as a loss leader to the provision ofNAS,
- there is a lack of fraud experience with an 'it will not happen to me' approach,
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- there is a lack of understanding of the significance of fraudulent transactions in cases when
they have been identified,
- the appointment and remuneration of the auditor by the client seems to militate against
scepticism.
A particular importance to the lack of auditor independence, leading to scepticism being
undermined has been the provision ofNAS and limitations in evidence resources available to
the auditor. This implies that the auditor is particularly vulnerable when confronted with a
fraudulent client. In instances when the audit firm provides other services to their audit
clients, there is a concern that the auditor may not be sufficiently independent and is likely to
fail to conduct a proper audit in accordance with auditing standards. In addition to economic
forces, the auditor is exposed to internal pressures within the firm he/she works for because
of excessive workload as well as pressures from NAS partners. However, the auditor is often
reluctant to own up to difficulties on the audit as it is seen as anti-cultural with the audit
firms. Thus, a preoccupation at work may influence the auditor in a way that he/she is likely
to reduce the level of applied scepticism. Further, Moizer (1995) pointed out the importance
of the stress associated with the auditor's assessment of competence and integrity of the
client's management. Whether or not to disclose information with potentially hurtful
consequences to the client and probable negative consequences for the profession, is always
under question. In practice, there is no place for the auditor who finds conflict between the
recommendations of the profession and his/her own conscience.
Increasing pressure to reduce reporting has recently resulted in new laws and standards.
Changes in business environment and growing litigation created a demand on audit firms for
additional regulations in the forms of standards and procedures (Percy, 1999). The notion of
professionalism in auditing has been recently equated with the standardisation and regulation
of conduct (Hopwood, 1998) where operational procedures of auditing practice express a
particular manner of making things auditable (Grey, 1998). Further, performance of the audit
firm is continuously assessed by the profession and by the audit firm itself in terms of the
process and compliance with that process (Hatherly, 1996). In such an environment, auditing
standards require the auditor to plan and conduct the audit so as to have a 'reasonable
expectation' of detecting material misstatements (SAS 110).
Facing the potential weaknesses from audit procedures the auditor must decide how to design
and perform the audit applying a great amount of professional scepticism to individual
judgement.
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The auditing literature evokes that in order to adopt a more sceptical approach to audit work
the auditor should:
- develop the understanding of the business and challenge hypotheses which underline
client's business activities and company results,
- look more critically at evidence available when it appears not to support the facts,
- be prepared to change figures in financial statements and seek to disprove them rather than
to prove them right. However, the auditor should not assume that people run business
dishonestly as it is not then possible to carry out an audit within reasonable cost limits. Thus,
there must be certain level of reliance on the client's management (APB, 1997b).
Fraud awareness needs to be a part of the audit judgement process in order to secure the
quality of audit services. For that awareness to be present in audit judgement (i.e. the
awareness of the possibility of intentional misstatements) requires from the auditor a better
understanding of the exposures he/she may encounter in the decision-making processes and
of their implications. Once these encounters and implications are identified, the auditor may
transcend pragmatic compliance with the structure of the audit process by activating an
independent 'way of seeing'. The reconstruction of the operational sense of independence
should allow the auditor to transcend the standard format of 'risk-based' auditing.
2.7. Summary
This study looks at audit judgement processes as a means of seeking a deeper understanding
of the auditor's ability to maintain his/her desired state of mind in decision-making
processes. Independence of audit judgement is assumed to consist of two components; that is,
independence of thought and independence from the client. Independence of thought is
derivative of Power's (1997) definition of operational independence while independence
from the client relates to apparent independence. Operational independence relates to the
restrictions the audit firms impose on audit judgement, in particular with regard to
programming judgements. The standard format of the audit process, propagated by audit
firms, moderates the auditor's capability to feel free to decide the scope and the character of
the audit methodologies and techniques. Hence, operational independence implies the
individual capacity to freely determine the scope of audit procedures. The structure of the
audit process (standard format of 'risk-based' auditing) puts independence of thought at risk
(i.e. operational independence), while the power of the client over the audit fees puts at risk
independence from the client (i.e. apparent independence). The preoccupation with
independence in appearance somewhat precludes academic debate with regard to operational
independence, i.e. the capacity of the auditor to freely decide the scope of audit and audit
procedures.
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This chapter discussed the issues associated with the impairment of audit independence
concerning the auditor's ability to withstand the client's pressure (Kilcommins, 1997;
Ezzamel et al., 1996; Barkess and Simnett, 1994; Mitchell et al., 1993; Abdelkhalik, 1990).
While the audit firm provides NAS to its client, the individual judgement of the auditor may
be moderated and/or even compromised (the conflict of interest arises when the auditor is
faced with suspicion of the client's management fraud, at the same time being aware of
his/her audit firm providing NAS to that client). Provision of NAS defines the service of a
managerial advice or consultation concerning a particular aspect of the client's company, for
example a design and implementation of internal control systems. The existence of NAS
opportunism and the risk of possible fraud represent the 'micro-structure' of independence;
in such instances, the client's management may exert power over the auditor by manipulating
the explanations in a way so to deflect the auditor from consideration of fraud. In
consequence, the auditor may accept given representations without sufficient facts because of
the fear of being replaced and not wanting to challenge or upset the client's management.
Hence, in cases when NAS are provided to the audit client, the potential impairment of
auditor independence may diminish the level of independence in the auditor's judgement and
in the recognition of fraud. The question is whether the auditor is able to see the 'big-picture'
when the audit task environment is obfuscated by the provision of NAS and audit process is
embedded in a standard format of 'risk-based' auditing.
Prior research in auditing recognised the importance of judgement, in particular at the
planning stages of the audit process; that is, when the auditor applies subjective reasoning to
assess the nature and significance of misstatements. Any audit, when there is a suspicion of
material fraud is as much an intuitive process as an analytical method. Fraud awareness
needs to be centred in individual decision-making. To 'see' fraud, the auditor needs to be
able to expand his/her independent judgement beyond a standard format of the process and
transcend the influences of other opinions, either from the client's management or from




Dynamics between professional judgement and structure in the audit process
3.1 Introduction
Historical conditions for the demand for auditing imply that when economic resources are
entrusted, human nature is assumed to be untrustworthy and in need of some kind of check.
Societal influences shape the norms of conduct in different organisations and define which aspects
of accountability have to be subject to the monitoring of audit. The standards of acceptable
behaviour derive from a societal value system and from the sanctions imposed by the changing
socio-economic environment. In this context, the concept of audit oscillates around the meaning of
a control mechanism for monitoring business conduct and performance.
Interpretations of the operational audit concept, however, constantly evolve. These interpretations
are dependent upon societal needs and changing circumstances of ethical standards, and determine
the evolution of audit. Flint (1988) argued that the audit function is perceived as required in
instances where there is a duty of accountability between two parties and that an audit is the means
by which accountability is ensured. He argued that in instances where there is an audit of any
description, there is a relationship in which one party owes a duty of accountability of some kind
or another to others1. Since audit is an integral part of the process of accountability, the existence
of a requirement is seen as a primary condition of audit. The concept of accountability exposes the
wholly utilitarian function of audit. The practical usefulness of audit has evolved in response to a
perceived need of individuals or groups in society who seek information and/or reassurance about
the conduct or performance of others, in which they have acknowledged legitimate interest. Audit
exists because the interested individuals and/or groups are unable to obtain for themselves the
information or reassurance they require. Thus, audited financial statements have an added utility;
the audit benefit - envisaged as reassurance and comfort - is frequently intangible, where the
'common sense' of audit practice contributes to the production of socially demanded assurance. In
a way, since the audit role emphasises the production of comfort, there is an institutionalised need
for auditing not to be too 'successful' in finding problems and in producing discomfort by
reporting these problems. Hence, the underlying philosophy of audit is a social control mechanism
for securing accountability (Flint, 1988) and producing comfort (Power, 1997). Standards of
accountability of the conduct, performance and achievement of quality of information are set for
those who are accountable (e.g. directors of organisations are accountable to shareholders).
1 The principles of audit may be universally applicable although the particular applications, standards of
specific performance and recognised audit practices are unlikely to show uniformity due to differences in
traditions, cultures, socio-economic development and the particular national characteristics, which resulted
in different needs for regulatory mechanisms, coiporate structures and business environments (Flint, 1988).
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Accounting and auditing have come to be regarded as socially constructed (Miller, 1994, p. 1); the
effect of reciprocity becomes entangled in heterogeneous practice and procedures embedded in the
philosophy of social science, the dictates of financial markets, managerial discourses and the needs
of society. Auditing exists because of the way our society is and the way individuals are
constituted. The high level of competition and socio-economic change in the last twenty years has
engendered an emphasis on the commercial vision of reality as a dominant ideology with
facilitating, legitimation processes (Birkin, et ah, 1999). Trust in the auditing profession becomes
institutionalised and bestowed on the auditor; this trust differs from the trust of ordinary
individuals. Trust is increasingly 'vested, not in individuals but in abstract capacities.. .the modes
of trust in modern institutions rest upon vague and partial understandings of their 'knowledge
base" (Giddens, 1990, pp. 26-27). Embedded in such an environment, the auditing profession acts
upon individuals, entities and processes to transform them and to achieve specific ends. The
profession, therefore, affects the world we live in and the types of social reality we inhabit.
In simple terms, the output of the audit process is an opinion; the effect of this opinion is to
enhance the credibility of the audited statements (Power, 1997, p. 16). The auditor's role in the
economic order is to judge and to attest to the validity of the financial statements, which contain a
stylised interpretation of the financial health of the company. (Pentland, 1993). The auditor in
his/her judgmental processes constructs the interpretations of accounts in order to reassure the
public that the examined statements are trustworthy.
This chapter discusses the importance of judgement in the auditing profession. The remainder of
the chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, underlying philosophies and applied meanings of
judgement in the profession are discussed. Secondly, a literature review on audit judgement and
decision making studies is provided. This review demonstrates that prior research has focused
heavily on quantitative assessments of the auditor's performance and has lacked a conceptual
framework of the auditing milieu in which judgements are subject to formation and deformation.
Thirdly, the role of knowledge and its systematisation in auditing are presented. Finally, drawing
upon the concept of audit as a social construct and locating the audit judgement milieu as being
embedded in wider structural and organisational contexts, the theoretical framework of this study
is defined.
3.2 Underlying philosophies and the operational role of judgement in auditing
Judgement is seen as a central activity of audit, since the auditing role is to judge and to attest the
validity of financial statements providing reassurance for its readers. Professional judgement
implies a meaningful choice, and involves difficult and complex issues and consequences that are
significant to those concerned (Gibbins and Mason, 1988). AICPA (1955) stated that judgement is
the most important factor in the making of an audit. Mautz (1959) argued that judgement must
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inevitably play a major role in auditing. Gray (1990) claimed that the audit is an essentially
imprecise and impressionistic process where professional judgement holds the central position.
Solomon (1995), on the basis of the review of auditing standards in the US and the analysis of
recent court cases, concluded that judgement pervades virtually every aspect of contemporary
financial statements audit.
Judgement runs right the way through any audit. Audit process is a process of measurement of
actual business conduct and performance and of its comparison with existent standards. Table 3.1
below provides a list ofjudgement activities related to the audit process identified by Bamber et al.
(1995) and the types of judgements to which these activities lead. As can be seen in Table 3.1
judgement at any stage of the audit process incorporates the estimation of outcomes and the
evaluation of the consequences of these outcomes, leading to a decision or to a choice among
alternative decisions. In the course of planning and executing any audit, the auditor is required to
make decisions on how to proceed and how to make choices among alternative courses of action.
He/she must decide how to conduct the investigations, the scope, the extent and depth of the
examination and the volume of evidence to obtain. Finally, he/she must conclude whether the
financial statements do show a true and fair view. Solomon (1995) further noted that audit
judgement not only relates to the audit process itself, but is also involved in pre-engagement
activities - including the client's selection and audit tendering and in post-engagement activities -
including decisions after the report had been issued in instances, when the omission of required
procedures was discovered. In short, audit judgement in any stage of the audit process
encompasses sequential steps: (1) definition of the task, (2) obtaining information from both
internal memory and external sources, (3) identification and evaluation of possible alternatives to
the problem, and (4) execution of the decision (Rennie and Gibbins, 1993).
It is not possible either to establish precise normative criteria against which to assess these
judgements at different stages of the audit process nor to obtain wholly persuasive evidence on the
matters of concern. Akresh et al. (1988) claimed that the process of obtaining and evaluating
evidence is a complex and little understood process in itself. Ashton et al. (1988) argued that the
audit decision is determined, not only by evidence, but by the nature of the audit process, the
characteristics of the auditor and by the audit environment. Section 3.5 is devoted to a discussion
on the interrelated components of audit judgement.
In the auditing profession the words judgement and professional judgement are used
interchangeably. The essence of a profession is that a high degree of judgement is required in its
practice.





Judgement within the audit process
Judgement activities Resulting judgements






Important transactions streams and balances.
Important financial statements assertions.
Assessing the inherent risk Implications of the client environment for identification
of potential audit concerns, focuses of audit attention,
and control structure.
Inherent risk assessment for financial statements
assertions.
Evaluating internal controls Potential for improved audit efficiency based on
assessing control risk as less than maximum.
Key control risk for financial statements assertions.
Control risk for financial statements assertions.
Weaknesses in controls.
Developing an audit strategy Reliance on tests of controls.
Potential for different audit approaches
(e.g. suitability of analytical procedures as substantive
evidence, circumstances favouring statistical or non-
statistical audit sampling, or other forms of detailed
tests).
Emphasis on balances or on transaction streams.
Identification of strategic assertions.
Generating the audit programme Selection of an appropriate combination of specific
audit procedures and determination of scope and timing
of application.
Selection and evaluation of
analytical review procedures
Particular procedures to be applied, data to be used,
relevant formulas and calculations.
Development of expectations.
Identification of significant fluctuations.
Formulation and corroboration of explanation of
fluctuations.
Evaluating of the results of
testing
Conclusions on the results of specific audit procedures
in relation to their objectives and to the results obtained
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Table 3.1 (Cont.)
Judgement activities Resulting judgements






Applying Code of Professional
Conduct
Selecting an appropriate audit
opinion
(Source: Bamber et al., 1995)
Consideration of the nature and amount of unadjusted
audit differences individually and in aggregate in
relation to their potential impact on users of the
financial statements.
Decision as to whether to press for adjustment by the
audit client, or to accept the differences as immaterial.
Whether the client can reasonably be expected to
continue in operation for forthcoming year.
Identification of relevant accounting and auditing
standards.
Determination as to whether or not such standards have
been appropriately applied in the light of client
circumstances.
Identification of appropriate courses of action in cases
where standards have not been correctly applied.
Determination as to whether auditor behaviour is
acceptable within the dictates of professional
requirements and ethical principles.
Whether the financial statements are fairly presented.
The value associated with the audit derives from the professional judgement of the individual
auditor and is supported by the more abstract, collective judgement of the profession as a whole,
encompassed in professional standards.
Professional judgement, therefore, takes place in the context of professional standards. By
communicating the expertise of the profession, the standards support the exercise of judgement by
the auditor.
'Professional judgement in auditing is the application of relevant knowledge and experience, within
the context provided by auditing and accounting standards and rules of professional conduct, in
reaching decisions where a choice must be made between alternative possible courses of action'
(CICA, 1995).
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'Standards are principles to guide and support quality and provide the basis for sound judgements'
(APB, 1994, p. 5).
A particular feature of the body of knowledge that supports auditing is its codified nature. Codified
auditing standards are drawn upon audit judgement - a central activity of the audit process. The
illustration of audit judgement in the context of standards is presented in Exhibit 3.1. A '0'
indicates that the auditor needs to exercise less judgement because the profession has issued
detailed rules and guidance of conduct. At the other end of the scale, '10' indicates a complete
absence of rules. In other words, instances where there is no guidance on what should be done may
be called 'pure' judgement situations. Professional judgement should be distinguished from
regulatory compliance with the product based on a prescribed procedures, indicated by '0', and
from a purely judgmental product, based on experience alone or a creative activity, indicated by
'10'. In situations, where there is no standards and guidance, indicated by '10', creativity may
involve a radical departure from the accepted norms. Between the two extremes the mean of '5'
judgement is meant to be exercised within the context of the existing standards and guidance.
Exhibit 3.1
Assessing the need for judgement
10








The existence of standards requires considerable judgement on the part of the individual auditor in
the processes of interpreting the situation and applying standards while conducting the audit. The
existence of standards, however, does not always solve a particular problem; the standards are not
fully consistent, clear, comprehensive or up to date (CICA, 1988). When exercising professional
judgement in a financial statement audit, the auditor makes decisions with respect to financial
reporting. Accounting, auditing and ethical standards are inseparable from the financial reporting
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judgement process. A definition of professional judgement in financial statement audit applies to
every stage of the audit process.
'The process of reaching a decision on a financial statement reporting issue can be described as
professional judgement when it is analytical, based on experience and knowledge (including
knowledge of one's own limitations and of professional standards), prudent and carried out with
integrity and recognition of responsibility to those affected by its consequences. Such professional
judgement is likely to be most valuable in complex, ill-defined, or dynamic situations, especially
where standards are incomplete, and should normally involve consultations, identification of
potential consequences and documentation of the analytical processes leading to the decision'
(CICA, 1988).
The above definition describes the circumstances where professional judgement would be most
valuable depending, to a large extent, on the nature and complexity of the audit problem. As
mentioned above, professional judgement takes place in the context of professional standards,
reflecting the judgement of the profession as a whole. On the other hand, by referring to
professional standards, the definition of professional judgement incorporates the concepts of
auditor independence, objectivity, and integrity. Respectively, by communicating the profession's
experience, the standards ought to support the exercise of independent judgement by the individual
auditor.
In the British tradition, judgement in audit is more of an individual process which encompasses the
experience of the profession. The auditor is required professionally to follow the standards and
guidelines, and where other pronouncements are not definite, the auditor is expected to exercise
his/her individual judgement in determining the audit procedures and in forming an opinion. SAS
100: Objective and General Principles Governing an Audit ofFinancial Statements states that
'[I]n undertaking an audit of financial statements auditors should...carry out procedures designed to
obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence...so as to determine with reasonable confidence
whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement' (para 2, APB, 1995).
Materiality in financial statements audit remains very much a matter of individual judgement of
the auditor applied with the reasonable confidence. Qualitative indicators and quantitative criteria
seem to be useful as aids to professional judgement, but audit evidence reliance must be placed on
the knowledge, skill and experience of the individual auditor. SAS 220: Materiality and the Audit
explains that
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'[T]he assessment of what is material is a matter of professional judgement and includes
consideration of both the amount and nature ofmisstatement...Auditors apply judgement taking
account ofmateriality in the context of the matters on which they are reporting'
(para 4, para 7, APB, 1995).
This need to consider materiality within a given context is reflected in professional judgement
which constitutes a fundamental principle of external auditing. Audit involves the judgmental
applications of the auditing principles, standards and guidance to the selection and evaluation of
evidence in the particular circumstances of the client's business (Porter et ah, 1996). Thus, the
auditor needs to be able to understand the client, and interpret the underlying characteristics of the
client's business within a wide environment. The appropriate collection and interpretation of
evidence by the auditor can verify the assertions or events associated with the particular client.
However, it could be argued that audit is a form of craft whose underlying concepts, such as
materiality, resist precise codification, and where the auditor sees himself/herself as providing
comfort (Pentland, 1993) rather than proof. The production of comfort is negotiated under the
characteristics of the particular audit, in the context of the development of technical guidance. And
since audit operates in situations which involve unknown elements and forces, feelings of
reassurance in judgement processes must be represented as cognitive in form (Pentland, 1993). For
the auditor, making things auditable is a practical issue; it is what one does when applying various
techniques, routines and experiences. However, the auditor perceives himself/herself as a provider
of reassurance. Thus, tensions exist between the practicality of audit, i.e. expected recognition of
material misstatements, and auditor's self understanding.
There are some differences in approach in professional practice to the understanding of the audit
judgement concept between the US and the UK. The two areas where the judgement activities of
the auditor differ between the UK and the US include ways of applying accounting and auditing
standards and selecting an appropriate audit opinion2. In applying accounting standards the US
tradition is much more rule driven than the UK tradition, and therefore the range of judgement
required by the auditor in the US seems much narrower than in the UK. The situation on the
appropriate audit opinion's selection does not differ much. In the US, SAS 58: Reports on Audited
Financial Statements provides a template of opinion which states presented fairly in accordance
with ...standards (AICPA, 1988); implying a narrower opinion than that given under British SAS
600: Auditors' Reports on Financial Statements with true and fair view (APB, 1993). The notion
true and fair means that the auditor has to take a judgement as to whether the information
presented does present information fairly for the user to make decisions and that information has
not been produced in a misleading fashion or been manipulated to show the client's company in a
2 Discussion with I. Marrian, ICAS, Deputy Chief Executive and Secretary.
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better light than it in fact is (Percy, 1999). Thus, audit judgement seems more of an individual
process in the British tradition.
There is no precise definition of professional judgement. In the UK a distinguishing feature of the
underlying philosophy of auditing is a connection between professional judgement and the
concepts of accountability and integrity.
'[Audit] is about seeking the truth.. .[Judgement] is, in the final analysis, personal and derives from
business understanding and experience as well as incisive knowledge of financial reporting and
business life...an expert view with personal accountability' (APB, 1994, p. 2 and 5).
Professional judgement, understood as incorporating concepts of accountability and integrity of a
personal nature, goes beyond the concept of the true and fair view and beyond the agenda of
compliance with auditing standards.
'The purpose of the audit is to secure accountability' (Flint, 1988).
'Standards should not be slavish checklists followed blindly with the risk of damaging the
robustness of the auditor's opinion' (APB, 1994).
Audit judgement is an independent process of giving understanding and meaning to generic
principles by their application in specific contexts.
3.3 Aspects of judgement and decision-making studies in auditing literature
For many years auditing literature has recognised the importance and persuasiveness of
independent judgement. Over the last decade an increased emphasis on improving the quality of
audit has resulted in a number of studies concerned with the formulation of judgement and
decision making. In many cases, academic research on independent judgement has been
encompassed in specific paradigms or models of judgement. There has been a focus on judgement
modelling in order to produce representations that reveal audit strategies. These models usually
focus on inputs to, and outputs from, the decision process. However, to improve the quality of
judgement it is necessary to get insight into the judgement processes of the auditor embedded in a
wider environment, the meaning of judgement and abstract categories associated with it, such as
independence, integrity, efficiency. Very little has been done in the area of the audit judgement
process itself. Further, these heavily quantitative studies lack a concise, theoretical framework of
the auditing milieu, where the individual auditor and his/her behaviour can be envisaged in a wider
context. Below, an overview of judgement and decision making research is presented.
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Most of judgement and decision making research in auditing has focused on (i) policy capturing,
(ii) heuristics and biases, (iii) predecisional behaviour including information search and hypotheses
generation, (iv) protocol analysis and (v) determinants of judgement performance (Trotman, 1997).
Studies on policy capturing attempt to identify the factors that influence judgement, and, on that
basis, to build mathematical representations of judgement policies in order to reveal judgement
strategies. This is generally done by providing subjects with a series of judgement situations with
different combination of cues. Various statistical methods, such as ANOVA, regression and
discriminant analysis are used to infer the judgement strategies based on the relationship between
selected cues and the judgement made. All modelling approaches provide only surface statistical
representation of relationships between inputs and outputs; they do not contribute to an
understanding of cognitive and/or affective processes. The primary issues addressed by policy
capturing research include consensus among auditors, the relative importance of individual cues
for the auditor, the functional form of the judgement policy, the stability of judgement over time
and the level of self-insight the auditor has into his/her own judgement policies (Solomon and
Shields, 1995; Brown and Solomon, 1991, 1990; Ashton, 1982).
A number of studies dealt with judgement under uncertainty and different heuristics and biases
associated with probability judgements. Into the heuristics and biases category fall studies which
examine how the auditor's initial beliefs are combined with diagnostic evidence, often by
comparison of judgement processes with predictions of statistical models. Several studies in
probability judgement were attempted to clarify understanding of its concept as well as of the
riskiness of the decision choices. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Bar-Hillel (1979) suggested
that judgements under uncertainty are made in terms of causes and effects, claiming that causal
information has a greater impact on judgement processes than equally informative diagnostic data.
Shaklee and Fischhoff (1979) argued that when the auditor develops a sufficient causal
explanation, additional evidence pointing to alternative causes may be underweighed while
supporting evidence overweighed. Anderson and Sechler (1986) suggested a way of reducing the
effect of causal explanations by an increase in the availability of opposing arguments.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) formulated and tested a number of heuristics of human judgement
suggesting that these heuristics reduce the complexity of cognitive tasks and respectively
judgmental operations, and thus may lead to systematic individual errors. The anchoring and
adjustment heuristic suggests that in many situations individuals make estimates by starting from
an initial value and then adjusting that to get a final answer. The audit decision making process is
sometimes viewed in the literature as the updating of beliefs on the basis of current information;
prior year's working papers are likely to be adjusted in the process of devising the current year's
audit programme. (Libby, 1981). The possibility, that this reliance on the previous year's
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procedures results in insufficient adjustments, was of concern to the auditing profession for some
time (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; 1974; Joyce and Biddle,
1981a; 1981b; Biggs and Wild, 1985; Butler, 1986). Heuristics and biases also exist in information
search tasks. The auditor often formulates hypotheses to explain certain factors and then searches
for evidence to test these pre-empted hypotheses. Some research employed Einhorn and Hoghart's
(1992) belief-adjustment model: if an individual has strongly held initial beliefs regarding
hypotheses, a disconfirming piece of evidence will result in a large decrease in revised beliefs.
Subsequent confirmatory evidence seems to lead to another substantial upward belief revision and
vice versa. The result is that the disconfirming-confirming order is hypothesised to lead to higher
final beliefs than confirming-disconfirming order. Knechel and Messier (1990), Asare (1992) and
Kennedy (1993) found a recency effect when auditors revise their beliefs on evidence; that is,
auditors tend to place more weight on evidence received most recently. Further, Knechel and
Messier (1990) found that negative evidence, in general, leads auditors to greater judgement
revisions that positive evidence. This implies that auditors tend to examine evidence with a view of
professional scepticism.
Alternatively to anchoring and adjustment heuristics, where the auditor chooses an initial estimate
(based on either a best guess or the experience of the client) or anchors against new information
and makes adjustments accordingly, auditing literature suggests that counterexplanation may result
in more effective audit judgement (Koonce, 1992; Heiman, 1990; Kennedy, 1995). In
counterexplaining, the decision maker is required to consider why the chosen alternative may be
incorrect and/or why the rejected alternative may be correct (Koriat et ah, 1980).
Counterexplanation has been found an effective technique in social psychology for correcting
over-confidence. In auditing, however, counterexplanation as a debiasing technique seems to be
only desirable if it does not reduce the confidence of the auditor. Kennedy (1995) found
inconclusive evidence that counterexplanation leads to professional scepticism. Synder and
Campbell (1980) found that decision-makers generally prefer information that confirms their
impressions rather than information that disconfirms them. Consequently, they often selectively
review the data set for confirming information and ignore disconfirming information. This
increases the availability of confirming information to decision-makers and results in an
explanation effect. The explanation effect may be explained by what Hoch (1984) refers to as
interference. When a decision-maker generates a set of reasons for or against the occurrence of an
event, this act interferes with his/her ability to generate reasons against or for the occurrence of the
event. Consequently, the alternative initially explained becomes more readily available to the
decision-maker and influences his/her resulting judgements.
An extensive body of literature has addressed the areas of predecisional behaviour including
studies on information search, hypotheses generation and protocol analysis (Anderson and Kida,
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1994; Butt and Campbell, 1989; Kida, 1984). These studies were devoted to testing of the
existence of the confirmatory bias: that is, situations in which individuals preferentially solicit
confirmatory evidence for their hypothesis, as oppose to disconfirmatory evidence. A common
finding for these studies is little support for the existence of the confirmatory bias. Anderson and
Maletta (1994) found that experience plays an important role in the auditor's attendance to
negative evidence: the less experience the auditor possesses, the more he/she focuses on negative
information.
Most of the hypotheses generation studies have involved analytical review tasks. Libby (1985)
examined the role of prior knowledge of financial statements' errors in the generation of
hypotheses. Perceived error frequencies were found to play a major role in the accessibility of
error hypotheses. Some studies showed the effect of individual experience on the generation of
hypotheses (Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Kaplan et al., 1992).
Following earlier psychology and medical studies (Elstein et ah, 1978) some research focused on
the understanding of the processes by which audit judgement occurs3. Using verbal protocol
analysis, the auditor's performance was examined with regard to the extent of audit testing (Biggs
and Mock, 1983), review of a planned audit programme (Biggs et ah, 1988) and hypotheses
generation about unexpected fluctuations (Bedard and Biggs, 1991). It seems that verbal protocols
provide somewhat greater insight into decision behaviour (Trotman, 1997). Verbal protocol
analysis is one of the commonly used techniques in studies on judgement processes, whereby
auditors are ask to think aloud as they perform a particular task; then their thoughts are analysed to
examine all phases of the process from the beginning to the end (CICA, 1995).
Some studies documented shortcomings in the auditor's performance, such as the tendency for
individual judgement to be subject to personal differences, resulting in various biases and errors.
The auditor tends to perform well in tasks, which require processes involving generating ideas and
constructing interpretations. Further, the quality of performance is likely to improve when the
auditor's reasoning is theory driven, not simply statistically based (CICA, 1995).
Many studies have focused on revealing what audit judgement strategy can be apprehended as a
first step to understanding the psychology of such judgements. Some studies have examined
auditors' predictions of the client's corporate failure and its impact on their going concern
decisions (Ashton, 1985; Simnett and Trotman, 1989); others examined auditor's subjective
probability estimates of audit values in the pre-sampling phase of audit (Shields et al. 1987; 1988).
J The importance of the hypotheses generation stage of diagnostic process has been well documented in
psychological research (Roediger et al., 1992; Nisbett and Ross, 1990) and auditing research (Asare and
Wright, 1995; Koonce, 1993), and some evidence in psychology suggests that hypotheses generation is the
key to expertise in diagnosis.
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In most studies on judgement strategies, agreement in fact refers to the similarity of overall
judgements, namely consensus4, while agreement in principle concerns the similarity of judgement
policies, i.e. cue usage5 (Ashton, 1982). The importance of consensus in auditing has been well
documented in auditing literature reflecting a concern with the abstract category of objectivity in
auditing:
'In the best of all possible worlds, every auditor, given the same sets of facts, would select the
same auditing procedures and apply them to the same extent' (Hicks, 1974).
The existence of internal manuals combined with on-going training, and the review processes are
expected to increase consensus among individual auditors within the particular firm. The purpose
of research on cue usage has been to reveal judgement strategies. The research on cue usage
involved studies on judgement stability (Ashton, 1974; Joyce, 1976), and on the accuracy of
judgement confidence (Solomon et al., 1985; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994). In order to improve
audit judgement processes, it is necessary to get some insight into the more ambiguous layers of
judgement processes, beyond the mere analysis ofjudgement strategies.
In considering the determinants of judgement performance the following equation was suggested
by Trotman (1997):
Performance = f (Ability, Knowledge, Environment, Motivation)
In this equation, audit judgement performance is a function of, and depends on, the auditor's
individual ability, knowledge, and motivation factors embedded in a wider environment. Audit
judgement research has emphasised the knowledge use by the auditor when exercising judgement.
Some research has focused attention on the role of auditors' task specific knowledge in areas such
as hypotheses generation (Libby, 1985) and information search (Kida, 1984). Some studies
recognised that experience in audit plays an important role in a task assignment and that the
experienced auditor relies on the wealth of job related knowledge brought to the tasks (Gibbins,
1984; Waller and Felix, 1987). Through on-the-job experience, the auditor gains knowledge and
expertise that is organised in the brain in ways that allow him/her to work effectively.
4 Consensus is usually calculated as a grand mean across individuals, of the mean correlation coefficient
with any one individual, or with all other individuals (Trotman, 1997). While the audit judgement literature
used correlation analysis to calculate consensus, it is a construct validity threat. Trotman and Yetton (1985)
attempted to overcome this problem by conducting a two way individual by case ANOVA, in which the cue
effect measured the agreement in professional judgements across cases and the individual effect measured
the auditor effect. For perfect professional judgements the within-case variance would be zero, and with the
between-case variance accounting for all the sum of squares.
5 Cue usage has typically been measured by the significance of a cue in a statistical model (Trotman, 1997).
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'Knowledge is an internal mental state which cannot be directly observed'
(Libby and Luft, 1993).
Libby (1995) noted that knowledge is a function of ability, experience, motivation and
environment. He defined experience as task related encounters (e.g. comments from superiors,
review of work of others, actual task completion, outcome feedback, staff training, etc.), which
provide opportunities for learning in the audit environment. Knowledge was defined as
information stored in memory comprising of episodic memory (i.e. particular experiences of the
individual) and semantic memory (i.e. memory for concept meanings and relations). Abilities were
perceived as the capacity to complete information processing tasks, such as encoding and analysis,
contributing to problem solving. Performance was defined as the correspondence of a judgement to
a criterion event.
Very important determinants of individual audit performance include wide environment and
motivation factors. Research interest on environmental and motivational factors has emerged in
the last decade. This research is more quantitative than any other area of research in audit
judgement and decision making. Some research involved the examination of differences in audit
firms' structure. (Cushing and Loebbecke, 1986; Kinney, 1986; Bamber et al., 1988). Cushing and
Loebbecke (1986) documented variations in the structures of the largest audit firms across the
USA: focusing on the guidance constituted in the audit manuals, and found that the degree of the
structure in the particular audit firm impacts the auditor's perception of the work environment; in
particular with regard to the ways the auditor approaches his/her judgmental tasks. They found
that firms varied in how 'structured' were their audit methodologies. Highly structured firms were
placing a strong emphasis on pre-engagement planning, explicitly defined responsibilities for each
audit, shifted audit decision making from individual auditors towards the firm, tend to qualify
audit risk during each audit with detailed guidance and placed high reliance on sampling
techniques. Less structured firms emphasised pre-engagement planning and the use of internal
controls questionnaires, but left the rest of audit process undescribed in detailed, quantitative
ways. Similarly, Kinney studied structure in audit firms (1986). He concluded that unstructured
firms use less structured guidance and leave more discretion to the auditor and that integrated
tests, relying largely on statistical sampling methods and the consideration of the audit risk model,
remain unspecified in such firms. Kinney (1986) classified audit firms as follows: (1) structured -
Peat Marwick Mitchell (KPMG) , Deloitte, Touche Ross (Deloitte and Touche Ross have since
merged to form Deloitte & Touche), (2) intermediate - Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, Ernst &
Whinney (Arthur Young, Ernst & Whinney have since merged to form Ernst & Young), (3)
unstructured - Coopers & Lybrand, Price Waterhouse (now merged to PriceWaterhouseCoopers).
Cushing and Loebbecke's (1986) study and Kinney's (1986) classification suggests that audit firm
structures are associated with methods used to co-ordinate and control auditors: that is, the
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auditor's role with more structured firms is to organise audit tasks so as to be more analysable,
devoting more energy to standard operating procedures, and the manner for making assessments
of audit risks for clients. McDaniel (1990) examined the effects of audit structure and time
pressure on audit sampling tasks and motivation of the auditors. Again this is an example of
examining together the effects of various determinants of judgement performance.
Libby and Luft (1993) suggested that other environmental factors, including prior audit
engagements and accountability issues, as well as motivational factors, seem to be important as
characteristics of the auditing milieu. Gibbins (1984) and Gibbins and Emby (1985) emphasised
the need to incorporate accountability relationships in the audit judgement framework. They
suggested that justification plays an important role in evidence gathering, and that understanding
of audit judgement requires these factors to be considered. Experimental studies that have
addressed issues of accountability include Ashton (1990), Kennedy (1993) and Peecher (1996).
Auditing research suggests the influence of embeddedness in the client, i.e. repeated audit
engagements, as another important characteristic of audit setting. On most audits there is usually
carryover of audit personnel from prior years (Tan, 1995).
Recently, there has been an increased interest in emerging research on other environmental and
motivational factors in the audit judgement setting. Libby and Luft (1993) argued that incentive-
induced effort may well interact with the abilities and knowledge of an individual. Grey (1998)
used documentary materials and interviews to analyse ways in which auditors perceive their
professionalism. Staff Evaluation Forms are used to assess auditors and consultants. These forms
comprise of six main sections: technical ability, client service, quality of work, job administration,
time management, managerial skills, professional and personal attributes. The auditor is evaluated
in each category on 5-point scale from 'outstanding' to 'unsatisfactory'. The category of
'professional and personal attributes' defines the everyday ways in which being a professional is
constructed within the firm, at least by those who design and implement the evaluation system.
The attributes for evaluation include the following
'[CJommunication, self-confidence, initiative, ability to win confidence and respect from clients
and colleagues, performance under pressure, co-operativeness, reliability, professionalism, self-
motivation, business sense, integrity, judgement, enthusiasm and commitment, appearance, team
working, ability to follow instmctions and accept responsibility, decision making, presentation
skills, contribution in meeting' (Grey, 1998, p. 575).
Under other sections Grey found attributes related to professional and personal characteristics
including
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"[Responding to client, managing client's expectations, logical organisation of written work,
neatness ofwritten work, creativity, time management, meeting deadlines, prioritising work'
(Grey, 1998, p. 575).
Grey (1998) concluded that the notion of professionalism in all attributes is bound up with ways of
conducting oneself. Being a professional is not a 'personal view' but how one behaves 'within
earshot of other people', and is perceived as being linked with behavioural functionality to
working with clients (p. 579). Consequently, auditors find themselves as being evaluated in terms
of their behaviour, rather than their technical competence. This is accommodated partially by the
fact that the auditor of the Big Five 'type' supplants a wider understanding of professionalism with
conformity to the professional body of knowledge encompassed in the organisational norms.
Similarly, Radcliffe (1998) discussing efficiency audits argued that, although audit manuals,
standards, etc., promote abstract ideas of independence, efficiency and effectiveness, in practice
auditors tend to use these terms more to refer to their work in general rather than to describe
matters with the fineness ofmeaning found in financial statements.
Until recently very little research has focused specifically on the socio-economic environment of
independent judgement within the realm of the auditing profession. The review of the main
streams of research in audit judgement and decision making conducted the over last decade has
focused heavily on quantitative methodologies. More ambiguous aspects of judgement processes,
however, cannot be measured by solely statistical models. Although the shortcomings of the
auditor's performance were of a concern in the prior research, these studies were limited to the
explanations a few factors associated with personality traits, and not embedded in the wider
context of the auditing milieu. Prior research carries out a substantial bias towards evidence
findings and lacks a conceptual framework of the auditing milieu in which judgements are formed
and deformed. Since the auditor performs well in processes of generating ideas and constructing
interpretations (CICA, 1995), research has to develop an altogether more localised focus with
qualitative indicators complementing statistical criteria, attending to the auditor's detailed
understandings and his/her operational practices in unveiling the degrees of insight the auditor has
in his/her judgement processes (Jonsson, 1998).
3.4 The system of knowledge in the auditing profession
Trotman (1997) indicated that the auditor's performance is defined by a degree of correspondence
of audit judgement to a body of professional knowledge. Growing expertise in society is organised
around occupations and professions. Audit practice, like any practice bounded by economic
constraints, is characterised by normative and operational components. The former constitutes the
ideas and concepts of dominant ideology which shapes the mission of the practice and positions
the practice in relation to the wider objectives of political spheres. Operational elements consist of
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tasks and routines, which make up the world of audit practice. Methods, checklists, samples etc
constitute a codified and formalised body of knowledge in audit practice, thereby allowing the
audit process to be written up and recorded (Power, 1997, pp 6-7). Claims about the possession of
knowledge and the display of appropriate behaviour are important elements in the constitution of
professionalism (Grey, 1998). The importance of expert knowledge in the formation and the
survival of professional services' firms, such as auditing and consulting firms, has long been
recognised (Morris and Empson, 1998). The body of knowledge developed simultaneously by
individuals and organisations is stored and preserved by professional coding schemes. While
individuals generate knowledge through their thought processes, organisations are envisaged as the
repositories of knowledge through a dissemination of routines and procedures (Nelson and Winter,
1982).
There are different views on organisational knowledge in the literature. Linked with the resource-
based view of the firm, a knowledge (base) is envisaged as a key determinant of the organisational
structure and performance of audit firms. (Conner, 1991, Morris and Empson, 1998). Knowledge
is seen as means of gaining and sustaining competitive advantage in post-industrial economies
(Drucker, 1992). The knowledge base represents both an input and an output in terms of the
expertise residing in the firms and it is an output in the form of products or services generated to
serve client's problems (Grant, 1996). Despite different views on the role and meaning of
organisational knowledge, it is argued that the basis for the existence of professions stems from its
possession.
'The power of professions stems from their ability to exclude others from the technical and legal
basis of their practices, thus enabling skills to be translated into material and symbolic rewards'
(Larson, 1977).
But Power (1991, 1997) argues against the essentially functionalist approach in the sociology of
professions.
'The existence of technical knowledge is never a sufficient condition for its institutional
implementation' (Power, 1991, p. 335).
In additional to technical knowledge, there are complex and inter-personal dynamics inherent in
its development and dissemination within firms (Morris and Empson, 1998). In other words,
knowledge in organisational settings is not simply based on objectified reality, but is socially
constructed. Although the technical skills of the auditor are emphasised in his/her formal
qualifications, actual day-to-day work in the field may be more concerned with the deployment of
inter-personal skills and the maintenance of the professional image.
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The system of knowledge in auditing consists of four principle levels: (1) official knowledge, (2)
training and education, (3) practice in the field, and (4) quality control (Power, 1997, pp. 36-39).
The first level is concerned with institutionalised knowledge structures of audit practice including
its codified rules, regulations on appropriate procedure or behaviour evolving over time. Such
routines are often developed ad hoc at the level of practice and, due to societal demands, become
codified at the level of a firm's internal documentation, and more abstractly at the level of
professional and regulatory bodies. All these procedures constitute what is often referred to as
generally accepted practice. The audit working papers, not sufficiently analytical and partly
descriptive, do not tell the story of why particular audit decisions are made. The process ofwriting
up makes the audit process conform to its institutionalised knowledge base. The second level of
the system constitutes mechanisms of procedural knowledge dissemination, including training,
education and socialisation processes. At this level tacit rules of know-how are learned -that is
styles of behaviours and discourses, the need to 'look busy' etc - as well as practical skills. Formal
examination systems act as barriers to entry supporting the institutionalisation of audit knowledge
by connecting procedures to legitimate forms of its abstract knowledge (Abbott, 1988). The third
level is associated with practice itself where audit judgements are made and written. The auditors
negotiate facts in the audit process in the contexts of discretion while interacting with the clients
who often resent the intrusion. These facts also emerge from 'lonely monotony of backroom
adding and subtracting' and 'ticking and bashing' (Stevens, 1981). The final element of the system
concerns the feedback mechanisms by which the remaining three levels - official knowledge,
practice, training and education - get connected to broader issues of quality. This is not a discrete
level of the system, but is built into all others, often as a response to the external pressures for a
reform. This system represents a powerful model of how a legitimate field of auditing practice is
organised: that is, auditing practice is operationalised in the form of a series of routines, which are
economically constrained to more abstract metaphors of best practice on the one hand, and have a
certain institutional credibility as a technique on the other.
Audit practice is expressed in its technical side where methodologies are designed to depict the
client faithfully and efficiently (a technique is focusing on the creation of facts which depict the
client), and in its social side complicit in modifying and regenerating the profession's abstract
body of knowledge, which reflects in turn its own-interest (a mean for monitoring the auditor's
decisions by making his/her judgements more visible, knowledgeable and documentable)
(Carpenter and Dirsmith, 1993). In other words, auditing practice includes both numerical
computations of the client's financial position, and particular discursive representations and
vocabularies.
Knowledge categories within the audit firms include: (1) individual and codified expertise based
knowledge, (2) individual and tacit experience based knowledge (knowledge of a client's group or
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an area, including an unrivalled range of personal contacts, and know-how of the individual
auditor), (3) collective tacit knowledge embedded in the routines of people as they carry out every
day assignments or encultured in the 'way that people do things around here', and (4) collective
codified knowledge (institutionalised knowledge base of auditing exemplifies codified
knowledge)6. Nonaka (1991) classified knowledge into tacit and explicit. The latter is formal,
systematic, more easily communicated and disseminated in forms of codes and formulas. Tacit
knowledge incorporates highly subjective insights, intuition and ideas of the individual. Tacit
knowledge is deeply rooted in action and in the individual's commitment to specific context - a
craft or profession. Tacit knowledge consists partly of technical skills, kind of informal 'know-
how'. Evaluation, assessment, checking accounts are part of everyday practice mostly explicit, but
sometime take place as a part of the tacit understandings which constitute practice embedded in the
wider social context. At the same time, tacit knowledge has an important cognitive dimension. It
consists of mental beliefs, strategies, and perspectives so ingrained in the individual that he/she
takes them for granted, not being able to articulate them easily.
'We know more that we can tell' (Polanyi, 1962 cited in Lam, 1997).
These implicit means profoundly shape how the individual perceives the world. Knowledge of
experience refers to tacit knowledge which is contextually bound and accumulated by action. In
contrast, knowledge acquired through formal training - a way of learning congruent to external
auditors - is generic in nature, more abstract, theoretical, standardised, internally coherent, and
tends to develop with regard to the best practice of the profession.
Morris and Empson (1998), incorporating Blackler's (1995) and Nonaka's (1991) classifications
presented types of knowledge within the professional firm (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2















(source: Morris and Empson, 1998, p. 615)
6 Blackler (1995) suggested five dimensions of knowledge: embrained, embodied, encultured, embedded,
and encoded. Embedded knowledge resides in systematic routines and procedures. Both embedded and
encoded categories represent the collective codified knowledge base.
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Table 3.2 implies that firms develop different types of knowledge. However, not all aspects of
knowledge in the audit firm may be subject to standardisation processes. Some firms may find
they can collectivise knowledge but not codify it in detail. Or, some firms may not to try to
appropriate tacit knowledge but aim to secure a share of the rents accruing from it. Although the
knowledge base in the audit firm is heavily codified, it is also constantly evolving. The knowledge
requires to be constantly renewing and updating (experience-based interpersonal skills seem
highly valuable). The shaded area of Table 3.2 represents (1) tacit individual knowledge, and (2)
encoded knowledge of the audit firm. These categories of knowledge seem to mediate dynamics
between judgement and structure categories; they are in particular of relevance in the present
study. Within the structure of collective knowledge, the study seeks insights into the usage of
individual tacit experience. Not all the knowledge may be a subject of codification strategies. An
appropriation of some aspects of tacit knowledge may not be susceptible to a transfer or storage
without deterioration.
The knowledge base of the audit firms is embodied in its professional staff. Auditors believe that
their knowledge of the field usually refers to knowledge of the client which is fundamental to their
work. In other words, the client's knowledge is an important source of power and prestige of the
professional firms. Auditors' knowledge of clients comes to delimit what is for them the
organisational reality within which they work. The financial and operational circumstances of the
client provide an important base, including the language, norms, and ideas circulating in both
clients' departments and in the wider audit environment. The auditor reacts to and acts upon the
environment; this dialectical relationship illustrates the mutual constitution of organisations and
environments (Neimark and Tinker, 1986). The knowledge base of the client is accumulated
mainly through informal, tacit means; through personal experience, through mistakes, and
continuing involvement (Radcliffe, 1999). Knowledge of the client's business is significant in the
establishment and pursuit of auditing tasks, but is largely unrecorded in conventional terms, and,
in effect, is written into the collective memory of auditors appearing in discursive formations.
Although, on the whole, the knowledge base in auditing is codified and thus structured, knowledge
with regard to fraud is rather excluded from this structure. Fraud knowledge and experience is
content and contextual dependent: embedded in the industry specifications and the client's further
particulars: such experience is not easily codified to facilitate structured inquiry. Thus, fraud
knowledge transfers a require highly diffused and fluid approach to the audit process and the
underlying systems of unstructure enabling its individual dissemination7.
7 For example, the Japanese organisational model seems facilitative of processes of fraud knowledge transfer
and dissemination. Knowledge may be accessed via intimate, socially constructed networks of individuals
(Nor, 1999).
Radcliffe (1999) argued that procedures, guides and documentary analysis, associated with the
popular image of auditing as a bureaucratically rational practice, seem to be of a relatively minor
value in the field. He realised that some auditors themselves turned away from such tools, having
found them to be of limited value. Those auditors perceive the local discourse and tacit knowledge
that they accumulate over time as being an essential resource that allows them to make audit
traceable. Thus, applied knowledge may derive from theoretical principle and standardisation, but
is also developed experimentally as interpretations in the form of responses to current clients'
problems. Newly created knowledge is likely to be informal and tacit (Nonaka, 1994, Morrison
and Empson, 1998). If the knowledge base is not updated and renewed, the firm runs the risk of
offering yesterday's solutions to the current problems of its clients.
By constituting the knowledge base in procedural terms, the nature of auditing is elusive and
somewhat obscured. Thus, the issue sits deep in the heart of practice and including a wide
environment concerns the relative balance between trust in independent judgement and the need
for conformity to formal and publicly defendable rules of the conduct. A social construction of the
auditing milieu requires embeddedness of its judgement in a contextual framework.
3.5 A framework for professional judgement
The very nature of the financial statement audit is socially constructed (Power, 1997; Grey, 1998),
and therefore simultaneously affects and is influenced by the society in a wide environmental
context. Broadly defined environment, a body of professional knowledge, legitimacy processes,
accountability issues, the auditor's characteristics, specific features of the audit task and the
decision making process itself, all build up interrelated key components of a framework for
professional judgement. A simple depiction of the milieu for the professional judgement of the
auditor is presented in Exhibit 3.2.
Without knowing the characteristics of the environment in which judgements are made, it seems
impossible to evaluate its quality. Broadly defined, the environment affecting professional
judgement encompasses: (1) the audit clients, including knowledge of their needs and their
businesses, (2) competitors and competitive pressures deriving from the audit services market, (3)
the auditing profession including its international professional bodies, in particular their role in the
administration of professional standards and guidance enveloped in the legitimacy claims, (4)
government with its statutory law, (5) financial statement users and their needs, (6) society with
their opinions and values, and (7) the audit firm itself including its culture, internal policies and
































The audit judgement milieu:
A simple depiction of reciprocally interrelated components of professional judgement
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The auditor develops a level of knowledge concerning the clients, sufficient to obtain an
understanding of the events and transactions that are interpreted and executed in judgement. These
may have a significant effect on the audit process. The auditor's level of knowledge appropriate
for an engagement with the particular client should include a general knowledge of the economy
and the industry within which the client operates and the knowledge of the client itself.
Acceptance of, and continuity with, clients means interpreting them and anticipating potential
problems. The audit judgement is significantly influenced by the level of cognition (i.e. individual
codified knowledge) and affection (i.e. 'gut feeling') in the first stages of the audit process8.
In the last two decades increased competition in the provision of audit services, socio-economic
development and the globalisation of markets have resulted in time and fee pressures in the audit
firms (see chapter 2 for more details). Demands imposed on auditors have been extended: an
increased workload leads the auditor to struggle in order to balance the nature and extent of audit
work with the desire to maintain good relations with the client. Public pressure on the auditor to
exert high quality in professional judgement and, simultaneously, competitive pressures on the
audit services market, make it difficult to perform audit responsibilities within given time and fee
constraints.
The auditor must be continually aware of these pressures since they may introduce undesirable
biases in judgements. The role of the audit firm, in particular its culture, internal policies,
procedures, and codes of conduct, are all significant to audit judgement. There may be situations in
which the auditor encounters compliance dilemmas between the internal policies and procedures of
the audit firm, and his/her level of subjectivity and scepticism applied in judgement. The role of
the auditing profession and its authority in the development of auditing standards and guidelines,
and codes of professional conduct (The Auditor's Code, APB, 1996), as well as the government
with statutory law (Companies Act 1985 and 1991), are important jurisdictionary elements of the
audit environment in which judgements are made. Professional standards have a pervasive
influence on professional judgement since auditors, embedded in the dynamics of legitimation
processes are regarded as bearers of professional knowledge, and are ethically bound to conform
with those standards. However, some demands for professional judgement arise because of
imprecision and inconsistency in the wording of the standards and/or because of a lack of specific
guidance in more ambiguous audit contexts.
8 The pre-engagement decision process is seen as the most important step in the audit process because no
other controls can adequately mitigate the adverse effects of a decision to serve an undesirable client
(Murray, 1992).
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Accountability is an important factor in a framework for professional judgement since audit is
about judgement (APB, 1994) and the purpose of the audit is to secure accountability (Flint, 1988).
Accountability may be envisaged as a duty to provide an account of the actions for which one is
responsible. It encompasses a pre-existing expectation that justification may be called for.
Accountability can be seen as a relationship involving giving and demanding the reasons for
conduct (Giddens, 1984). To be accountable is to be liable to present account of, and answer for,
the execution of responsibilities to those entrusting those responsibilities (Roberts and Scapens,
1985). The general framework of accountability in the accounting and auditing literature is the
principal-agent model (Power, 1991, Laughlin, 1996) which assumes that a principal (an
individual or an organisation) has certain rights to make demands on the conduct and the reasons
for conduct of an agent. These rights are assumed to derive from the fact that the principal
transfers resources to the agent with expectations as how these resources are to be used.
'He who pays the piper calls the tune' (Laughlin, 1996).
Thus, financial accountability imposes on an agent (the audit client) the obligation to supply
periodic ex post financial accounts to a principal (the shareholders) on uses of resources which
have been entrusted to the former by the latter. Because the client, third party or other audit firm
can call a particular act or an event into question at any time, auditing decisions must be
defensible. The auditor must be prepared to justify, document and take responsibility for
judgements and decisions with regard to (un)qualifying the financial statements, as a means of
providing assurance to society. In view of the consequences of such work, the auditor is always
faced with the prospect of being held accountable for any audit judgements or actions. The
profession requires the auditor to act in the interest of primary shareholders, whilst having regard
to the wider public interest.
'The identity of primary stakeholders is determined by reference to the statute or agreement
requiring an audit: in the case of companies, the primary stakeholder is the general body of
shareholders' (The Auditors' Code, APB, 1996).
The individual possesses potentially diverse forms of knowledge, different tastes and preferences
(e.g. tolerance for ambiguity), a specific memory structure embedded in hermeneutic circles - or
more specifically a unique combination of individual-specific characteristics. Hence, individual
characteristics can influence the execution of professional judgement. The auditor exists
simultaneously as a professional and as a private individual. The distinction has to be made
between those personal characteristics of the auditor required by the profession and those
'residing' in the personality of each individual. The auditor envisaged as a professional is
independent, knowledgeable and experienced, maintains professional competence and is aware of
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the judgmental biases. The auditor envisaged as a private individual is affective, has
inquisitiveness and innate scepticism reflecting societal and ethical values. Quinn et al. (1996)
argued that a professional intellect operates on four levels: cognitive knowledge, skill, system
understanding, and self-motivated creativity. Cognitive knowledge is a base for mastery of a
discipline achieved through training and education. Advance skills translate 'book-learning' into
effective execution; the ability to apply the rules to complex client's problems. System
understanding is knowledge of the cause and effect relationships underlying the profession. It
permits moving beyond the execution of tasks to solve more complex problems with the innate
ability to anticipate subtle interactions and unintended consequences. The ultimate expression of
systems understanding is the level of applied intuition - through the tacit means of the individual.
Self-motivated creativity consists of will, motivation, and adaptability in the midst of the firm
culture. These interrelated characteristics make the auditor an independent professional, capable of
making things auditable.
The assertion of professional conduct involves assessing the auditor's performance according to
notions of independence, objectivity and integrity. These audit concepts are interrelated. The
independence of the auditor relates to the circumstances that would favour the application of
unbiased judgement in arriving at the opinion or decision in a particular situation, whereas
objectivity relates to the auditor's state of mind that results in the application of unbiased
judgement (APB, 1996). Objectivity is characterised by integrity and an impartial approach to
professional work. The auditor's professional integrity provides a benchmark for assessing the
objectivity of the audit opinion (Bartlett, 1993). The rules of professional conduct require
independence and objectivity of the auditor (APB, 1996). Thus, the auditor as a professional has a
fundamental responsibility to exercise the highest standard of professional judgement based on
these abstract concepts of independence, objectivity and integrity. Audit firms should be concerned
with a development of quality controls specifically aimed towards securing these concepts.
The auditor's expertise is envisaged as another determinant which influences audit judgement, a
concept difficult to define and operationalise. One of the important determinants of expertise is a
general problem-solving ability, which includes the ability to recognise relationships between data,
interpret data and reason analytically. To provide high quality in audit services the auditor must
continuously review his/her knowledge. On-the-job experience and training helps the auditor to
acquire the requisite expertise and skills. The experienced auditor can readily distinguish relevant
evidence from irrelevant data in the specific problem, and apply relevant knowledge to accept the
responsibilities for the outcomes of the decision. The auditor has to be able to adjust decision¬
making strategies to fit particular situations. In addition, experience assists the auditor in insightful
recognition and evaluation of more ambiguous and/or conflict situations, and enhances overall
decision-making ability. A significant part of the auditor's experience relates to the accumulated
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knowledge of a priori performed audit tasks and embeddedness with particular clients (Bedard et.
al., 1994). To sustain professional competence, the auditor needs to participate in on-going training
and continuous self-education by keeping informed and complying with developments in
professional standards and guidelines, revising his/her knowledge base (codified and tacit), and
being responsive to eventual changes.
'Auditors act with professional skill, derived from their qualification, training and practical
experience. This demands an understanding of financial reporting and business issues, together with
expertise in accumulating and assessing the evidence necessary to form an opinion'
(The Auditors' Code, APB, 1996).
Further, the ability to know one's own limitations relates to the auditor's level of self-knowledge.
The auditor, aware of his/her own limitations must be prepared to consult with others.
The auditor's personal characteristics ultimately affect his/her actions and thus have an impact on
audit judgement processes. Each individual person has a particular way of perceiving the world
and existing in the world. The phenomenology of the individual is shaped by a particular culture,
embeddedness in a widely defined environment, and learning processes; then is adjusted according
to personal beliefs, societal norms and universal values. The nature of our beliefs is related to
human emotions, needs and attitudes. Here, an affective side of judgement disseminates. Thus, the
personality of the auditor and his/her expertise and experience are intertwined and interrelated in
the judgement process. It is argued that certain auditors are more likely to defer to management
representations in order to avoid potential conflicts between a particular client and the audit firm.
Personal characteristics of the auditor which have an impact on his/her capacity to doubt what is
seen as the truth under pressure include: (1) scepticism and affect, (2) ethical orientation, (3)
conflict management style, and (4) ego strength. These individual differences of the auditor as a
private individual seem to be relevant in particular at the planning stage of audit. There are many
classifications of personal traits affecting individual behaviour in decision making. This selection
is based on a literature review on audit judgement and decision making studies (see section 3.2).
A notion of scepticism relates to the level of applied intuition in the audit process. It is a personal
ability to be distant and to doubt what is seen as a truth, in particular with regard to complex,
and/or conflict situations. An attitude of professional scepticism is inherent in the exercise of
professional judgement. The auditor's scepticism derives from requirements of professionalism,
but originates in the personality of an individual.
'Auditors approach their work with thoroughness and with an attitude of professional
scepticism' (The Auditor's Code, APB, 1996).
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Without the attitude of professional scepticism the auditor may not recognise red flags in the
client's environment. Red flags are factors that increase the risk of material misstatement and
circumstances which indicate that the financial statements could be materially misstated. Thus, the
auditor may draw inappropriate conclusions from gathered evidence. On the other hand, the
auditor who approaches each audit with obsessive suspicion and paranoia, viewing each
transaction or circumstance as a likely fraud, would never be able to complete any audit. Thus, the
level of professional scepticism applied in audit should be somewhat intuitively balanced in order
to sustain the high quality ofjudgement.
Conflict management style also seems to affect individual judgement in the audit process since
conflicts at the work place may produce either positive or negative consequences for the audit
firm. The result of the conflict often depends on the method of conflict management adopted by
the individual involved (Schwenk, 1990). Individuals may perceive conflict situations harmful
either for themselves or for the organisation, and in that case are likely to view each situation with
suspicion. As a result of these perceptions, they tend to avoid conflicts (Janis and Mann, 1977). On
the other hand, certain individuals may tend to view unpleasant conflict situations as productive
and constructive (Tjosvold, 1985). In either case, the outcome of conflict situations seems to be
significantly influenced by decision makers conflict management style. In the auditing profession
the auditor frequently finds himself/herself in complex situations where conflict may arise. There
are instances when the most pervasive type of evidence can be obtained only via thorough inquiry
of the client since the client's management seem to be the only reasonable sources for answers
concerning underlying features of internal controls, unexpected fluctuations or certain accounting
estimates (Koonce, 1992). For instance, the client may provide the auditor with explanations
concerning particular features of the internal control system and the auditor must decide if these
representations are reliable and competent as evidential matter. In a situation when the auditor
considers information provided by management as incomplete or unreliable, he/she will demand
additional testing with the risk of open conflict with the client over a potential fees re-negotiation.
However, if management representations are considered as sufficient and reliable, potential
conflict is suppressed and no further testing is required. In addition, negative attitudes towards the
client may affect the categories of efficiency and effectiveness of the independent audit by limiting
the auditor's willingness to interact with the client's management. Since the evidence gathering
phase of the audit involves ongoing communication with the client, the perceived severity of
communication barriers seem to have an impact on how much interaction between the client
management and the auditor actually occurs. If the auditor perceives significant barriers to
communication and fears to create a potential conflict in the relationship, he/she may perceive
interaction with the client's management as non-useful or insufficient. As a result, the auditor may
avoid the client and attempt to gather information for evidence using alternative sources. The
auditor should be aware of his/her own attitude to conflict situations with the client while making a
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judgement, in order to be able to foresee the risk of bias over the decision made which his/her
personality may implicitly impose.
Ethical orientation is one of the important individual characteristics of the auditor affecting
judgement. Auditors must be sensitive to ethical situations (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). Several
studies have indicated that individuals with high moral standards are more sensitive to ethical audit
issues associated with client integrity and competence (Ponemon and Gabhart, 1990; Trevino and
Youngblood, 1990; Shaub et al., 1993; Bernardi, 1994). Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) claimed that
the moral development of the auditor could affect the audit strategy and its effectiveness. Ponemon
(1990) demonstrated a relationship between individual ethical reasoning and the audit judgement
with regard to client integrity, and thereby noticed an important link between the auditor's moral
development and the quality of audit. Shaub et al. (1993) found that the auditor's ethical
orientation is associated with increased sensitivity to ethical issues. Bernardi (1994) found that
audit managers sensitive to moral issues tend to detect fraud at a higher rate. Therefore, it can be
argued that auditors with high personal morality tend to be more sensitive to management
(mis)representations and to red flags indicating the potential risk of material misstatements, and
accordingly to be more alert to recognition of potential fraud.
Kohlberg (1976) argued that most individuals develop heuristics for dealing with complex,
controversial issues and dilemmas, and these heuristics fall into different stages of moral
development: (1) pre-conventional, (2) conventional, and (3) post-conventional (Table 3.3). In the
pre-conventional stage, individuals make moral decisions based on the consequences of an action,
such as reward, exchange of favours, punishment or on the unquestioning deference to power
(mode 1), or the right action is defined as that which satisfies individual needs, and the elements of
fairness are interpreted in terms of physical or pragmatic consequences upon the decision maker.
In mode 2 egoistic reasoning applies to the interest of an individual, resulting in a trade-off
between self-interest and public interest. In the conventional stage, rules within the society and the
needs of others are relevant to the moral reasoning of the individual. Mode 3 emphasises behaviour
in order to gain approval from others for the decision maker; thus the significance of conformity to
stereotypes of majority, or acceptable behaviour is underlined. Within mode 4 an individual takes
the perspective of a generalised member of society. Thus, in this mode, emphasis is put upon
adherence to set of societal, legal or religious procedures. This mode reflects upon deontological or
contractual reasoning, where a person uses logic to identify duties or imply contractual obligations.
Deontological or contractual reasoning is reflected in professional codes of conduct. In the post-
conventional stage, the good of society is included in the moral reasoning of the individual. Mode
5 emphasises the possibility of changes in law based upon rational considerations of social unity.
Mode 6 defines 'right' by the consequence of the decision maker in accordance with self-chosen
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ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensives, universality and consistency9. If the
auditor's response to an ethical dilemma is related simply to following professional ethical
standards and guidance, i.e. compliance audit, it would have an equivalence to using societal rules
to frame individual response in Kohlberg's stages ofmoral development (mode 4).
Table 3.3
Kohlberg's stages of moral development
Stage Mode
1 .Pre-conventional 1: Punishment and obedience orientation
2: Instrumental relativist orientation
2. Conventional 3: 'Good person' orientation
4: Law and order orientation
3. Post-conventional 5: Social contract legalistic orientation
6: Universal ethical principle orientation
Increased sensitivity to broader and more idealistic, 'what should be' notions of behaviour are
associated with the two highest modes in Kohlberg's approach: a post-conventional stage (mode 5
and mode 6). The auditor at these higher modes tends to be more sensitive to 'what should be'
issues, such as judgements that may relate to public expectations, higher quality, higher rate of
fraud recognition, etc. Table 3.4 below presents an application of Kohlbergian moral development
to individual audit judgement.
The stages of moral development attempt to identify the auditor's perceptions on his/her use of
fairness in the judgement processes. Because of the fact that the auditing profession has a long
tradition of formal codes of ethics, there is a danger that auditors may tend to view ethics10, and
respectively ethical dilemmas, according to dichotomous criteria; 'covered/not covered by the
professional code' (mode 4). Thus, the auditor needs to transcend the conventional stages,
applying judgement with the notion of scepticism, mediated by individual values and professional
experience.
9 Literature provides several techniques for measuring moral judgement: the Moral Judgement Interview
(Kohlberg and Colby, 1987), the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1986; 1979) and the Multidimensional Ethical
Scale (Reidenbach and Robin, 1995; 1990; 1988; Hansen, 1992). This study does not tend to quantify the
level of moral judgement of an individual since each technique carries a bias resulted from measuring
stereotyping and prejudice opinions on ethical behaviour, rather than authentic, rational judgement. Hence,
the morale of the individual is encompassed in the theoretical framework for audit judgement.
10 Definition of ethics from gr. Ethos - a set of moral principles of good, right, duty, obligation, virtue,




The auditor's stages of moral development: A Kohlbergian approach
Stage Mode
1 .Pre-conventional 1. Obedience to the hierarchy and authority in audit
firm, and promotional incentive orientation.
2. Successful cost-effective audits, efficiency drive and
promotional incentive orientation
2. Conventional 3. Stereotypical, encultured in the audit firm
Acceptable behaviour, internal policies/manuals
compliance orientation.
4. Professional standards and guidance, law compliance
orientation; goodpractice.
3. Post-conventional 5. Quality and evolving standards orientation.
More judgement, interpretive practice.
6. Awareness of evolving nature of professional
standards and law in accordance with universal ethical
principles orientation. Highest quality of audit services.
Interpretive, judgmental practice
The ability of the individual to self-direct activities in complex situations, i.e. field independence,
is an important characteristic affecting audit judgement, since the auditor evaluates information
and identifies problems embedded within the context of a wider environment prior to making a
decision. Ego strength moderates individual capacity to doubt what is regarded as truth. Ego
strength is associated with strength of conviction and self-regulating skills. Individuals with high
level of ego strength benefit from a high level of self-esteem. High self-esteem is manifested in
one's self-respect, appreciation of own merits and recognition of own faults to overcome. Hence,
individuals with higher self-esteem tend to evaluate data in ambiguous situations better.
Individuals with a high level ofmotivation to self-direct their own activities are better at problem
solving (Cohran and Davis, 1987) and decision making (Benbasat and Dexter, 1982). Pincus
(1990) found that more field independent auditors detect fraud at higher rates.
The features of the audit task build up another factor within a framework for audit judgement. The
specific features of the audit task, in particular the type of audit evidence sought in relation to
materiality and audit risk", impacts the exercise of professional judgement.
11 The audit risk model is a core of the risk-based audit methodologies. The audit risk model consists of three
components: the inherent risk, the risk that material misstatements will occur; the control risk, the risk that
internal controls do not prevent or correct material misstatements; and the detection risk, the risk that the
audit procedures will not detect material misstatements (SAS 300, APB, 1995).
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The auditor tends to be particularly sensitive to audit evidence with respect to the hypotheses
assessing fair presentation of financial statements. The evidence available to the auditor is often
persuasive in its nature, not conclusive, in which case judgement permeates the auditor's work.
Further, evidence is influenced by more abstract categories, such as materiality, inherent risk,
efficiency, etc. The auditor is required to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence. Audit
judgement with respect to appropriateness and sufficiency of audit evidence is influenced by
materiality and audit risk considerations. Decisions over materiality and risk form the basis for
determining the extent of the auditing procedures to be undertaken.
In the mid-1960s various forms of statistical sampling in audit were replaced by the system
approach of analytical auditing based largely on the examination and evaluation of internal control
systems. In the mid-1980s analytical auditing was supplemented by the risk approach based on the
audit risk model. This model focuses the audit accordingly to materiality and risk judgements,
reducing the audit of areas low in inherent risk and low in control risk. In the beginning of 1990s
the fourth generation of audit approach evolved, namely strategic auditing.
'In the traditional detailed audit ['risk-based' audit], auditors' expectations are developed by
selecting a random or judgmental sample of accounting transactions; testing the transactions
through inspection and validation of corroborating documentation, observation, inquiry, or
recomputation; and projecting the adjusted sample amount to a population basis. Expectations
developed from details of transaction samples, because they are based on a reductionist process,
have inherent shortcomings which can lead to potential decision-making biases... Without a more
thorough and unbiased understanding of inherent business risks that threaten the client's business
activities, the auditor's ability to judge effectively whether sufficient competent evidential matter
has been collected can be hindered' (Bell et al., 1997, p. 63-64).
While the audit risk was reduced to an acceptable level by reduction of the detection risk (in the
risk-based approach), the new approach shifts focus to the inherent risk and the control risk.
'Clients ask for an audit that does more than look at numbers. They want to know about potential
risks facing their business and to know how they compare against industry best practice'
(Jeppesen, 1998).
Fisher (1996) argued that the realised benefits of introducing new audit methodologies stems from
the reduction of costly substantive audit procedures. The Big Five audit firms envisage the new
approach as aimed towards the integration of audit with other services such as consulting and tax;
this holistic approach enables understanding of the strategic objectives of the clients, associated
risks, and controls necessary to respond to the risks. The new strategic approach - the business
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measurement process methodology - includes strategic analysis, business process analysis, risk
assessment, business measurement, and continuous improvement. The overall risk assessment
starts with strategic analysis. Strategic analysis is intended to give the auditor an understanding of
the client environment and the client's potential for reorientation. At this stage the auditor strives
to understand the history of the client, its business strategy, objectives, business risks and planned
responses to such risks. In business process analysis, a profound understanding of the key business
processes supporting the strategy is aimed for. By the end of this stage risks are identified, as well
as processes to control those risks. The risk assessment is a continuous process performed
throughout the audit. The traditional conception of control beyond the segregation of duties and
functions include looking into diagnostic control systems measuring, and monitoring the
accountability of empowered, belief systems, and incentives. Also taking place on an ongoing
basis is business measurement, in which additional evidence needed is obtained. Finally, a
continuous improvement process takes place. The new strategic auditing supplies the client with
new reports: the business profile (i.e. a customised description of the client's business), the
business risk profile (e.g. understanding ofmanagement's perception, assumptions and judgements
about risks), and the gap analysis (e.g. gaps between the client's performance and the benchmarks
as defined) (Bell et al., 1997). To sum up the new audit approaches - strategic, business audit - are
largely about detecting inherent risks and about evaluating corresponding controls. Inherent risk is
redefined and perceived as the risk that the client may not reach its strategic objectives. Where
previously financial audit was confined to financial statements, the new approach attempts to audit
the client's business and strategy. Further, regardless to the different methodologies used, some
structure is inevitably present in audit process.
The knowledge base in auditing is biased towards the client by the focus on adding value to the
audit, being aggravated by the direct involvement of the client in choosing the areas to be audited
(Jeppesen, 1998). It seems that auditing is constantly being attached to models and frameworks
which promise a new operational potential. Power (1997) argued that the common sense view is
that audit techniques are accepted by auditors because they more or less 'work' whereas the
systemic view is that these techniques and procedures are perceived to 'work', because they have
become institutionally acceptable ways of gathering and processing audit evidence (p. 88). The
structure of the audit process, however, does not end judgement; rather it relocates judgement and
directs it in a certain way. Any audit methodology encompasses both structure and judgement and,
therefore, a tension operates between them. As a result of'compliance pressure' to maintain a high
standard of practice, the auditor may not necessarily mediate or/and reflect upon the structure of
the process while conducting the audit.
In short, the auditor exists as a professional and as a private individual. The auditor's individual
traits - incorporating his/her existence as a professional and as a private individual - and the
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dynamics of a wide environment influence the ways in which the judgement strategies in the field
are applied. The organisational 'learning process' and work place itself predispose in certain ways
the auditor's style of conduct and his/her attitudes to the judgement processes. The individual
organises and processes information by relating affective judgement to modes of cognitive styles.
The cognitive judgements which manifest themselves in the routine of everyday activities at all
stages of organisational systems and processes, are an important determinant of professional
performance12. Hence, it is argued that applied cognitive judgements predetermine the ways in
which the auditor organises and processes information while exercising professional judgement
and respectively how he/she 'reads' audit evidence. Prior literature has recognised the importance
of cognitive style in audit judgement and decision making (Bernardi, 1994; Pincus, 1990;
Anderson and Marchant, 1989). It seems that the auditors who are more structured and analytical
in their thinking will take to codification more readily. Riding and Cheema's (1991) overall
classification of individual cognitive styles, bipolar in nature13 is summarised in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5
(W)holist and analytical family of cognitive styles
(VV)holist style Analyst style
• Wholist • Analyst
• Intuitive • Analytical
• Diverging • Converging
• Innovator • Adaptor
• Holist • Serialist
• Impulsive • Reflective
(source: Sadler-Smith and Badger, 1998, p. 250)
12
Cognitive judgements relate to cognitive styles, i.e. modes of perceiving, problem solving, remembering,
reflective of information processing regularities which develop in congenial ways as around underlying
personality traits (Messick, 1984). For more discussion on the phenomenon of cognitive styles see Sadler-
Smith and Badger (1998).
13 The purpose of bipolar classification of cognitive styles is to present different ways of describing
individual styles rather than better ways of thinking. Prior research supports such view (Sadler-Smith and
Badger, 1998; Sadler-Smith, 1997; Riding and Pearson, 1994; Kirton, 1989).
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Riding (1991) argued that some individuals process information into its component parts while
others retain a global overview of information. The former characterises analysts and the latter
defines (w)holists or intuitive thinkers. Intuitive thinking seems to be executed in immediate
judgements, based largely on feelings, and in the adoption of a global perspective in the decision
making processes involving imagination, intuition, receptivity and simultaneity. Analytical
thinking is likely to result in judgements, based on mental reasoning and focus on detail (Allison
and Hayes, 1996). (W)holists, tend to be over-inclusive in their thinking. For analysts, the
separation of the whole problem into parts may mean that one aspect of the problem may be
emphasised on the expense of its other aspects, and hence its overall importance exaggerated.
Respectively analysts tend to be convergent in their thinking while (w)holists characterise
divergent approach to thinking. Sadler-Smith and Badger (1998) argued that intuitive thinkers
characterise entrepreneurial and proactive behaviour which translate in their acceptance of higher
risks and a resistance to bureaucracy, norms and routines of underline tasks. Analytical thinkers,
on the other hand, seem to be good at planning and co-ordinating sets of activities in the pursuit of
well-defined and structured goals. Similarly, Kirton (1989) argued that adaptors are those
individuals who conform to structure and discipline (i.e. more structured thinkers) while
innovators characterise less structured thinking. With relation to modes of individual learning
processes Pask (1976) argued that serialists (analysts) take small steps at a time in learning
processes. Serial learning is thus facilitated by a reflective mode of a task repetition with step by
step changes for incremental development of the individual. Holists however progress rather
impulsively by drawing together knowledge obtained across different activities. Individuals may
combine styles or aspects of styles to provide an alternative for dealing with a particular problem
or facing a particular decision (Allison and Hayes, 1996). Hence, a cognitive strategy in judgement
is a function of the interaction of the individual's style of conduct and the underlying situation.
Cognitive strategies for audit judgement and decision making are summarised in Table 3.6.
Auditors have different ways of being with regard to audit judgement and decision making
processes. Auditors of an analyst style are likely to engage in concrete judgement processes in a
manner different from auditors of a (w)holist style14.
14 In this study it is assumed that cognitive style of an individual is relatively static over time. Pask (1976)
argued that some individuals may employ both serialist [i.e. analytical] and holist approaches in decision
making. Those individuals have versatile strategies for action, some which derive from cognitive style and
others, which are consciously applied to overcome the weakness of cognitive style approach (i.e. the product
of a conscious strategy).
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Table 3.6
Applied strategies for audit judgement and decision making
Holistic Analytical
Unstructured judgement Structured judgment
processes processes
• Revision and re-appraisal of • Working within existing norms,
existing norms, procedures procedures, accepted structure
and constrains of the structure
• Creates of overall picture • Gives details in isolation
• 'Big picture' orientation • 'Black box' orientation
• Wide horizon • Narrow horizon
• Broad generalisations as • Gives specific hypotheses
hypotheses
• Looks for alternatives • Proceeds in stepwise manner
approaches for decision
• Relates ideas to everyday
experience
(source: Sadler-Smith and Badger, 1998, p. 250)
Some auditors are characterised by precision, reliability, discipline and conformity to the structure
of the audit tasks. They tend to seek solutions applying previously tested modes of highly
structured audit methodologies maintaining high accuracy over long spells of detailed work. Other
auditors typify undisciplined thinking and tangential approaches to audit tasks and judgement
processes. They tend to transcend the structure of audit methodologies and may see well beyond
conventional practice of materiality and risk assessments. Those auditors who are capable of
deployment of both strategies, depending on underlying circumstances, are versatile. Hence,
auditors of an analyst style seem to be 'at home' in an audit task which requires planning
embedded in a highly structured and logical method. Auditors of (w)holist style, however, would
find the demands of a structured audit task at odds with their preferred way of judgement and
decision making. In short, auditors who adopt convergent strategies to idea production in audit
judgement and decision making are envisaged as more structured thinkers whereas auditors who
adopt divergent strategies to idea initiation in audit process as more unstructured in their thinking.
Thus, cognitive judgement is one of the key factors,13 which intervenes between aptitude and
ability to predispose audit processes.
15 Other determinants of audit behaviour include the widely defined environment including the legitimation
of the profession, the morale of audit firm, as well as the auditor's own value system (see Exhibit 3.2).
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The decision-making process itself is part of a framework for audit judgement. The decision¬
making process in the exercise of professional judgement applies to each phase of audit; that is to
the stages of planning, evaluation of systems, testing, evidence aggregation and opinion
formulation. Judgement assists the auditor right way through all stages of the decision making
process. Judgement is present in identifying crucial aspects of the audit, gathering information,
seeking solutions, evaluating alternatives and reaching conclusions. The ability to identify the
aspects of audit in a holistic manner depends on the auditor's experience and expertise combined
with his/her intuition. Professional scepticism should always be present particularly with regard to
the acceptance of management representations. The auditor must independently corroborate any
significant assertions and representations made by the management16. The auditor must be aware
that often there is no single solution to an auditing question, which leaves a lot of space for
individual judgement. The auditor is often overly concerned with the views of the client's
management and does not challenge the client to seek for alternatives Having completed the
evaluation of alternatives, the auditor should be ready to reach final conclusions (CICA, 1995). In
summary, it is important for the auditor to acknowledge that professional judgement adopts a
decision making process incorporating key steps: interpretation of the situation, identification of
crucial aspects of audit, gathering information, identification of possible solutions, evaluation of
alternatives and reaching the conclusions. Each of these steps requires the exercise of professional
judgement so that legitimately defensible decisions concerning financial statements may be
reached.
The more ambiguous aspects of individual judgement call for clarification. The focal point in the
processes of understanding audit judgement seems to be correlated with one's awareness of self, of
dynamism and reciprocity of key interrelated factors in the auditing milieu (as per Exhibit 3.2).
3.6 Summary
Financial statements exist in a context where individual judgements are influenced by many
factors. In making a decision in the judgement process, the auditor is subject to various contextual
factors relating to practice. These include the regulatory framework (professional standards and
guidance, law) to be complied with, factors affecting the quality of the audit (client's firm type,
industry, etc.) and factors affecting audit independence (length of tenure, fee level, level of NAS
provided to the client, etc.). The elements of the audit judgement milieu incorporate social and
contextual aspects of audit practice in its turbulent reality. In this study, the audit judgement milieu
encompasses a widely defined environment comprising of (1) the auditing profession with its body
of knowledge, legitimacy claims and standardisation processes, (2) government with laws, (3)
audit firms with their cultures, tacit knowledge and internal procedures, (4) competitors and
16 The auditor should not to fall into so called confirmatory trap of searching solely for information to
confirm a preliminary hypotheses rather than searching for information which refutes it (CICA, 1995).
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pressures to retain clients and pressures for NAS, (5) clients with their powers, (6) financial
statements users evoking their reporting needs and quality requirements, and (7) widely defined
society with its values and opinions. Within such an environment, elements of the milieu
enveloped in accountability relations include features of the particular audit task, the decision
making process itself and the personal characteristics of the auditor. The personality of the auditor
and his/her expertise and experience are intertwined and interrelated in judgement processes. The
ways in which the individual acts are embedded in on-going learning processes, and are adjusted
according to ways in which he/she perceives the world. The nature of judgement disseminates
complementarily in cognitive and affective dimensions. Thus, the auditor simultaneously exists as
a professional and as a private individual. A balance between personal and anonymous, subjective
and objective, intuitive and technical, concrete and abstract, constitutes the heart of judgement in
the turbulent realms of audit practice. This study focuses on the individual auditor and seeks to
gain some insights into his/her 'learning processes' in professional judgement and tacit knowledge
of being predisposed to audit. Further, the study unveils tensions between structure and judgement
from the practitioner's point of view. New audit methodologies are briefly discussed as a realm of
on-going transformation and adaptation processes in audit firms. The widely defined environment
of the audit milieu sets the contextual scene in which judgements are made, and remains somewhat
opaque since certain elements of the environment affect judgement in ways which are difficult to
pinpoint and define.
In this study, the audit judgement process is being considered from the inside, in terms of the logic
of auditability and subjectivity, with the aim of contributing to the development of new ways of
thinking which might improve judgement processes. The conventional approach of auditing is
openly challenged. Hence, alternative ways of thinking about auditing need to emerge in order to
develop and refine the techniques capable of supporting the duality of the domain: the technical
and social sides of audit practice. A revolving interchange between the profession and society
around the issues of independent judgement and responsibilities of auditing suggests that the
legitimacy processes in the milieu and a corresponding system of abstract knowledge are social in
nature and destined to be continually contested, redefined and modified as social interpretations. It
is easy to lose sight of the uninterpreted world, which precedes ontologically the current
worldview of the individual.
'The main problem is not whether [people] conform to principles of rationality, but to discover
which kind of rationality they are using' (Foucault, 1988, p. 59).
A need for a deeper understanding of judgement processes is one of the key determinants of the
post-modern milieu in audit theory. We must not devalue the network of unveiled elements of the
audit milieu where independent judgement is embodied in a wider context of social institutions,
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structural conditions, and power relations. This wider context thematises the relations between
action (judgement) and structure.
'There are hierarchies of power and processes of legitimation, all of which may remain opaque to
the actors which they enmesh' (Thompson, 1981, p. 157, cited in Llewellyn, 1993).
These elements, attributed to the turbulent environment in which the auditor exists, extrapolate
beyond statistical inquiry. The explanatory component of independent judgement calls for further
clarification by reference to the relationship between action and structure inhabiting a wider
context. Hence, investment in an institutional rationality of the audit process which does not
threaten the discourse of individual judgement needs to be sought. For that reason, this study is
embedded in an interpretive approach and attempts to contribute to understanding audit judgement
through emphasising the social and contextual aspects of audit practice. Interpretive dimensions of
auditing is the subject of discussion in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
Interpretive dimension of auditing: Hermeneutic turn in a methodological framework
4.1 Introduction
Throughout the social sciences, the last two decades have seen the emergence and establishment of
an interpretive and hermeneutic research agenda which seeks to describe and illuminate the
connections between subjective meanings and practices, thus going beyond traditional positivistic
paradigms which confidently asserted the possibility of describing an objective reality'. This
process can be discerned in accounting and auditing research agendas (Hines, 1989; Hopwood,
1983).
Hermeneutics can be envisaged in at least three different ways: (1) as an auxiliary science
providing the rules for explaining ancient texts, i.e. recovering meanings, (2) as a general
problematic of understanding, i.e. interpreting meanings, and (3) as the ontology of the individual
who lives giving meanings to his/her world2; the world envisaged as the horizon of individual
interpretations. 'Being' designates the interpretation of the ways in which the individual
understands him/herself within 'being'. The route of interpretation may lead to an understanding
not only of self, but also of the structures of 'being' in which life is embedded (Leeuwen, 1981, pp.
68 and 70). Hence, the present study, drawing on the general problematic of understanding (point
2) and phenomenological hermeneutics (point 3), in particular Ricoeurian hermeneutics, explicates
the consequences of individual interpretations into the wider social spheres of audit practice.
Hermeneutic phenomenology can be adopted as a methodological framework in interpretive
research where human practice is envisaged as simultaneously reflecting and shaping its own
structures and ideas. Hermeneutics constitutes a 'methodological stance' rather than an
explanatory medium through which research findings are interpreted. Thus, hermeneutics proceeds
from a less encompassing position than grand social theories which have a tendency to
unnecessary abstraction (Ahrne, 1990, p. 19).
1
In a positivist approach the subject and the object of the research is conceptualised as observations and
records concerning the object of the research.
2
Hermeneutics, envisaged as the ontology of the individual, was inspired by the phenomenology of
Heidegger. In this study, hermeneutic phenomenology is represented by the work of Ricoeur.
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Llewellyn (1993) states, with reference to hermeneutics that:
'[T]herecan be no clear-cut distinction between a 'methodological stance' and the adoption of fully
developed social theory as a theoretical framework3; the latter position tends to substantiate the
initial theory rather than producing new knowledge' (Llewellyn, 1993, p. 234).
Hermeneutics serves as an appropriate research vehicle for this study in that its methodological
focus is the work of interpretation; how the individual makes sense of and interacts dialectically
with the surrounding structures and realities. By refuting the positivistic division between
'subjective' and 'objective', the phenomenological perspective does not pre-empt the ways in
which social reality is constructed, as with grand social theories. It rather seeks to shed light on the
processes by which new perspectives and new knowledge are created by the individual through the
description of the subjective and the ways in which the objective is apprehended.
The auditing and accounting literature has explored aspects of the hermeneutic tradition. Francis
(1994) discussed audit judgement as a hermeneutical practice; Llewellyn (1993), Willmott (1993)
and Boland (1989) discussed hermeneutic contributions towards the paradigm of accounting
research; Lavoie (1987) examined the application of hermeneutics to an understanding of
accounting as the language of business.
The present study, by taking a hermeneutic turn - a particular way of conceptualising audit
practice in the social world - seeks to enhance the understanding of meanings associated with
professional praxis. In particular, the meanings of audit judgement processes are sought through
interpretations, where these meanings are expected to be inferred by auditors themselves. Thus, the
study denies an objective-subjective dualism, and involves an appreciation of the close
intertwining of a social practice and of the language embodied in a particular field of practice
(Taylor, 1979).
This chapter presents the work of auditing as a hermeneutic practice. The remainder of this chapter
is organised as follows. Firstly, the role and significance of hermeneutics is presented. Secondly,
drawing upon Ricoeurian propositions, the parallels between the means of interpreting text and
that of human practice are made. This section discusses implications of the hermeneutic turn as a
methodological stance. Thirdly, the limitations of the Ricoeurian framework are presented.
3 I.e. work of Foucault, Gadamer, Habermas. (See Stewart, 1992; Macintosh and Scapens, 1990; Laughlin,
1987).
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Following that, drawing on organisational theory, a contextualisation of individual practice is
provided in order to integrate subjective understanding with an analysis of more objective
conditions of that practice, which simultaneously enable and constrain the individual endeavour.
The subsequent section demonstrates that auditing can be envisaged as socially constructed
hermeneutic practice. Finally, standardisation processes in auditing are presented, in particular
with regard to audit operational approaches. This section demonstrates the 'downside' effects of
tensions between individual judgement and structure in the audit process in the interrelated
'socially constructed' and 'standardisation' contexts.
4.2 Insights from the theory of hermeneutics
Hermeneutics constitutes a mode of discourse and conceptualises human action in terms of a text
analogue, so that hermeneutics may be subsumed as an interpretive methodology. Historically,
hermeneutics encompassed the notion of the search for authentic knowledge with the attempt to
recover the authenticity of biblical texts where an original meaning had been lost through
successive translations into different languages, and embedded in different cultural contexts. The
sense of the word 'hermeneutics' has evolved over the years and the usage as 'recovery of a
meaning' gave way to the use as 'interpretation of a meaning'4. Nowadays, hermeneutics seeks to
interpret the 'situated practices of the individual' (Scapens, 1992). Hermeneutics generalises all
understanding as a subjective interpretive enterprise of responding to the distance that constitutes
individual being in the world. It is this focus on individual nature in the world which defines
hermeneutics as being concerned with both 'how we are' and 'who we are' (Gadamer, 1991), that
is from epistemological to ontological inquiry. Taking a hermeneutic turn requires approaching the
social world as a text that is alien and unfamiliar; a text in which significance and meaning will
emerge only through interpretation (Boland, 1989). Hence, as a theory, hermeneutic
phenomenology draws parallels ontologically between aspects of social action and certain features
of a text, and methodologically, between the understanding of social action and the interpretation
of a text (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 197). In other words, written theory does not stand apart from actions
as an objective impersonal essence of subjective and personal performance. Rather, theory and
action are bound and both emerge from a common field of language practice. Hence, the
hermeneutic problem centres on action as related to the essentially linguistic character of human
experience and behaviour (Jervolino, 1996, p. 63). The Ricoeurian version of hermeneutics,
adopted in the present study, focuses on social practice as an active relation between the realms of
ideas and the realms of real, material objects (Sayer, 1992, p. 205), not being solely concerned
with the explication of subjective meanings. Ricoeurian hermeneutics also rejects the notion that
explanations are inappropriate in social sciences (Llewellyn, 1993, p. 234). The existence of
structures, through which many unarticulated conditions encompass human practices, invokes the
4
For more discussion on the origin of hermeneutics see Bauman, 1978.
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need for explanation as well as subjective understanding. This problem can be envisaged as
reflection on the fragility of language and socio-political action (Jervolino, 1996, p. 76), implying
that the individual needs to strive to 'win' meaningfulness for his/her action.
Human practices, no less than literary texts, display a sense as well as a reference and possess
internal structures as well as projecting a possible world, a potential mode of individual existence,
which can be unfolded through the process of interpretation. Thus, the individual strives to
construct knowledge about the world through participation in forms of life. This construction of
meanings to the words and to propositions is grounded in the action of daily practice. Ricoeur
(1981) draws on Gadamer's development of philosophical hermeneutics, which constitute a
general framework for articulating how individual understanding emerges through engagement
with the particular traditions and social practices in which one is enveloped. Such a context may
enable standardisation of a particular social practice.
'That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is nameless...always
has power over our attitudes and behaviour' (Gadamer, 1991).
Gadamer (1991) claimed that the world of daily life confronted by the individual is alien, and
therefore in need of interpretation if he/she is to engage in purposive action. He further argued that
interpretation of the world is grounded in the tradition which both prejudices and allows one's
ability to understand the world. Ricoeur (1974) stated that hermeneutics has to do with
'[T]he continual exegesis of the significations that come to light in the world of culture; [...] works,
institutions, and on the other hand, that interpretation is related to symbolic structure' (Ricoeur,
1974, p. 12 and 22).
Hence, hermeneutics implies a reflective or existential moment of explicit or implicit self-
understanding. For Ricoeur an understanding of the other coincides with an understanding of the
self and of 'being' (1974, p. 51). Individual capacity of thinking and being creative tends to be
denied in favour of the power of anonymous structures of the language governing one's
consciousness of the world and of him/herself. To understand individual behaviour is to
understand the structures that constitute his/her language, the network of myths and texts that
constitute his/her culture, the social and institutional structures that constitute his/her society
(Leuween, 1981, p. 75).
4.3 Social action as text
The hermeneutic discourse of action recognises that human practice itself projects a mode of being
in the world, a mode which can only be grasped in a 'discourse which qualifies itself as
interpretation' (Ricoeur, 1981). Action may be regarded as text, insofar as it may be objectified in
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a way that embodies forms of distanciation which constitute the semantic autonomy of the text.
For just as a text is disconnected from its author, so too human practice becomes detached from the
individual and develops consequences of its own. Ricoeur (1981) claimed that unless the
connection between the understanding of social practice and the interpretation of a text is
established, the links between hermeneutics and interpretive methodologies remains tenuous. Fie
unfolds the distinctiveness of discourse in terms of an internal dialectic between event and its
meaning. A word becomes a 'trader' between the system and the act, between the structure and the
event (Ricoeur, 1974). To develop the analogy between the interpretation of texts and that of
human action, Ricoeur (1981) points to ways in which the meaning of an action becomes detached
from the event of its performance, therefore becomes objectified, and thus an appropriate focus for
an act of interpretation. These axioms for the understanding of a social practice as a text-analogue
are summarised in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Ricoeurian hermeneutic propositions
Proposition 1 The fixation of action
The 'sense-content' of action and text must be drawn out;
comprehension is not immediate or unmediated.
Proposition 2 The autonomisation of action
The text or the action has both personal and social significance, its
social dimension implying the possibility of institutionalisation.
Proposition 3 Relevance and importance
The text or the action may transcend its encompassment within its
initial circumstances and develop meanings in other social contexts.
Proposition 4 Action as an 'open work'
Textual interpretation and social understanding are essentially
'open' in nature.
(adapted from Llewellyn, 1993, p. 238)
Firstly, human practices and written texts can be analysed for their 'sense-content' encompassing
anticipated intentions and motivations, thereby including a pre-understanding of rationale and
contradictions to those practices (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 204). Each practice has a prepositional and
identifiable content in the form of structures of locutionary acts, i.e. a coherence between the
practice and individual meanings of the envisaged situation. Hence, the purpose of text-action
analogy is to find coherence between social practice and the meaning of its situatedness for the
individual. Secondly, practice and text are capable of becoming detached from the individual who
91
performed or wrote them and can attain a social dimension, developing consequences of their own
(Ricoeur, 1981, p. 206). In that sense, practice can be understood as a social product; hence the
practice is socially constructed. The social nature of an individual action implies that its
antecedents are not fully encompassed by his/her personal motives. In any social setting, systems
ofmeanings conform to work practices.
'Meanings attributed to work practices are not just in the minds of those engaged in them, but
depend on what they mean in society' (Sayer, 1992, p. 30).
Changes in work practices are therefore accompanied by changes in their meanings. Thus,
behaviour cannot be understood in isolation from the structure of social rules, i.e. standardisation,
by which it is regulated and from which it derives its meaning. Decisions and their fulfilment are
based upon these existential structures to which the individual consents. Both the rules which
define the socially constructed content of human action and the structures which shape the scope
and the power of the individual endeavour present as objectifications. These objectifications
negate an equating of the antecedents of practice with the personal motives, reasons, and intentions
of the individual. It is a process which generates the links between systems of meanings and
material practices, so that what practices are, is dependent partly on what they mean in a wider
environment. Practices become objectified and present as a social reality which simultaneously
enables and constrains individual action, where hierarchies of power, processes of legitimation,
and social structures can be somewhat obscured5. In a similar way, auditing practice depends on
what it means in the society through the process of generating the links between systems of
meanings and material work practices. Thus, action as a text can contribute to an understanding of
the emergence of institutionalisation, where the object of social science is rule-governed behaviour
(Winch, 1958). Governing rules are not superimposed; they are constituted of meanings as
articulated from within the instituted work. This could be envisaged as a kind of objectivity which
proceeds from the social fixation of individual behaviour (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 207). Thirdly,
practices may escape their initial definitions and circumstances and may develop meanings in
other social contexts. The meaning of an important event exceeds, overcomes, and/or transcends
the social conditions of its production and may be re-enacted in new social contexts (Ricoeur,
1981, p. 208). Finally, human action as a text is an 'open work'.
'[Wjork does not only mirror its time, but opens up a world which it bears within itself
(Ricoeur, 1981, p. 208).
5 Some antecedents and consequences of practice are known to the individual but some of the conditions for
social action, such as hierarchies of power or processes of legitimation, may remain unrevealed (Rabinow
and Sullivan, 1979).
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Thus, the interpretation of practice is an integral and necessary condition for the continuity of
social life. Fresh significance can always be placed on an event by invoking a new and different
frame of reference - interpretations which determine new meanings. Any action can receive a new
relevance and interest by being viewed from a different perspective.
In short, Ricoeurian propositions assume that individual interpretations refer to values and beliefs
within the perceived 'contextuality' of action. 'Contextuality' is equated with the setting of the
action and determines individual awareness of the processes and structures which are used to
orient and make sense of the enacted action (Giddens, 1987, p. 215), i.e. a realm of the 'first-order'
construct in the social world. The 'sense-content' of action is not confined to individual reasons,
motives and/or values, and lies in its nature as a social product. Consequently, the 'second-order'
construct can be constructed using language, which reinterprets the action, events and experience
of the individual (proposition 2). However, as practice is essentially an 'open work' (proposition
4), and individuals make and know themselves and their world through social practice, the
individual may appropriate the emerged 'second-order' construct into the 'first-order' construct
and so on.
The notion of human practice as a social product is associated with the post-structuralist notion of
the 'decentring of the subject' (Giddens, 1987, p. 88), evoking that a legitimate account of events
which may differ from or transcend the understanding of the practitioners themselves can be
constructed. Hence, such constructed research enables reflection upon both the pre-understanding
of the author and the 'first-order' construct of the research subject.
Ricoeur's justification for the possibility of treating human practice as a text is built upon two
arguments. His first argument is concerned with the fixation and inspiration of human action. He
argues that the process of action is characterised by an 'intentional exteriorisation', which
facilitates the detachment of the meaning of the action from the event of its performance.
Individual performance becomes in a sense depersonalised by a rule-bound reality enveloped in
organisational and societal norms. One of the traits which characterises the text as work is its
production in accordance with rules that defines its literary genre. 'To master a genre' is 'to master
a competence' which offers practical guidelines for 'performing' an individual work. His second
argument concerns the emancipation of human action from the circumstances and participants of
the underlying situation. As a text is free from reference restrictions, so too the importance of
action transcends its relevance to the original circumstances of its production. An 'important
action' can develop meanings which can be actualised or fulfilled in situations other than the one
in which this action occurred (Ricoeur, 1981). The 'open' nature of human practice points to an
inevitability of the hermeneutic circle of understanding and explanation. As an event, discourse is
an open end, and in principle, an unlimited process of creating meaning. The openess of'language
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as discourse' is evident. Firstly, discourse refers away from itself and becomes a claim of
expressing a view on the world, or affirming something about reality. Secondly, discourse is an
illuctionary act, an act by which some question, statement, or wish is expressed (Leeuwen, 1981,
p. 78).
Hence, the processes through which individuals build understanding about the world is an
interplay of embeddedness in tradition and of the world perceived as a text; this interplay refers to
a hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutics of understanding and explanation describe the processes
through which the subject and the object of the research become somewhat more aware of the
concepts and ideas guiding individual thinking processes. The hermeneutic circle recognises that
in the understanding of a text there is a dependence on a theory of the whole to understand the
parts, and, at the same time, there is a dependence on a knowledge of the parts to comprehend a
theory of the whole (Boland, 1989). Gadamer (1991) argued that this hermeneutic circle can be
perceived as the underlying structure of understanding.
'The circle, then, is not formal in nature, it is neither subjective nor objective, but describes
understanding as an interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the
interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act
of subjectivity, but proceeds from the communality that binds us to the tradition...Thus the
circle of understanding is not a methodological circle, but it describes an ontological structural
element of understanding' (Gadamer, 1991).
As stated earlier, hermeneutic thought is not concerned with a question of absolute knowledge or
method, instead it is concerned with a question of what kind of social practices achieve authentic
and good understanding through which individuals make and know themselves and their world.
Auditing may be envisaged as such a practice. Taking hermeneutics as a research methodology has
its consequences and implications. Firstly, the hermeneutic circle allows more awareness of the
concepts and ideas which guide individual thinking, as well as of inherent emancipatory or
constraining qualities. Ad hoc interpretive skills and some kind of pre-understanding of the event
govern any 'reading' of an event in the social world. The pre-understanding of the researcher and
the researched is conditioned by their social belonging (Llewellyn, 1993, p. 239). A heightened
awareness of such pre-understanding leads the individual to strive to attain more adequate
conceptualisations through both critical reflection and an engagement with their frames of
reference. Subject and object are thus 'mutually implicated' in commitment (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 57).
Secondly, the hermeneutic circle encompasses interpretive research where there is neither an
obvious starting point, nor obvious boundaries to the problem. For the content of narrative analysis
see chapter 5. Such constituted work may be further the subject of appropriation, and from there an
enacted change may emerge.
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4.4 Beyond Ricoeur's hermeneutical point: The medium of institutions
The processes of creating meanings are influenced by the socio-cultural position and experiences
of the practitioner as well as the references of the context in which the act of interpretation takes
place. Ricoeurian hermeneutics brings some limitations, in particular with regard to the
contextualisation of structures in socially constructed practices. Human practice needs to be
situated within the wider social context of social institutions and social conditions through the
thematisation of the relation between action and the structure. In particular, the exercise of power
cannot be easily accounted for in the analogy between structure of social spheres and structure of
language. Thus, the explanatory component of the socially constructed practice may be further
clarified by reference to the relation between action and structure through the medium of
institution. Knowing how to act in specific contexts, is, among other things, knowing the range of
possible actions which are permitted by the relevant institution (organisation), and which provide
the individual with general parameters for acting in new and unanticipated situations. Schemata
become inscribed in the desires, inclinations, attitudes and beliefs of the individual, constituting
the sphere of values as roots of the action. This process of inscription relates to the notion of
'habitus' defined by Bourdieu as 'the durably installed generative principle of regulated
improvisations' (Bourdieu, 1977, p.78). Within the realm of the post-modern economy it is easy to
lose sight of an implicit, uninterpreted world which ontologically precedes the individual's current
worldview. Such schemata, however, may enable the negotiation of routines to novel
circumstances of everyday life; either transmitted through a trail, an imitation, and/or an error.
Human practice embodied in the medium of institution can be a creative and potentially
transformative process. In certain circumstances the individual may act in a way that directly
transgresses an institutional schemata, thereby placing his/her own career and/or the continuation
of the institution at risk. Insights into institutional structures may induce individuals to reflect upon
the circumstances in which they act, and may enable them to grasp 'enshadowed' conditions of
their existence.
Hence, the understanding of motives and actions of the individual as social constructions implies
the embeddedness of their initiative in a wider socio-political milieu. Hermeneutics, through the
interrogation of subjective and objective realms of experience, focuses on the analysis of the
experience of the individual embodied in social practice and the analysis of the objective structures
that make this experience possible (Bourdieu, 1988). The present study, somewhat dressed in
interpretive hermeneutics, is aimed to integrate subjective understandings with an analysis ofmore




In the present study, auditing practice is envisaged as a socially constructed hermeneutic practice.
Firstly, the auditor situated within the practice tradition on a daily basis audits the client, i.e.
interprets the 'representional text' of the client's operations, that is the financial statements. Audit
is then a communication process with the medium of communication being a written text. Drawing
on the tradition in auditing, the auditor strives to understand and interpret the 'economic text'
narrated by the financial statements and to evaluate whether this is a true and fair view, i.e. the
assertions are made in narratives of the client's view of the economic reality. The auditor judges
and attests to the validity of financial statements, which contain stylised interpretations of the
fiscal health of the client's company. For the auditor, judgement about the validity of financial
statements is formed and translated into an audit opinion. By doing so, the auditor reassures the
public that these interpretations are trustworthy. Secondly, the auditor, drawing upon the tradition
of auditing practice, refers to this tradition as auditing standards and guidance. The meaning of
these standards is itself a hermeneutic question, asking what tradition is and what it requires of the
individual in the particular audit engagement. Hence, auditing as interpretive practice shapes the
individual understanding about social life. Thirdly, the auditor as an interpreter situated in the audit
process is distanced from the object-text to be interpreted. That is, the auditor is not 'on location'
and cannot see when and where the underlying events of the client's accounts to be accounted for
have occurred. The auditor's interpretive judgement on financial statements arises in response to
this distance. The auditor processes evidence (data) according to his/her individual experience of
the client where meanings are always context-dependent. Accounting explanations objectify
performance and disconnect the auditor's action from his/her personal motive. The hermeneutic
understanding appears in another important way in the auditing tradition, i.e. the emphasis on the
auditor's scepticism as his/her genuine stance. The sceptical auditor challenges his/her own
preconceptions about the economic text of the client's accounts during the processes of
interpretation and understanding being perpetually sensitive to financial statements' text
alterations. These alterations of 'economic reality' may result in the state of financial statements
not being able to be presented. This may occur in the situations when the auditor doubts the
integrity of the client's management or quality of the client's control systems. Hence, the end-
product of the audit process, an auditor's opinion, and the means of producing the audit are
mediated by the individual auditor. This situates the auditor within the context of hermeneutics.
The auditing profession, like any other profession, has its particular professional and social
significance, simultaneously reflecting on the societal needs and shaping its own distinctive
structures and ideas. Drawing upon the social understanding of audit practice being 'open' in
nature (proposition 4) implies the possibility of its institutionalisation. Auditors, as members of a
profession, co-operate in carrying out designated tasks within specific social contexts. These social
contexts include both an externally imposed structure and internally acquired behaviours. The
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externally imposed structure contains the interrelated components of organisational design
including technology, which is written into the work environment. The external structure can be
illustrated by the examples of compliance practice where the system of meanings is governed by
the conventions and rules (professional standards and legislative requirements). The
institutionalisation process in the auditing profession can be envisaged as the accumulation of
'linguistic objectifications' (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 56). These objectifications order all organisational
routines of the audit firm encountered in the pragmatic motives of everyday practice. The
existence of pragmatic motives embedded in day to day operations ensures that whilst a context,
culture, or a way of thinking allows the individual to 'go on' in the work, it is likely to continue
(Giddens, 1984). The individual strives to construct knowledge about the world in the participation
in forms of life, and seeks for meanings to the words and propositions grounded in daily action.
Within the audit context auditors communicate, interact, and develop symbolic meanings using
certain validity claims. Firstly, the audit can be validated as the most efficient and effective means
for attaining the end; getting the job done. The auditor makes these claims in the audit engagement
to both the client and other auditors. Secondly, the audit can be envisaged as 'correct and proper in
accordance with relevant norms'. The auditor makes such a claim in implementing accounting and
auditing standards as they represent socially acceptable modes of behaviour. Thirdly, the audit can
be validated as constituting authentic subjective action, which relates to subjective judgement in
the sense that the auditor holds himself/herself to be 'genuine' (Dillard, and Bricker, 1992, p. 218).
In that sense, norms, traditions, and values are the basis for individual internal representations,
which provide for an understanding of social discourse.
Levi-Strauss (1969), from a structuralist perspective, argued the importance of demonstrating not
how the individual thinks in myths, but how myths operate in the individual's mind without his/her
awareness of this fact. These myths, existent in auditing practice, represent conformance to daily
routine operations which are objectified by the level of abstraction embodied in standards and
guidance. Both the profession and the audit firms propagate a symbol of the 'ideal of the service'
in the hope that it convey to auditors' shared meanings. The judgmental character of auditing
cannot be solely grounded on a reliance on structured methodologies, since conformance to the
structure does not end the auditor's understanding. Auditors make and know themselves and their
professional world through work practice and through the exercise of individual judgement. The
auditor on the job is situated in the context of intensive, on-going interactions with other members
of a team, the firm, the client's organisation, and the profession. Further, judgement has an
irrational element including personal knowledge of (1) the breadth and impact of individual
actions external to self or the institution(s) one is identified with, and (2) the breadth and impact of
individual actions internal to self (e.g. empathy). The individual auditor is able to process the
symbols of the 'ideal of service', if not as a wholly free agent, then as an interpreter. In such ways
the individual strives to reveal the profession's assumption that it controls the terms on which the
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individual relates to the organisation (Cohen, 1994, p. 93). Organisations are creations of human
action since within these very organisations individuals often experience their world of lived
experiences (Ricoueur, 1981). Hence, the judgement process is enveloped in the hermeneutic
dynamics between the auditor and the evidence, more precisely, between the auditor's pre-
understanding of the circumstances of the audit task and the audit evidence.
Hence, alternative ways of thinking about auditing practice need to be constructed in order to
properly apprehend the dynamics of practical interventions in the world, in order to supplant
current 'orthodoxy' in the practice (orthodoxy in auditing manifests itself in the conformity to
standardised audits). Auditing practice envisaged as socially constructed hermeneutic practice is
one of such alternative ways.
4.6 Standardisation in the auditing milieu and the debasing of practice
The auditing profession, as with other professions, relies on knowledge standardisation; the means
by which knowledge may be appropriated and replicated. The process of standardisation in the
auditing milieu could be looked at through the prism of legitimation processes (i.e. codification)
and through the prism of the form (i. e. structure). The objective of different forms of
standardisation is to bring uniformity to behaviour and the individual skills of the professional by
using standardised techniques of conduct and respectively to balance judgement and expertise.
Structure can be envisaged as the individual category (i.e. cognitive and tacit processes of the
individual), the team category (i.e. cognitive and tacit processes of the individuals working on the
same task), and the firm category (i.e. its hierarchy and authority). The systematisation of
structures in the auditing milieu is presented in Exhibit 4.1.
The profession exerts control over bodies of knowledge and defines what that knowledge consists
of. A codification process can be envisaged as (1) a first stage in the process of deskilling of the
individual (Morris and Empson, 1998) and/or as (2) legitimation process with the opportunity for
the intensification of judgement (Bourdieu, 1988). Perceptions of organisational reality are
fragmented and subject to individual interpretations. The ways in which events and actions are
interpreted define the essential performance environment and portray the base on which
judgements are made. It can be assumed that factors, which favour the perceptions of legitimacy,
lean to societal expectations and organisational behaviour (Carpenter et al., 1994).
6
Carpenter et al. (1994) argued that audit judgement as a social behavioural phenomenon is strongly
influenced by the social context of the particular audit firm.
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Exhibit 4.1
Standardisation in the auditing milieu





















The institutionalisation of the profession can be envisaged as a process of creating reality, wherein
elements of formal structure are simultaneously legitimated and a source of further legitimation. In
this study, legitmation is intertwined with professional reality. The auditing profession produces
and provides rules and procedures, which establish and enhance its legitimacy and a survival
prospect. These standards and procedures bring the audit activities within the realm of impersonal
techniques performed by individuals. By adapting statistical and econometric methods to the
auditing context, audit firms acquire ways to create their own structures and methodologies. In
effect, audit firms modify the abstract system of knowledge in response to societal forces which
initiate and end legislation changing the current of legitimation (Carpenter et al., 1994). Through
such means, abstract notions of economic discourse are made calculable and knowable. In other
words, abstract categories, such as objectivity, effectiveness and efficiency come to be translated
into, and held to require, the 'calculative apparatus in accounting' (Miller, 1994, p. 3).
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Knowledge codification acts as means to utilise (the leveraging of) expertise and enable
deployment of less experienced individuals on the client's assignments. Knowledge helps in the
framing of audit issues, procedures and anticipated outcomes. Structured auditing methodologies,
however, do not flow spontaneously from the minds of neutral and detached individuals. It is a
result of tailoring to be applied to modify and support the goals of the profession. As a result of
these legitimation processes, applied judgements contain the bureaucratic practice where expertise
comes from some external and objective sources. Professional knowledge becomes encoded
within the organisational structure and therefore decision autonomy rests not with individual
auditors but with those who structure their roles.
Regulatory structures of accounting bodies threaten the concepts of neutrality and independent
judgement in audit practice. It is the professional institute that controls the entry to the auditing
profession and acts as repository of knowledge on which jurisdiction is claimed over certain areas
of performance and client's problems (Abbott, 1991). Documented knowledge (i.e. standards,
manuals, guidance) is formally held out as a basis for professional judgement. The significance of
such documents should not be underestimated; the notion of professionalism in accounting and
auditing has increasingly been equated with the standardisation and regulation of professional
conduct (Hopwood, 1998). Standards are useful in establishing both the professional claims and
the body of knowledge with which auditors claim to work.
By standardising and normalising judgements and encoding them in forms of organisational
structure (e.g. operational procedures in manuals), by specifying thresholds of such judgement
errors as acceptance or rejection of the client's financial statements, etc., the power is transferred
from the auditor to the administrative component of the audit firms. Each audit firm adopts its
own rules and conventions to which govern audit process. For instance, the preparation of
working papers is highly structured including its requisite formats and terminology. Such
standardisation facilitates a review process through the staffs familiarity with the content and
form of these papers, enabling notions of efficiency and effectiveness. Further, the auditor 'learns'
that written working papers can be used as evidence against him/her in an eventual court case
(Rich et ah, 1997).
'The institutionalised professionalism is symbolised by the comportment of the auditor on the job.
The working routines of the auditor are an important way to symbolise and establish his/her
legitimacy...it seems somewhat ironic that the very qualities that create the impression of
professionalism and commitment when viewed from the frontstage seem to remove individual
discretion when viewed from the backstage' (Pentland, 1993).
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Since legal processes rarely question the body of knowledge as such, defensibility is not only a
matter for the individual auditor, but also involves the development of a body of procedural
knowledge, conformity to which counts as executing best practice. In such sense, justificatory
discourses and technical methods displace judgements. In effect, audit seems to be largely treated
as a 'black box' exercise (Hopwood, 1996), a technique of verification of accounts and/or
checking the compliance with a priori established criteria (Flint, 1988).
The knowledge base of the audit process, however, remains obscure. Firstly, although knowledge
flows in the audit firms may be upward and lateral, from junior to senior staff via network of
standards, some knowledge ad hoc does not seem to be easily codified without deterioration of its
content and context (Hopwood, 1998). Knowledge and experience of fraud cases is content and
context dependent; hence, not facilitative of structured inquiry. Secondly, although audit process
for all its density of operational procedures is interactive and judgmental, there is no clear
conception of 'authentic' process, independent of the system of knowledge in which judgements
are embedded. The auditor perceives that the nature of the assurance provided by the audit process
is elusive and problematic. (Power, 1997, p. 36) The auditor attempts to overcome this obscurity
by appealing to the authority of his/her own judgement determining what is reasonable practice.
Practitioners discuss the merits of structured and unstructured audit approaches (e.g. Sullivan,
1984; Francis, 1994). These were, and continue to be, the concerns that audit could become a
merely mechanical practice, threatening the status of the individual auditor. Further, the Big Five
audit firms have been periodically changing their entire audit approaches, and these changes are
ongoing. These firms have a particular power over operational independence of those individual
auditors who often prefer inventive and methods based approaches on broadly defined principles;
that is, the 'big picture' thinkers. Lastly, it seems that regulations become political decisions where
proponents of this processes emphasise that markets favour those with existing resources or/and
position in the society (Cooper and Sherer, 1984).
The changes in a business environment and a growing litigation drive a demand from the audit
firms for additional regulations in the forms of standards and procedures. The official procedural
knowledge base of auditing, although evolving (often in response to corporate failure and
scandals), maintains an institutionally credible system where central to legitimation claims of
professional bodies and audit firms is the presentation of auditors as bearers of professional
knowledge and professional standards (Grey, 1998). There are concerns that audit becomes a more
'regulatory compliance' product at the expense of space for professional judgement, as each crises
pushes it in this direction. Hatherly (1996) argued that existing regulatory structures in the UK
tend to overvalue the audit approach based on objectivity of the formal and structured process.
Operational procedures express a particular manner of making things auditable and of securing
acceptance that the system of auditing works. An extensive body of procedural guidance provides
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the benchmark for best practice. Hatherly (1996) argued that the performance of the audit firm is
increasingly judged by the profession and by the audit firm itself (in terms of a process and
compliance with a process), and consequently compliance with a process seems to be more visible
and demonstrable than judgement. Regulation seems to reshape the meaning of audit from a
professional judgement for shareholders into a compliance statement for the regulator. Hence,
legitimation via process inevitably displaces legitimation through reference to judgement. In
effect, 'good' auditing ends as conformity to agreed procedures over time.
'We live in a compliance culture where people are driven to look at the rulebook to ensure that they
have completed the checklist, rather than to think outside the box. The auditor experiences a
challenge to look outside the square [i.e. the 'black box']...at the information and decide in his/her
judgements it is true and fair, or whether it is merely a compliance of 'how does it fit the law'
(Percy, 1999, p. 6).
The debasement of practical reasoning in auditing can be illustrated by the structure - judgement
metaphors which characterise and differentiate audit operational approaches. Structure does not
end judgement, rather it reallocates judgement and directs it in a certain way. In this respect, any
audit methodology contains both structure and judgement, and a tension operates between them.
The rhetoric of structure may affect reflexivity and the awareness that there is always judgement
and subjectivity in audit. It fosters the illusion that a science-like objectivity can be achieved.
Cushing and Loebbecke (1986) describe a structured audit methodology as
'...a systematic approach to auditing characterised by a prescribed, logical sequence of procedures,
decisions, and documentation steps, and by a comprehensive and integrated set of audit policies and
tools designed to assist the auditor in conducting the audit...the policies and tools are
comprehensive in the sense that they cover the entire audit process, from initial acceptance of the
client to the ultimate issuance of the audit opinion' (p. 32).
Power (1997) argued that audit techniques are accepted by auditors because (1) they more or less
'work' and (2) are perceived to 'work' since they have become institutionally acceptable ways of
audit. The advantage of structure centres on two themes, economic efficiency and litigation
protection. The argument for the economic efficiency of structure results from the standardisation
of what is presumed to be an inherently standardisable and routine task. With the deregulation of
the audit market, i.e. price competition and increase in auditor switching, the efficiency of the
audit became a serious economic concern for the audit firms. The argument for structure reducing
litigation risk is similar in that it again focuses on cost savings to audit firms. The systematic
character of structured audits is perceived as reducing the risk of audit failures and providing
documentation that the audit firm has conformed to auditing standards and guidance, and hence is
not negligent in production of a true andfair view. On the other hand, unstructure is a code word
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for subjective judgement, and structure is being opposed to the tradition of professional judgement.
The traditions and norms historically valued the individual auditor's subjectivity and professional
judgement. Nowadays audits are presumed to be homogeneously sufficient across contexts to
benefit economically and technologically from the kind of universality and standardisation
embedded in rule-bound reality (Francis, 1994, p. 253).
It is important to emphasise that methodology should be of service in audit; that is, used as a tool
which underpins but not overwhelms the practice. Instead, the auditor is increasingly in the service
of decision aids and structured audit methods. Cushing and Loebbecke (1986) identified trends in
the auditing environment facilitating structure in audit practice. These are: (1) severe competition
on audit services market, (2) greater regulation of auditing and accounting, (3) increased litigation
risks, (4) development of technology, and (5) greater complexity in the economic environment in
general, with consequences for the capability of financial reporting and auditing to reflect
economic reality. In such a reality, it seems that the structure and standardisation offer a kind of
promise to produce more legitimate audits for the benefits of audit firms. The competition in the
audit market creates the incentive for lowering the costs of audits through the standardisation of
the audit process. Regulation and increased litigation risk are linked in the legitimation processes
in which regulations define the auditor's legal responsibilities and hence, potential failure to meet
these responsibilities may lead to costly litigation for the audit firm. Structure, therefore is seen as
lowering contingent audit costs from negligence. The complexity of data processing systems and
of economic environment more generally, implies that audit tasks are growing more complex.
Hence, audit firms promote the argument that structured audits and decision aids are there to help
the auditor to 'better understand' the complexity of information. In structuring the audit process,
audit firms impose restrictions on audit independent judgement (Francis, 1994). Structured
methodologies and audit approaches (pre-established structured plans, checklists, etc.) are
expressions of striving for standard services and objectivity. In result, structured audits are used
whether appropriate or not. This may have a deteriorating effect on an operational independence,
i.e. the auditor's capacity to freely decide scope and character of audit procedures and techniques
(Power, 1997).
The rationale for structure rest on the technocratic belief that the audit is a technically solvable
problem. There are a number of examples of the applied structure in audit practice. Firstly, the
auditing standard SAS 300 (APB, 1995) intimates that the risk model is an abstraction whose
usefulness lies as a tool for audit planning; it illustrates how a scientised representation of the audit
masks the hermeneutical character of auditing practice. It does so by reducing the rich complexity
and contingency of each unique audit and the diversity of audit testing strategies to a three
parameter statistical model of audit risk. The audit risk model cannot tell the auditor what to do or
how to do it in a meaningful way because it is contextless and therefore represents 'empty
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abstraction' (Francis, 1994, p. 255); it creates an illusory reality. Audit judgement is subordinated
to and debased by that reality.
Secondly, expert systems7 (knowledge based systems) are the expression of striving for structure
and objectivity in audit decision making. These systems are believed to improve audit consistency
by insuring appropriate audit procedures and reducing the likelihood of human error. While the
development of such systems may be able to reduce costs and increase efficiency and effectiveness
of audit in the short-term, there is a danger that necessary human development and expertise may
be sacrificed if decisions and judgements routinely come within the domain of such systems. Many
of the expert-system applications have been used in the areas of audit planning (Sirvastava et al.,
1990), risk assessments (Graham et ah, 1990), internal control (Francis, 1994), and selecting
efficient combination of audit procedures (Broderick, 1988; O'Leary and Watkins, 1989). For
example, Francis (1994) cited an example of operational decision aid in audit firms: the
standardised internal control questionnaire, which in excess of six hundred questions forms a basis
for evaluating internal control systems. The presumption of such decision aids is to include all
possible contingencies. The auditor's objective becomes a matter of completing the questionnaire
rather than understanding the internal control system. These developments indicate that technology
is being applied to sophisticated areas of audit judgement.
Thirdly, the development of structured methodologies and more detailed standards is an evident
expression of technocratic reality in audit practice. Dirsmith and McAllister (1982) promoted a
contingency approach to audit, trying to reconcile the use of structured decision aids, such as pre-
established plans, checklists etc., to a tailored approach in which each audit is viewed as unique.
Under such an approach, the auditor needs to be able to determine when the circumstances warrant
departure from the pre-established or structured plans. This understanding, however, is itself a
hermeneutical moment which cannot be objectified and reduced to prestructured decision aids that
tell the auditor when to switch the approach. The use of decision aids and expert systems in the
audit process implies that the decision structures are imposed through a computer system. At first,
the individual is not in the position to question or change that structure. Such process leads to non-
reflective learning where the practical and theoretical validity claims are accepted as behavioural
norms instead of being verified or mediated. (Dillard, and Bricker, 1992, p. 220). Technology
becomes embedded in both the context of the task and in the psychology of the individual auditor.
If the auditor solely engages in instrumental action, the normative and subjective dimensions of
judgement are lost leading to distorted understandings and ultimately to distorted actions.
7 The goal of expert systems is to represent the decision making process in algorithmic form so that non¬
experts can qualitatively make the decisions as experts.
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In summary, the argument in this study is that the independent judgement of the individual auditor,
in particular independent in operational sense, is increasingly conforming to standardised audit
procedures and in consequence to rule-bound reasoning through structure and method. These
practices deteriorate understanding and hermeneutical dialogue proceeding from the auditor's own
prejudices and an application of this understanding to specific contexts of the client milieu. These
prejudices enable a dialogic process of interpreting and understanding the economic text of the
financial statements. The consequences of individual judgements and actions are not necessarily
reflected upon and mediated by the auditor, hence, judgement is not aware of itself.
'The auditors may lose the capacity for moral and critical reasoning and hence for moral agency
with respect to their actions qua auditor' (Francis, 1994, p. 235).
Structure of the audit process displaces the auditor's subjectivity and individuality as a
hermeneutic agent and puts into question the authority of tradition in auditing and the authority of
the auditor to draw upon that tradition for doing the audit. Kinney (1986) argued that in the US,
more highly structured audit firms favoured and lobbied for auditing standards in general, and
especially those which imply or justify a standardisation in audit practice (e.g. statistical
sampling). These standards came to be viewed as norms for practice which put further pressure on
all auditors to adopt structured audit methodologies. Bowrin (1998) argued that the Big Five
auditing firms all followed a similar methodological approach, which he defined as being semi-
structured. It could be argued that such an approach potentially provides leeway for the auditor to
transcend a structural orientation in his/her judgement.
Of course, judgement is always present in audit practice, even with structured (semi-structured)
decision aids and audit approaches. Judgement and structure must be intertwined, but structure
should be facilitative of subjective and independent thinking.
There are trends in the auditing milieu which create incentives for and advantages of more
structured auditing. Further, the auditing practice as social practice is sustained and threatened by
two kinds of institutions: (1) the audit firm, in which the auditor is employed, and (2) outside
institutions such as the professional regulatory bodies, the legal system, and general political
economy. For the audit firm to persist it needs to have some power over individual action inside it
in order to increase the control of the environment outside8. The organisation (i.e. audit firm) in
order to increase its legitimacy reflects the myths of its tradition and institutional environment;
formal structure can be envisaged as such a myth (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 341). According to
s
Organisational theory portrays organisations as 'cultures' which shape their members' behaviour and
perceives the individual as being modelled by the logic imperatives of the organisational structure. Hence,
the organisation has assumed capacity to confer identity on its members by identifying with that organisation
(Cohen, 1994, p. 93).
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Giddens' theory of structuration (1984) neither individuals nor system are the principle objects, but
the social practices ordered across space and time where individual actions are marked by routines
and habits. He sees structure, which patterns human activities, and the system, which is being
reproduced.
'In order to be the auditor, you have to act as one' (Pentland, 1993, p. 608).
Displaying the appropriate behaviour and conformance to structure are essential to the creation of
the professional in auditing. Professionalism is symbolised by the comportment of the auditor on
the job, including his/her language and dress. Dressing well, carrying the right kind of briefcase,
and 'looking the part' are the basics of the professional front (Pentland, 1993, p. 618). For the
individual, the meaning of actions becomes embedded as routines in his/her general body of
knowledge. Hence, widely defined structure is seen as
'[T]he properties which make it possible for discemibly similar social practices to exist across
varying spans of time and space' (Giddens, 1984, p. 17).
Another aspect of structure implies the existence of institutions embedded in wider contexts;
institutional rules which enact upon the reproduction of practice and institutions seem highly
intertwined. Auditing practice entails a reciprocal and dialectical relationship between the auditor
and praxis. The widely defined environment and profession, envisaged simultaneously as
institution and tradition, play an important role in supplying meanings and values for the creation
and maintenance of the auditing milieu. The auditor on the job is situated in the context of on¬
going interactions with other auditors, the audit firm, the client, and the profession. This
emphasises the social and contextual aspects of the audit work. The perspective of the auditor's
creative searching for understanding is essential to the identification of dynamics between the
auditor and the construction of the meaning for audit evidence9. Hence, the auditing milieu
consists of multiple overlapping and intersecting power of institutional networks and causal
sequences which are 'too complex to be theorised' (Mann, 1986, p. 29). In effect, the level of
auditor's subjectivity and individual judgement institutionally regulated are defined to serve the
purpose of the regulator. The client's economic power seems to serve in reshaping the meaning of
audit from a professional judgement for shareholders into a compliance statement for the regulator.
Hatherly (1996) argued that audit quality should be build from within the audit process, and not
imposed from outside through compliance regulation. Given the political attractiveness of the
protection through compliance regulation where normative forces institutionalise judgement
processes, it seems a difficult task. Hence, the processes of legitimation seem to displace
9 In particular, judgement process setting can be recognised as one of the major sources of referents, i.e. the
symbolic meanings of the auditor's self-understanding.
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legitimation through reference to individual judgement since already given technical knowledge is
not mediated or deliberated by the auditor.
It could be argued that the organisational 'learning process' and the environment of the work place
predispose the auditor's attitudes to audit tasks so as his/her style of conduct becomes enveloped in
the routine of materiality concerns and risk assessment. As a result of 'compliance pressure' to
maintain a high standard of practice the auditor does not reflect enough upon the methodologies of
the audit approach. In effect, the auditor may not be fully aware of him/herself, in particular not
aware of his/her capacity for authentic, independent reasoning. Hence, it seems that the
structuration of the audit process has somewhat bypassed the genuine understanding of the auditor.
This relates to the concept of 'fixation' of human action. Fixation facilitates a detachment of the
meaning of action from the event of its performance (Ricoeur, 1981). This concept is evident in the
audit judgement process, and can be depicted in its 'production' in accordance with the rules of the
profession, which offer practical guidelines for 'performing' the audit. Alternatively, the fixation
of judgement can be envisaged as something the auditor could have avoided doing as a result of
his/her knowledge of predisposition. This results in the loss of the judgmental subjectivity by
fragmentation of experience and loss ofmeaning for independent judgement.
As an effect of standardisation, understanding in auditing is reduced to the application of
technique. The audit firms increasingly rely upon procedural arrangements (e.g. operating
manuals, working papers) to maintain the quality of audit service. Dirsmith and Mcallister (1982)
argued that structured and standardised audits deprofessionalise auditing practice and lead to
bureaucratic controls over individual auditors. Auditing is permeated by legal risk which enters the
audit process as liability exposure and this creates a certain mode of conducting and representing
the audit process in working papers as a discourse in a defendable manner (Power, 1997, p. 139).
The audit working papers become discursive representations of the auditor's discernment and
judgement. But more importantly, the working papers are all that is visible and that can be
examined by quality reviewer (or peer reviewer). Working papers document the work done during
the audit and support the conclusions; nearly everything that the auditor does on the job involves
creating or using these documents. Further, the practice of reviewing the auditor's work is an
obvious structured mechanism of control. Reviewing has a sound basis in rational principles of
error avoidance and correction. The review notes enforce the details of audit mechanics (Pentland,
1993, p. 614). The audit firm thus must document and produce artifact, the trace of the audit, for
the outside (and the peer review); this is a potential force for promoting highly structured
'legitimation' in audit practice. The working routines of the auditor are an important way to
symbolise and establish legitimacy. Legal risk leads also to representations of the scope and
capability of audit in official documents in order to maximise its discretion. Since legal processes
question rarely the body of knowledge, only the enactment of it, defensibility is less a matter for
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the individual auditor, but it involves mostly the development of procedural knowledge,
conformity to which counts as best practice.
Francis (1994) argued that auditing practice is shifting away from a grounding in the auditor doing
auditing (i.e. producing audit), towards the production instead of working papers, what might be
termed a discourse about the audit; Francis (1994) calls it after Baudrillard (1983) a pure
simulacrum.
'The audit becomes a pure simulacrum, an institutionally driven discourse about auditing that is its
own reality. Audits become centred solely on the production of working papers for the purpose
(reality) of producing working papers.. .There no longer is an audit, only a discourse about an audit'
(Francis, 1994, p. 261).
In that sense, the auditor's role is instrumentally defined by this discourse of audit, which is to be
produced to construct and document the working papers. The 'realm of the real' becomes only that
what is reproduced. As institutional practice auditing
'[TJends to be self-perpetuating regardless of relevance to or achievement of goals. This disjunction
between means and goals is enlarged by scarity of resources, ambiguity of services, status anxiety
of agents, cultural emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness, and on exclusive possession of skills'
(Sieber, 1981, p. 208).
Auditing tradition however, is where subjectivity and being in the world for the individual begins,
where the capacity for understanding and critical reasoning begins, where the professional
constructs realities, their interpretations and ways of construing the world beyond the norm system
of reality (Ahrne, 1990, p. 6). Organisational culture reposes in the professional who brings it to
the organisation. That is, individuals, rather than organisations, are the agents of culture; their
agency is constituted by their experience of self (Giddens, 1991, p. 53). Hence, audit culture is not
rigid, it is rather readable and interpretable, and continuously remade through individual
behaviour. Practice envisaged in such a way constitutes something more than mere efficiency.
There is something 'intrinsic', an insight, as a result of professional judgement and interpretation
interacting with the contextual factors in socially constructed hermeneutic practice.
4.7 Summary
In short, in this chapter it was argued that by taking a hermeneutic turn, audit practice can be
envisaged as an interpretive enterprise in terms of meanings that auditors create judgement
(action) and share structure (text). Ricoeur's version of hermeneutics, in particular his analogue
between social practice and written text from which the existence of structures emerges, evokes
the need for an explanation of unarticulated conditions which encompass audit praxis. In the audit
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process, the underlying meaning of evidence becomes detached from individual performance,
therefore objectified and appropriate for an open act of interpretation. Awareness of processes and
structures represents the perceived 'contextuality' of the audit. The practice-structure relationship
is encompassed in the roots for action; that is in individual inclinations, attitudes and desires. It
was argued that the objective conditions of the audit firm are integrated with subjective
understandings, and so simultaneously enable and constrain an individual audit endeavour. The
auditor on the job strives to understand client's operations and to interpret the 'economic text'
narrated in the financial statements. By doing so, he/she produces assurance to the public that these
interpretations are trustworthy.
This chapter also indicates the possibility of the debasement of critical reasoning by structure-
judgement tensions. The profession and the audit firm propagate a symbol for the ideal of service.
This can be illustrated by conformity to routines of operational approaches objectified by the
abstraction embodied in the professional standards and guidance. The argument for structure
advantage centres on two themes; of economic efficiency and litigation protection. Since
judgement varies between individuals, it may be idiosyncratic and sometimes inaccurate. Some
structure is therefore necessary to guide the individual. On the other hand, unstructure is
facilitative of subjective thinking. More structure mediates judgement and reallocates it in a way
that the auditor does not reflect upon the format of the audit process, and characteristics of the
task. The auditor's interpretive power is constrained by explicit frameworks and compliance
practice. As a result, working papers as a means of symbolic legitimation processes become
discursive representations of the auditor's discernment. The profession needs to redefine ways of
understanding the audit to enable individual capacity for critical and independent reasoning about
the client's 'economic reality'. Since authentic action in audit seems to be processed from the
auditor's good understanding, which emerges through interpretive practice (Francis, 1994), audit
quality may be built from within the audit process (Hatherly, 1996) and not be imposed from
outside through regulation. Hence, standardisation processes of the auditing milieu needs to
develop in ways so as to somewhat transcend the 'downside' effects. Auditing envisaged as a
hermeneutic practice is one of such alternative ways. For instance, the return to a more traditional
function of auditing, involving the auditor in an exercise of expert judgement and in the role of
judge, would suggest expanding an institutional domain for audit individual judgement, beyond a
mere verification.
'Nothing takes the place of judgement: the laws of probability are only a guide'
(Prytherch, 1942, cited in Power, 1997, p. 74).
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Drawing on the tradition of judgement, a value of the auditing profession, the auditor is depicted as
an interpretive agent, and his/her interpretive power should be at the heart of the discipline.
This study is enveloped in a duality of hermeneutics aimed to portray dynamics between the
auditor and 'readings' of evidence as economic text. These dynamics are embedded in context of
interrelation between anticipated components of audit judgement milieu and research findings.
Chapter 7 is devoted to the analysis of auditors' narratives in order to create an open story about
the 'realm of the real' in audit practice. The auditors are both the actors and authors of that story.
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CHAPTER 5
Research design and research methods
5.1 Introduction
The study seeks to obtain supportable insights from questionnaire data and interviews as to the
impact of the client's power and the structure of the audit process on individual judgement. The
research is designed to examine whether the auditor is capable of transcending the structure of the
audit process and thus applying wide horizon judgements beyond risk and materiality concerns
when the audit environment is 'shadowed' by NAS opportunism. Hence, the experimental design
reflects two different tensions. First, between the auditor's independent judgement and the
structure of the audit approach: a 'wide horizon' tension (i.e. associated with an operational
independence threat). This is embedded within a second tension between the provision of NAS
and fraud recognition: a 'narrow horizon' tension (i.e. associated with an apparent independence
threat).
This research brings together three highly topical audit issues in a single research experiment.
The experiment explores how the individual auditor's sensitivity (1) to the possibility of fraud,
(2) to the client's management representations and (3) to management service opportunities
(NAS) impacts upon audit judgement with respect to the likelihood of error and the need for
detailed checking of controls and transactions. In particular, the auditor's willingness to 'buy
into' the client's management representations is examined as one of the auditor's potential
weaknesses in cases where non-audit services opportunity arises. The client's management may
manipulate their explanations in a way so to deflect the auditor from consideration of the problem
as a possible cover for fraud. This may be done, for instance, by presenting a weak internal
control system as an immediate or potential opportunity for the audit firm to provide a
management service. In such circumstances, the auditor should still be able to analyse potential
threats arising from fraud clues and from weaknesses in the client's control structure as a part of
their diagnostic understanding of the client's business, its systems and controls. This is
complemented by the qualitative analysis of personality and attitudinal factors which influence
the orientation of the auditor in the context and affect the extent to which penetrative insights in
judgement processes are made.
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This chapter commences with an examination of relevant qualitative and quantitative
methodologies. Following that, the research objectives are briefly discussed in the light research
methodologies deployed (Moser and Kalton, 1979). The combination of qualitative and
quantitative methods, the chosen approach for this study, is then explored. This is followed by a
discussion of the development, refinement and inner logic of the research design. Next, the
selection of the respective population and the development and administration of the requisite
research instruments are presented. Data collection involved a two-stage process; firstly a case-
study survey was carried out based on mail questionnaires, following that interviews including a
process tracing exercise and semi-structured questions were conducted. The subsequent section
discusses the research population, response rate and demographic characteristics of respondents.
Next, a discussion of narrative analysis perceived as a vehicle for exploration of interview data is
presented. This is followed by a discussion of statistical tests used to analyse questionnaire data.
These include the Chi-test, Spearman rank-ordered correlation coefficient, and Kruskal-Wallis
one way analysis of variance. Finally limitations of the study are discussed.
5.2 The qualitative and quantitative methodological mix
Qualitative and quantitative methods constitute alternative strategies for research (Patton, 1990).
The term qualitative covers a range of approaches. Van Maanen (1985, p. 9) sees it as an
umbrella term covering an array of interpretative techniques which seek to describe, decode,
translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of a certain social
world's phenomena. Patton (1990, p. 24) argued that qualitative measures are longer, variable
non-systematic and more detailed in content. Thus, data which results from such qualitative
measures is rich and renowned for its depth. Quantitative measures, on the other hand, are easily
aggregated for an analysis. They rely on the use of instruments which provide a standardised
framework in order to limit the data collection process to certain responses and/or analysis
categories (Patton, 1990, p. 14). The resulting information provides a somewhat static account of
social life (Bryman, 1988, p. 140), and an account of the regularities and patterns of existing
structure.
The auditor's awareness of, and sensitivity to the possibility of fraud, to the client's management
representations and to non-audit services opportunities as well as the level of professional
scepticism applied in a structured audit are built into the research design. There are a number of
methods, based on the previous studies discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4, that might be applied to
investigate the effects of selected issues on independent audit judgement and recognition of fraud.
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They include both qualitative and quantitative methods, such as mail questionnaire surveys,
interviews, case studies-based experiments, etc. Different methods used in these previous studies
indicate that both qualitative and quantitative techniques can be used in audit judgement and
decision making studies (although much prior research on audit judgement and decision making
primarily focused on quantitative methods). Each method has its own strengths and weaknesses,
and no single method is likely to be fully comprehensive and sufficient in itself.
It has been argued that qualitative studies allow a greater richness and depth in the analysis of the
data, but are more subjective. On the other hand, whilst precision and accuracy are conveyed in
statistical data generated by quantitative research studies, the construction of questionnaires
and/or case studies to produce raw data on which the statistical calculations are based, is open to
subjectivity bias in the same way as asking questions at an interview. Hence, a major trade-off
between qualitative and quantitative methods is a trade-off between the breadth and depth of the
study (Patton, 1990, p. 165). Breadth is facilitated by the quantitative approach, in that it allows
measuring the reactions of many subjects but at a cost to depth because the range of criteria must
be limited. Qualitative methods generate a wealth of detailed information from a much smaller
number of subjects and often produce a surplus of knowledge.
An important strategy to strengthen the study design is through triangulation; the combination of
research methodologies in the study of the same phenomena (Jick, 1985, p. 136). Hence, rather
than seeking qualitative and quantitative methods as being competitive, they are seen as
complementary. Qualitative work assists quantitative work by providing a theoretical framework
and interpreting statistical results (Fielding, 1993; Fielding and Fielding, 1986).
'Triangulation captures in a more complete, holistic, and contextual manner the unit(s) under
study and may be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives but
also to enrich our understanding by allowing new or deeper dimensions to emerge'
(Jick, 1985, p. 138).
It has been argued that the effectiveness of triangulation rests on the premise that the weaknesses
of each single method will be compensated by the counterbalancing strengths of the other (Jick,
1985). Triangulation increases confidence that research findings can lead to each approach
enriching and validating the other and may be better imparted to the audience (Faulkner, 1982, p.
87).
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This study embraces a qualitative and quantitative methodological mix that captures aspects of
the phenomenon under investigation in a more complete and holistic manner. Research is
experimental, based on mail questionnaires and interviews. The mail questionnaires provide
breadth to the study, by examining approaches to judgement of a bigger sample of respondents.
Interviews provide rich detail to the study and allow probing further into the more ambiguous
aspects of judgement, which remained uncovered by the statistical analysis.
A diagnostic task (based on the case study of the questionnaire) is carried out by subject audit
seniors and audit mangers using both between and within subject design. The experiment design
embodies a routine structure of audit practice; a planning memorandum alongside the tasks of risk
and materiality assessments. That is, the experiment is designed to trigger a certain structure
within the audit judgement process, a presupposed repeated pattern of a conventional audit
approach. The evidence derived from mailed questionnaires data is based mostly on non-
parametric analysis and is further explored and validated through follow up interviews.
Interviews are carried out to gain more insight into the audit judgement processes, and the
auditor's personal characteristics and are aimed to establish how the auditor perceives the
environment of the audit firm with respect to the emphasis placed on fraud discovery and/or the
development of management services. The interviews and the audit process-tracing data (verbal
protocol) are intended to describe the details of audit judgement processes and to contribute to
understanding of the more ambiguous aspects of the audit judgement environment on both
empirical and theoretical grounds.
The use of a combination of methods should provide the most useful insight into audit judgement
processes, enabling reasonable coverage to be achieved (the mail questionnaire) whilst at the
same time allowing some deeper understanding to be obtained (interviews and process-tracing
exercise).
5.3 Research design
The experiment (a diagnostic task of the questionnaire's case study) focuses on a poorly managed
control system. A weak control system is permissive of fraud and error, and it may also represent
a potential management services opportunity in terms of systems design and advice (i.e. NAS).
The auditor's confidence in the client's management may be shaken by the discovery of a poor
system but this can be restored significantly where the client's management represent that they
have responded to the problems clearly and positively. In general, the auditor's scepticism
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moderates the level of confidence in the client's management representations, and accordingly
influences the auditor's judgement with regard to a need for detailed checking of controls and
transactions. The individual judgement varies across auditors depending upon the auditor's
experience, especially of the client, and the auditor's personal traits. This study examines the
impact of these factors on the auditor's individual ability to recognise the manipulations in the
client's management 'selling offer' as a cover for possible fraud when the work environment
'promotes' a structured audit approach. The question is whether the auditor perceives a
compliance dilemma between the concepts of audit independence and integrity (defined in the
Auditor's Code of Ethics) and the internal policies within a cultural context of the audit firm in
which he/she works under such circumstances.
The research instrument imposes an ad hoc structure on audit judgement, which is typical of 'risk
based' auditing1. The process of devising the research instrument was facilitated by the advice
provided by an anonymous Technical Partner from one of the Big Five auditing firms. As a result,
the instrument contains the semi-structured approach to audit, similar to those used in the Big
Five (Bowrin, 1998) (prior to the recent introduction of new audit methodologies). A standard
audit format facilitates the examination of judgmental processes embodied in individual
discourses of the audit planning memorandum. Hence, the experiment presents a scenario
conducive to the application of a standardised approach in the audit process alongside the
structure of risk and materiality assessments. A two-year span of the study is introduced to
examine anchorage (i.e. a dominant theme in the auditors' narratives) in the planning
memorandum when the problem appears durable across cases.
The instrument is comprised of three case studies (A, B, C) based on a diagnostic task with
different arrays of fraud clues and NAS opportunities. These cases allow for different emphases
in judgmental reasoning (i.e. the across-cases design secures differentiation of the case's
circumstances). The subjects were asked to complete the questionnaires comprising a concise
case study, split into a year 1 scenario and a year 2 scenario; each followed by series of questions.
5.3.1 Case study for the first year
The core of the scenario incorporates a real situation, which was taken from one of the recent Big
Five audit firms' fraud cases. The audit firm wins by tender a new client with a good general
1 The subjects were familiar with new audit methodologies for 'strategic' auditing at the period the research
was conducted. However, these methodologies weren't operational at that time. Further, regardless of the
different methodologies used, some structure is inevitably present in the audit process.
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reputation - a small listed company which assembles and installs laboratory equipment across
Europe. For the purposes of the tender, the client has been assessed as a low engagement risk. On
the initial planning visit the auditor learns that there have been problems with one of the key
accounting systems - with the sales record-keeping system. An old computerised system for sales
is unable to deal with new types of sales contracts. The auditor is advised that the recent problems
have arisen when inexperienced staff had conducted the manual preparation of invoices and
journals and that errors had resulted. The basic setting, therefore, is a newly discovered weak
control. In addition, there is a possibility of fraud - a slight red flag - regarding European Union
grants, which are available to customers of the audited company on the purchase of the research
equipment. Subjects are divided into three groups (A, B, C) with each group receiving different
information regarding the managerial response to the weaknesses in the sales record-keeping
system. At one level, the managerial response is common across all three groups. In each case,
the client's management represents that a major internal exercise has been launched to identify
and correct errors and that suitable staffing is being allocated to the sales record keeping. In the
cases for groups B and C, however, the client's management believes there is also a need for a
more fundamental solution and they intend to develop and implement a new sales invoicing and
recording system. Subjects in group B are advised that their audit firm will be invited to tender
for the work, whereas in group C they are informed that the contract has already been signed with
outside consultants (not connected with the audit firm). Thus, the three groups are faced with
three different managerial responses from the client embodying three different opportunities to
promote management services, as presented in Table 5.1.
Having been given details of the case (A, B, C) subjects are invited to make an interpretation of K
pic and on that basis to list the main points in a memorandum for audit planning purposes.
Subsequently, subjects are invited to assess the likelihood of material misstatement, and the need
for further audit work as being indicative of the audit judgement they would make.
The literature, as reviewed in chapters 2 and 3, is divided as to whether the existence of an NAS
opportunity influences audit judgement. The concern is that a desire to secure the management
service contract will discourage the audit firm from upsetting the client's management. Hence,
the auditor will not wish to appear to challenge the client's management when they represent that
the problem has been fixed. As a consequence, the auditor will be disinclined to extend the
detailed checking or at least to charge the client as a response to the sales system problems. This
issue is examined through a comparison of the subjects' judgements in case B versus case C.
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Table 5.1
Case Study for Year 1
GROUP Management Response Management Service
Opportunity
A Internal exercise launched.
Management represents that
(1) errors are corrected and
(2) suitable staffing is allocated




B As with A,
but states intention to design
and implement a new sales system.
Audit firm invited to tender.
(A good opportunity)
C As with B,
except faster off the mark
since the contract for the
new sales system has already been
awarded.
Contract awarded to outside
consultants.
(Opportunity lost)
Given the speed of management's response, confidence in the client's management might, prima
facie, be marginally higher in case C. If case C subjects require a tougher audit than case B,
therefore, the implication is that B subjects have been compromised by the existence of NAS
opportunity. The issue can also be examined through a study of case A subjects' responses.
Prima facie, given a low key response, confidence in the client's management for case A might
be lower than for B or C. Thus, more extensive audit work might be required than for the B or C
cases, but the question is whether the status of case A as a 'potential' NAS opportunity changes
the outcome vis a vis C. Alternatively, case A audit work may be less rigorous than case B or C.
If so, it could be that unlike in either B or C, the client's management in case A do not regard the
sales system's patch as a temporary solution and are therefore more likely to give both the
internal exercise and testing of the patched sales system more attention.
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5.3.2 Case study for the second year
The case study (A, B, C) is extended to the second year of the audit, it having been assumed in all
three cases that the audit work carried out in year 1 enabled the audit firm to issue an unqualified
opinion. A further year's experience allows the auditor to update their assessment of the client's
management, and in the experiment, the second year is designed to explore the auditor's reaction
to different fraud signals associated with different levels of confidence in the client's
management.
At one level the second year's experience is the same for all three cases. In each case it is found
that the change to more appropriate staff has not solved the problem and errors have continued to
occur. In each case therefore, the client's management once again represent that they have
launched a successful exercise to identify and correct all the errors. In case A the client's
management respond to the continuation of the sales system problems by undertaking to issue a
contract for the design and implementation of a new sales system. The audit firm will be invited
to tender. Case A, year 2 (A2) is therefore, very similar to B1 except that the client's
management in A2 may have lost some credibility through their delaying of a more fundamental
response to the existing problem. Cases B2 and C2 are similar to each other in that neither B nor
C have yet implemented the new sales system. In B2, subjects are advised that the audit firm won
the design and implementation contract. They are further advised that the audit firm's consultants
have serious doubts about the client's management's specifications of the new sales system. In
particular, they are concerned that the client's management is insistent upon the sales system
incorporating unusual features, which, according to the consultants, would allow the client's
management to backdate accounting entries with respect to sales without trace. This is intended to
raise a serious fraud signal. In C2 the auditors are unable to establish the precise reasons for the
delay in an implementation. The client's management claim that the consultants have not
delivered to specification, whilst the consultants claim the work is complete and the delay is
down to the client's management. This is intended to raise the 'possibility' of a fraud flag, being
management's delay in the system's implementation. Thus, in the second year the three groups
are faced with three different experiences of the client's management each associated with a
different level of suspicion regarding management fraud, as presented in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2
Case Study for Year 2





recognise the seriousness of the
problem and state intention to
place contract for new sales system.
The audit firm will be invited
to tender.
Slight fraud flag,
not significantly greater than
case B1
B The audit firm won the tender
but the new sales system is not
yet implemented. The firm's
consultants are concerned by
management's insistence that
'unusual features' are included
in the new sales system.
Serious fraud flag
C The new sales system is not yet
implemented. There is a dispute
between the client's management and
the consultants as to the reasons.
Moderate fraud flag
Again in year 2, having been given details of the case, subjects are invited to interpret the K pic
client and on that basis to list the main points in a memorandum for audit planning purposes.
Subsequently, subjects are invited to assess the likelihood of material misstatement and the need
for further audit work as indicative of the audit judgement they would make.
The inclusion of a second year allows one to adopt both a between subjects and a within subjects
design in the research. In the between subjects design the study looks for statistical differences
between the three groups attributable to the different experiences of the client's management
contained in the three cases embedded in a structured audit approach. In the within subjects
design the study looks for statistical differences between the same group in years 1 and 2
attributable to that group's additional experience of the client's management in year 2.
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For the between subjects design it is hypothesised that the ordering in respect of the rigour of
audit work based on the level of suspicion of management fraud is B2 > C2 > A2. If B2 > C2,
then it might be argued that in the second year the audit firm's involvement in consultancy has
benefited the audit through knowledge spillovers which are not available in case C2. This is a
point which is sometimes made in the literature in a defence ofmanagement service provisions by
audit firms since it may potentially enhance the audit firm's knowledge of the client's business
and its management. See chapter 2 for the literature review on the provision of NAS and effects
of knowledge spillovers.
As regards the within subjects design for case A the question is whether confidence in the client's
management in case A2 is reduced by the continuing failure of the existing sales system, or
enhanced by management's belated recognition of the need for a new sales system. In cases B
and C, however, it can be hypothesised that the rigour of the audit work should be greater for B2
than B1 and for C2 than CI given the suspicion ofmanagement fraud present for both these cases
in the second year. Thus, the experiment examines the issue raised in the auditing literature as to
whether auditors recognise and respond to fraud flags (chapter 2 presented a literature review on
fraud).
In short, the experimental design reflects two different tensions: first, between the auditor's
independent judgement and the structure of the audit approach: a 'wide horizon' tension (i.e.
operational independence threat). This is embedded within a second tension between the
provision of NAS and fraud recognition: a 'narrow horizon' tension (i.e. apparent independence
threat). Chapters 2 and 3 presented a discussion on the concept of audit independence and audit
judgement.
5.4 Collection of data: Questionnaires and interviews
The collection of data was based on two stages. First, a mail questionnaire survey was carried out.
The second stage involved interviews including a process tracing exercise. Before launching the
questionnaire, its draft version was piloted with the members of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) and with the members of Accounting and Business Method
Department at the University of Edinburgh. The aim of the piloted study was to identify problems
associated with construction of the questionnaire and to ensure that the narrative part of case
studies and associated questions were relevant and clear. Constructive comments on the drafted
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version allowed refinement of the questionnaire; changes were made to the layout of some
questions and some additional information to the narrative part of the case study regarding the
financial performance of K pic and an initial assessment of the client as a low engagement risk
client was included. The final version of the questionnaire is included as Appendix 1.
5.4.1 Mail questionnaires
The final version of the questionnaires, together with a covering letter and stamped addressed
envelope were mailed to 185 individuals. The design and the layout of questions are of
importance to the achievement of a high response rate. Berdie et al. (1986) argued that the
appearance of the questionnaire frequently determines whether it is read because once the
respondent takes an effort to read it, he/she made some commitment to complete it. The final
version of the questionnaire, in particular the narrative part of case study, was interesting, short
and easy to read and complete. Further, the confidentiality and anonymity of responses were
clearly pointed out in both the questionnaire and the covering letter.
The questionnaire consists of three short sections A, B, C. Section A asked for a demographic
profile of the auditor. The purpose of this section was to obtain background information on the
respondents and included standard questions on length and nature of their work experience, their
age and gender. Section A included five questions. Question 1 asked for the age of the
respondent. Question 2 asked for gender. Questions 3 and 4 asked for the experience in the audit
firm including its length (in years) and the current position in the firm.
Sections B and C include a concise case study, split into a year 1 scenario followed by short
series of questions (the questions from 6 to 10) and a year 2 scenario followed by short series of
questions (the questions from 11 to 15).
The subjects were asked to complete the questionnaires comprising the concise case study, split
into year 1 and year 2 scenarios (sections B and C). The core of the scenario incorporates a real
construct, taken from one of the Big Five audit firms' cases. Section 5.3 presents details of the
research design.
In both years, having been given details of the case, subjects made an interpretation of K pic and
on that basis composed a list of the main points in a memorandum for audit planning purposes
(question 6 in year 1 scenario and question 11 in year 2 scenario). The strategy for data
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compression and interpretation was based on the method of a reduction to the core narrative (Bell,
1988), this represents the case of NAS and material misstatements embedded in structure of 'risk-
based' auditing (a narrow horizon of the study).
'How we arrange and rearrange the [experiment] text in light of our discoveries is a process of
testing, clarifying and deepening our understanding of what is happening in the discourse'
(Mishler 1991, p. 277).
The auditors' discourse made in the audit memorandum embodies their subjective interpretation
of the overall situation of K pic. The recurring words in the respondents' narratives led to insights
that shaped its sub-categories; such process determined the classification of the responses in the
audit memorandum. The boundaries of this classification are shaped by the scope of this study -
the case ofmaterial misstatements and NAS opportunism enveloped in the structured audit. There
is an explicit reliance on underlying theoretical concepts embedded in the experiment itself, such
as NAS opportunism (Mitchell et al. 1993), fraud recognition (APB, 1995) and anticipated
tensions between the structure of the audit process and individual judgement (Hopwood, 1998;
Power, 1997).
Three independent categories of auditors' discourse emerged. Firstly, if conventional terms such
as risk, materiality, compliance with auditing standards were dominant themes in the
memorandum, the subject was categorised under 'conventional audit practice'. This category
represents a narrower scope for the interpretation of K pic. Secondly, if the dominant theme of the
memorandum was associated with questions over the client's management integrity and/or
potential intentional misstatements, the subject falls under 'potential fraud recognition'. Thirdly,
if the points concerning the opportunities for NAS were incorporated in the memorandum, the
subject was categorised under 'recognition of NAS'. Categories two and three indicate a broader
scope to the interpretation of K pic, beyond standard audit practice of 'risk-based' auditing.
Both the construct and order of memorandum narratives is bound to the auditors' judgements
upon K pic's context. These individual judgements may 'become normalised by being accepted
as the conventional template for action' (Llewellyn, 1999, p. 229). Hence, these narratives reveal
to some extent conditions for possible organisational strategies for audit judgement within the
audit firm. All categories are summarised in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3







Detailed tests to perform
Standard audit practice (II)
K pic financial performance (III)
Knowledge of error sought (IV)
Systematic error carried over
(year 2 memo)







Dispute with consultants concern






Offer a review or/and assistance
on the system
(I) system inadequacy, manual invoicing, management competence (with regard to sales system)
(II) pic, compliance, accuracy, comparatives, new client, quick audit, Greenbury and Cadbury, overseas
SSAP20, grants SSAP4, VAT investigations, going concern
(III) Concerns over business activity, capital, profit, sales, production process, profile of
customers/suppliers
(IV) Extent and persistence of error
In addition to the composition of the audit memorandum, the auditors were required to assess the
level of risk of K's pic financial statements containing a material misstatement (questions 7 and
12) and to estimate a budget of hours for the testing of the sales cycle (questions 8-9 and 13-14)2.
In this study, a degree of conformity with the routine of the audit process for risk and audit testing
assessments determines the structure consistency of judgement. The potential changes from year
1 to year 2 made with regard to the level of risk and/or the extent of audit testing were applied in
one of the following directions: (1) an increase, (2) a decrease, and (3) no change in the level of
risk and/or of the budget for testing. Hence, possible situations for judgement consistency
include: (1) same (SS), (2) higher (HH) and (3) lower level of risk and lower budget in year 2
2 The risk embedded in the cases is theoretical; it does not really affect the audit firm. In this type of
research there is always a question whether the instrument properly asserts subjects' approach to audit.
Hence, it has to be addressed as a limitation of this study.
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(LL). Hence, possible situations signifying judgement inconsistency include: (1) higher risk and
same budget for testing i.e. (HS), (2) higher risk and lower budget for testing (HL), (3) same risk
and lower budget for testing (SL), (4) same risk and higher budget for testing (SH), (5) lower risk
and same budget for testing (LS), and (6) lower risk and higher budget for testing (LH).
5.4.2 Interviews
The second stage of the data gathering process involved interviews. All interviewees were
guaranteed confidentiality at the outset of the fieldwork and promised that they would not be
individually identified in the research. This was done in order to elicit open and unguarded
responses to the questions asked during the course of interviews. At the beginning of each
interview and before embarking on the collection of data sought, the purpose of the study was
briefly outlined and the importance of interviewees' opinions was stressed. In addition, each
interviewee was offered an option to receive a brief report of the findings when the study is
completed.
The first part of the interviews was devoted to a process tracing exercise. Garfinkel (1967)
demonstrated that individual performance is embedded in and inseparable from a body of
common sense knowledge and practical reasoning which renders conduct 'accountable'. The
process tracing exercise recognises that talk is the primary vehicle for the accomplishment of
social actions. The production and intelligibility of performance are the self-same resources
through which sense of the particular action (audit) is assembled. These resources of common
sense knowledge and of practical reasoning are 'seen but unnoticed' and thus unavailable to
unguided intuition, introspection or theoretical imagination. Garfinkel (1967) and Sacks (1992)
demonstrated that these resources are made accessible through detailed analysis of performance.
Thus, the analysis of a verbal protocol exercise focuses on the situated organisation of individual
performance and derives from activities from within the situation in which it is produced and
rendered intelligible. Individual judgement is contextual and situated. The accomplishment of
judgement, its sense, impact and accountability are embedded within the particular situation
(audit). Social actions rely upon a body of common sense knowledge and reasoning. This method
is particularly relevant both in the production and in the recognition of situationally embedded
ordinary conduct (audit practice).
Protocol analysis facilitates the verbalisation of judgement and decision making behaviour, and is
particularly suited to developing an understanding of how individual judgement and decisions are
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made (Bouwman et al., 1987). Decision behaviours can not be improved without understanding
the nature of processes underlying behaviour (Hogarth, 1991). The verbal protocols are a
common technique in auditing research (Trotman, 1997). Recent judgement and decision making
research has emphasised an interplay between subjects' characteristics and tasks (Johnson, 1983).
The strength of judgement process tracing is its ability to provide generative explanations of in
situ conduct and gain insights to the sequential unfolding of organisational performance of the
audit firm. These explanations, however, do not rely on extraneously formulated analyses or
theoretical models of action.
In this study, the subjects were invited to 'think aloud' while performing tasks, notably the
construction of the narrative form of the audit memorandum for planning purposes. These
narratives allowed the researcher to see how the auditor understands and responds to the structure
of the audit process and how some auditors are capable of transcending their experience of the
structure of 'risk-based' auditing. Responses represented auditors' treatment of auditing standards
and their response to the structure of the audit task.
The judgement process tracing exercise allowed a check for the correctness of the classification
of the auditors' discourse made in the audit planning memorandum (questions 6 and 11 in the
questionnaires). Here are examples of the auditors' narratives made in the audit memorandum and
subsequent extracts from the process tracing exercise.
'Background to company - to set scene. Sales problems. Detailed review of the discussion the
client showing value of an error, actions taken by the company, possible impact on the accounts,
impact on our testing' (Russell, Senior Auditor, Audit memorandum in year 1, case A).
The process tracing exercise served to enrich Russell's answers in the memorandum for year 1 of
the audit.
'It is obviously the first time we are being involved with the client, so we do not have a great deal
of information about how the client operates. We have got the overview, the client is generally low
risk. We then find out that the client has problems with sales, and it is 10% of total sales. If I were
to write the audit memorandum, I would like to put some background about the client to allow the
reader to find out more about the client, and then since we know there is a problem, I would focus
in the memo on the sales problems, trying to work out the possible value of error and what testing
we would do for that. If all of the 10 % was error, then I thought there was not high chance of
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material misstatements there...Turnover, profit and stuff like that — I wasn't overly interested in
them. But I was interested in the fact that it was 10 % of sales. I thought it was most relevant
thing, because if it would be 2.5 % the chances of material misstatements would be very slim, if it
would be 25 % the chances of misstatements would be lot more.. .so I thought this figure was most
relevant. 10 % of sales would be £ 20m. If it is restricted to 10 %, it is not over worrying. I think
that there is quite low profit for the high sales figure...On the whole, there was enough
information to work out the type of the client.. .i.e. turnover and profit figures. It allowed me to
estimate the size of the company. It was good to mention it was low engagement risk. It was well
explained how errors arose. I was able to think about the impact and consequences of it. It was
also good to mention the problem as 10 % of sales. It allowed me to work out how much time I
would have to have' (Russell, process tracing in year 1, case A).
Russell's concerns were associated with issues of materiality and background information to the
client since he mentioned a few times 'a problem of 10% of sales'. In year 2, similarly to year 1
he focused his concerns on materiality of error (clearly not even on misstatements).
'Sales errors - highlight basis of the problem, highlight the value. Highlight that same error as last
year and last year's corrections by the company as well as our work and an opinion issued'
(Russell, Audit memorandum in year 2, case A).
Subsequently the following information was extracted from the process tracing exercise in year 2.
'In the second year the problem happened again. I would be able now to talk about the results of
prior year testing. I thought that it would be slightly less risk of error. I think that the client would
have learned something through going through the same process in the prior year, and probably
correct things better. We are still looking at 10 % of sales income. I was also trying to look at the
bright side here - even though they did not manage to correct errors by the year end, but hopefully
they still have good knowledge and the ability to correct it this year. From the audit point of view
it seems slightly lower risk, depending on the outcome of last year, but I thought it was not too bad
at all... for the company to have material errors two years in the row' (Russell, process tracing in
year 2, case A).
Issues beyond a conventional audit approach were not present in Russell's reasoning. He clearly
focused on materiality issues. Hence, Russell was classified under category 1 'conventional audit
practice' in both years of audit (C1>C2).
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An example of 'big-pictured' reasoning is illustrated by the audit memorandums of Stephan (case
B). Stephan, early in year 1 of the audit, enlarged the scope of judgement beyond materiality and
risk concerns.
'Can we rely on the old system? Need a computer specialist. How do they ensure that all invoices
passed and that none are double-counted? How do they track trade debtors on invoices input by
journal? Do they appear on the sales ledger? Will need to review the resolution of the issues
regarding mis-postings. Alert computer specialists about possibility of a tender for new system'
(Stephan, Senior Auditor, Audit memorandum in year 1, case B).
A process tracing exercise resulted in more insight into Stephan's memorandum.
'The first thing I have picked up was sales system difficulties. They have an existing computer
system, but there are some sales that are done manually. That is obviously a risk, because it is
something different from the normal system. Again you have inadequately experienced staff, and I
wondered what sort of risk it would indicate. They said that they have suitable staffing. And then
the problem represents 10 % of total sales, so it is material for this kind of company. Other
systems are working satisfactorily - good. And then can we rely on old systems since it is a new
client? They have a computerised system producing accounting information - can we rely on it?
Does the trial balance add up for example? Does it produce reports that can be relied upon? I
would advise our consultants to look at the system and assess the reliability of it. There is a
problem with manual invoices, human error comes into it. How do we know that they are posting
all the invoices? We have to check for that. Then thinking in terms of how do they manage their
business, if they have a computer system that has a debtors' ledger so they can probably track
those who paid and those who haven't paid. How do they deal with manual invoices? There is
input by journal entry. So how they are going to track payments, and collections of debts. Do they
appear in the sales ledger or is it just one big figure, i.e. £lm of manual invoices. Mis-
postings....have they sorted out mis-postings problems? How they are going about to sort all those
problems and whether we are happy with the ways they have done that. Last point there is the
comment that...if they are going to introduce this new sales system, and I suggested that our
computer specialist do some work there - if the specialist does not know that we will be tendering
in the future, then we should let him/her know that, so he/she can bear it in mind' (Stephan,
process tracing in year 1, case B).
In year 1 Stephan focused on risks associated with the sales system and on the opportunity for
management service (IT consulting). Hence he was classified under the category of 'NAS
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focused' in year 1 (NASI). In the following year he 'switched' his attention from non-audit
services opportunities to fraud concerns.
'Reliability of management. Why do they only correct at the year end? Why do they want to
backdate entries without trace? (Stephan, Audit memorandum in year 2, case B).
The process tracing exercises confirmed Stephan's primary concern with fraud.
'In year one we issued an unqualified audit report - that is good. We won the tender to design a
new system - which is good. There are still the same problems. It is disappointing. But they were
able to solve the problems last year - through an internal exercise. Hmm...I would be concerned
that errors are still occurring. We would recommend to them that this is not good enough - why
they are still happening and they did not sort them out. There is a risk here that there will be errors
occurring. And a last comment.. .why do they want to backdate the entry without trace. It does not
sound very good. The way that we approach audit work is that we rely a lot on key controls that
management has in place. Somebody looks at management accounts and identifies if there are any
funny looking figures.. .Here the information couldn't be relied upon, as there are controls
breakdowns. We would have to change the audit approach in this particular area. And the fact they
are talking about backdating entries without trace...I think it becomes riskier. We would maybe
need to look at other areas too. We need to find out what management is up to regarding
backdating entries. My overall perception was that this client is a bit dodgy - not only on the basis
of the figures, but on the basis of the control environment and the client's culture in general
(Stephan, process tracing in year 2, case B).
Since in year 2 Stephan's primary concern was with managerial fraud. He was classified in year 2
under the category of 'fraud recogniser' (F2).
Not all of the auditors' performance could have been categorised as either a conventional
(Russell's example) or a 'big-pictured' mode (Stephan's example) across a two-year span. Some
auditors switched their judgement orientation from a conventional mode in year 1 of treatment to
a 'big-pictured' mode in the second year. Therefore, it was necessary to consider two categories
of switchers between conventional and 'big-pictured' modes, i.e. those conventional auditors who
switched to fraud recognition (C1>F2) and those who switched to an awareness of NAS
(C1>NAS2) in the second year of treatment. These two examples of the auditors-'switchers' are
illustrated by the audit memorandums of Sarah (case C) who switched from a conventional mode
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to fraud recognition in the second year of treatment, and Andrew (case A) who switched from a
conventional mode to NAS recognition in the second year of treatment.
Sarah in year 1 applied a conventional approach to audit. It was only in year 2 when she enlarged
the scope of her judgement.
'Inadequacy of sales ledger processing manual invoicing, journal entries made manually. Variety
of sales terms increasing potential for error in addition to processing error. A need to look at the
client's systems' (Sarah, Audit Manger, Audit memorandum in year 1, case C).
A process tracing exercise in year 1 confirmed conventional concerns in Sarah' judgements over
K pic in year 1 of the audit.
'I think obviously it is a new client and we have been through the proposal process and we have
found out a reasonable amount about the client - it is a listed client. It has advantages and
disadvantages. Advantages that you would expect to work with the previous auditor.
Disadvantages that you may have to do it more rigorously, because of the public and information
to be believed. We have got reasonable financial statements... We have a change of system, which
is always a period of risk and uncertainty. And we change procedures and processes at the same
time. So you have a lack of familiarity with the system but also with procedures underlying the
system. The other thing is that invoices processed manually aren't significant with regard to total
sales. Ok, they are not that significant in value, but are they disproportionate with regard to the
number of invoices in it... It looks like reasonable performance, 5 % of profit margin is not high,
but is not too low either' (Sarah, process tracing in year 1, case C).
In year 1 Sarah was classified under 'conventional audit practice' category (CI). The second year
brought a change in Sarah's judgements, enlarging her 'picture'.
'All as per year 1. Relationships with outside consultants...i.e. dispute. Continued inadequacy with
sales system' (Sarah, Audit memorandum in year 2, case C).
Insights from process tracing confirmed Sarah's 'big-picture' judgement in year 2 of the audit.
'So the first year audit went reasonably well. Interesting here is the dispute with consultants - we
have to understand that - because it could be a contingent liability under way. In terms of how
much more involvement we got in that, I think you have to consider very carefully. It doesn't say
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in any way that the consultants make any claim against to get management, so management claim
against outsiders. What are the costs and how much of management time it is taken to deal with
this and not being directed to the business. I think you want to know why the manual operations
happened to be amended to prevent the errors to happen again, that shows the lack ofmanagement
control, once unacceptable and twice a bit careless. I would want to make sure that information is
really available before committing to audit...We need to understand the relationship with the
consultants, we do not know whether there is a continuing relationship or what other arrangements
K pic made to continue service' (Sarah, process tracing in year 2, case C).
In year 2 of the audit, besides concerns with the risk of material error Sarah questioned
management integrity and was concerned with the dispute between management and consultants.
Hence, she was categorised under 'fraud recognition' (F2).
Similarly, Andrew applied a conventional approach to the audit in the first year of treatment. It
was only in the second year when his judgement's orientation has enlarged.
'We [the audit team] had not, as yet, performed any testing on this or any other system. Thus,
there is a need to address this and other related risks, e.g. debtors. A need to ensure that errors
have stopped and an extent of error needs to be highlighted (its potential impact)' (Andrew, Senior
Auditor, Audit memorandum in year 1, case A).
The process tracing exercise in year 1 confirmed conventional concerns in Andrew's judgements
over the client K pic in year 1 of the audit.
'Firstly, there is a large potential impact - a problem arising from the manual sales - 10 % of the
sales value. I suppose, more profit than the capital employed would have an impact on how we
would calculate materiality, because the capital employed is fairly large. It is something we [a
team] would have to understand fully. The problem could expand on the whole sales processing
systems, in which case, we have to consider whether or not to involve with the client. Sales are
obviously debtors related, so we would need to look at debtors.. .also at the other areas such as
VAT areas. The client thinks that the system is being corrected and is controlled manually...this
may need a closer examination...To understand how the problem arose and what it is related to,
there is something you could do to deal with it in an efficient manner; and that is, in many cases
like this you would actually review the client rather than perform a great scale exercise. You
would get the client to justify its position in detail. You would have to understand the position of
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the company, things such as its trading performance and a general background to the business. I
would say there is a reasonably high risk there' (Andrew, process tracing in year 1, case A).
In year 1, Andrew was classified under 'conventional audit practice' category (CI). The second
year of treatment brought a change in Andrew's judgmental mode and he switched to see a
'bigger picture', i.e. the NAS opportunity.
'The errors of the same nature as highlighted in the year 1 memorandum. The client had
performed an exercise to ensure that the errors were tested, which we tested and found no material
errors. A new system is being sought' (Andrew, Audit memorandum in year 2, case A).
Insights from process tracing confirmed Andrew's 'big-picture' judgement orientation in year 2
of the audit.
'Firstly, I would look at how things apply to a prior year audit, it is just to show really that we
have some background knowledge and an understanding of the nature of the problem, its extent,
how did it arise, how it was dealt with. Now, the client is looking at the replacement of the system,
so typically if it is a client which has a significant problem - in one of the areas fairly important -
we would push the client to resolve it and we could assist to solve the system problem. We can go
to the process of testing and make sure that the position is corrected. We would end up with
testing the elements or the final position.' (Andrew, process tracing in year 2, case A).
In year 2 of the audit, besides being concern with the persistence of error, Andrew was aware of
the need for a new system design and suggested the audit firm's assistance in this respect. Hence,
he switched to a 'NAS recognition' category.
The following four categories of judgmental mode emerged; that is, a conventional mode (i.e.
C1>C2), a 'big-pictured'-versatile mode (i.e. NAS1>F2) and two switching to 'big picture'
modes (i.e. C1>F2 and C1>NAS2). Hence, the above four examples of the individual narratives
reveal to some extent the ways in which judgement strategies are promoted in the audit firms
(organisational strategies). Although the task 'to think aloud' is somewhat an abstraction of real
performance 'on the job' (Anderson and Potter, 1998), the verbal protocol allows one to get some
insight into understanding of attitudes towards and structure of tasks associated with construction
of the memorandum at the planning stage of the audit process. The process tracing exercise
confirmed the categorisation of the auditors' responses in the audit planning memorandum.
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The second part of the interviews was based on questions regarding auditors' attitudes to structure
and judgement and their personal traits. A semi-structured approach was chosen.
'The semi-structured interview is a process in which the interviewer focuses his/her attention on
some limited number of points. He/she may range quite widely around a point, but it would be
done only as means of getting the required information on the particular point'
(Smith, 1972, p. 119).
Hence, as this study was concerned with a number of issues; that is, it recognises the influence of
the characteristics of the audit process, the power of the client and personal traits of the auditor on
behavioural and ethical reasoning in audit judgement processes, this approach (semi-structured)
was more appropriate than either unstructured or structured interview approaches. The
unstructured interview was inappropriate because it assumes that questions and/or topics emerge
from the immediate context and are not at all determined in advance (Patton, 1990). The
structured interview approach was inappropriate because it did not allow for the spontaneity of
responses (Fontana and Frey, 1994). Hence, a free style allowed the researcher to alter the
sequence of questions and to probe for more information. The questions were mostly open-ended
in order to gain spontaneous insights with regard to the auditors' attitudes and actions. They were
embedded in symbolic interactionism perspective where the context of production of data,
intrinsic in its understanding, somewhat allowed the respondents to use their own particular way
of defining the world. This part of the interviews was intended to identify the relevant dimensions
of auditors' motivations in their judgements at the planning stage of the audit process, in
particular with respect to the recognition of potential fraud, and their attitudes to the structure of
that process. Since structure in audit firms is based mostly on rules and systems that reside in
several levels of human and social consciousness, it was important to allow for some spontaneity
in responses.
These interviews lasted about an hour each and were tape recorded and transcribed, providing a
source of longer verbatim quotations. Recording of data was important in order to increase the
accuracy of data collection and to allow the researcher to be more attentive to the interviewee and
to assure that the interactive nature of the interview was not interfered with3 (Patton, 1990).
3 However, one of the problems associated with the use of tape recorders is that it may somewhat interfere
with the openness and depth of a discussion (Patton, 1990).
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The use of narratives is common in ethnographic research, and less in auditing research
(Pentland, 1993, p. 608). It provides data associated with the more ambiguous aspects of audit
judgement and decision making, in particular it depicts to some extent the interplay of the
application of standards, structure of audit task and the auditor's behaviour in judgement
processes.
In short, the readings of data were themselves located in process tracing and individual
discourses. This combined method resulted in detailed insights into some aspects of audit
judgement at the planning stage of the audit process.
5.5 Research population
The random sample of audit seniors and audit managers was drawn from the Big Five auditing
firms. The target group for this study consisted of audit seniors and audit managers in order to
match the requirements of the task embedded in the case study questionnaire with suitable
experience of the respondents. Tasks similar to the one included in the case study are normally
performed by audit staff at senior level; that is, with at least 2 or 3 years of audit experience. The
selection of the Big Five's offices was made in a way that maximised the geographical spread
within the UK. A list of the Big Five audit firms' offices were obtained from the ICAS official
directory (ICAS, 1997). In some cases, colleagues in the Department of Accounting and Business
Method at the University of Edinburgh and connections with the auditing profession provided
contact names for each office. These persons were then contacted and asked to provide a list of
audit seniors and audit managers of that office. Most offices agreed to participate in the study.
These offices furnished short lists of names of their audit seniors and audit mangers. Then
questionnaires were sent to those individuals.
Out of 185 mailed questionnaires launched in autumn 1998, 74 usable responses were received
(i.e. a response rate of 40 %). This response rate resulted from the initial mailing in autumn 1998
and follow-up telephone calls made in December 1998. Some auditors requested follow-up
mailing of the questionnaire. The questionnaire response was very satisfactory. It was much
higher than can normally be expected in a mail questionnaire survey. Many respondents (i.e.
68%) requested a summary of the results. A summary of the questionnaires' responses is




Number of responses Response rate
%*
First mailing 59 31.8
Follow up telephone call 11 8.7
Second mailing 4 2.3
Overall responses 74
Overall response rate 40 %
* Response rate by reference to the residual proportion, e.g. second mailing (4/185-11)=2.3%.
A non-return bias is impossible to check since the study guaranteed the anonymity of
respondents4. The high response rate suggests, however, that non-response bias is unlikely to be
a problem.
At the second stage of the study, interviews were carried out. Information regarding the
possibility to participate in follow-up interviews was included in the mail questionnaires. The
subjects were asked to provide names and addresses at the end of the questionnaire if they
expressed an interest in participation in an interview. Ten individuals were selected for
interviews. These individuals were chosen from two Big Five audit firms based in Edinburgh:
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (5 subjects: 4 male and 1 female) and Arthur Andersen5 (5 subjects: 4
male and 1 female). The selection was made to reflect diverse attitudes to judgements and the
auditors' different backgrounds and experience. Interviewees represented both senior and
managerial levels in the audit firm (5 audit seniors and 5 audit managers). All 10 subjects agreed
to participate.
4 The impossibility of check for non-return bias must be addressed as an unavoidable weakness of this
study.
1
According to Kinney's categorisation (1986) the Big Five audit firms were structured in different ways:
Delloite & Touche and KPMG were perceived as structured, PriceWaterhouseCoopers as unstructured, and
Arthur Andersen and Ernst & Young as semi-structured. Kinney's categorisation (1986), however, did not
include recent mergers among the Big- Five auditing firms, e.g. PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Further, Bowrin
(1998) argued that the Big Five all followed similar semi-structured audit approach.
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5.6 Narrative analysis
The statistical analysis of questionnaire data is taken further into an interpretive dimension. The
narrative turn takes the study beyond its traditional focus on the representation of organisational
structures of audit process and the client's power to encompass knowledge of agency. The
narrative is a form of a meta-story as it depicts the interview quotes from a central perspective
(i.e. the soul of narrative) embedding them in the underlying theoretical stance. The story
metaphor emphasises that we create order, and construct texts bound to particular contexts
(Reissman, 1993, p. 1). These contexts encompass an analysis of individual experience of the
auditor and an analysis of the structures which make this experience possible.
'Culture speaks itself through individual stories...It is because of their subjectivity, their
rootedness in time, place, tradition and personal experience that we value them'
(Reissman, 1993, p. 5).
There is a growing interest in developing narrative methodologies in accounting research (e.g.
Llewellyn, 1999; Boland and Schultze, 1996; Sinclair, 1995). Llewellyn (1999) examined how
narratives can be understood and used as forms of explanation and argument in accounting
research in general. Boland and Schultze (1996) presented how narratives can be used in the
production of individual accountability (acceptable self)- Sinclair (1995) used narratives of chief
executives in the public sector to illustrate different forms and discourses of accountability.
In this study, narratives identify some conditions of the possibility of action within an
organisation (the audit firm), and show how its objectives can be normalised by being accepted as
the 'conventional template' for action (audit), hence absorbed into taken for granted assumptions
of organisational reality and/or organisational strategies (i.e. structurisation processes). The
portrayal of these conditions and consequences is inherently political as it draws on
interpretations of both auditors and the author, interpretations reflecting on individual experiences
and identities (Llewellyn, 1999, pp. 221and 228-229).
Since this study focuses on the organisations (the audit firms) and more specifically on the
auditors employed in these firms, the language of these individuals becomes an important part of
the analysis. The methodology most suitable for this purpose is thus hermeneutics since it can be
used for the analysis of human action (audit). Chapter 4 was devoted to a discussion on the theory
135
of hermeneutics. The goal of hermeneutics is to give an understanding of a phenomenon (audit
judgement) through the interpretations of actions and statements in the context of the
phenomenon (audit judgement milieu). The conditions that need to be met in order to achieve an
understanding of human action include a common language, a common tradition (in the field),
self-understanding, all of these encompassed in a theory of interpretations. A common language
with the subjects of study is necessary to interpret individual behaviour and statements. For
instance, professional jargon in auditing may somewhat disable understanding. A common
tradition refers to a personal knowledge of the field of auditing enabling one to place actions and
statements in an appropriate context. Self-understanding refers to the ability to understand
oneself. If one is able to understand self well, he/she is capable of understanding others (in a
similar cultural background since those individuals are assumed to act according to similar norms
or rules). As the result of interviews whole passages of text need to be taken apart in order to
discover the underlying rules or systems of rules presented in them. To do so, an interpretation
theory is necessary, which in this study is embedded in a hermeneutic methodology.
Based upon the assumption that society is socially constructed, interpretations concur when
similar interpretations can be made from statements presented from different individuals. Thus,
research is based on an interpretation of an interpretation. The first interpretation is made by
subjects of the culture in question (the auditing practitioner), and the second by the author as
he/she interprets the actions and statements of the subject auditors. Giddens (1974) referred to
this phenomenon as the duality of hermeneutics. In addition, if similar interpretations can be
made from the statements of several subjects, the reliability of these interpretations increases.
The present study is enveloped in the duality of hermeneutics. First, the auditor in the study is
envisaged as acting in 'hermeneutic way'. That is an interpretive interrelation between audit
evidence and the auditor is assumed where the auditor 'reads' the economic text of the audit
evidence applying subjective judgements. Second, research is embedded in hermeneutic
methodology where research findings are somewhat anticipated by the pre-understandings of the
audit judgement milieu.
5.7 Statistical analysis
The research design which was determined by the micro-structure of independent judgement and
embedded in the case of NAS provisions' opportunities and fraud recognition, allowed for a
certain pattern of the auditors' behaviour to emerge. As a result, two categories of the auditors
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with different judgmental orientations were identified: (1) a conventional mode (i.e. C1>C2) and
(2) a 'big-picture' mode sub-divided between a 'big-pictured'-versatile mode (i.e. NAS1>F2),
and a 'big-pictured'-switched to fraud recognition mode (i.e. C1>F2) or to NAS opportunism
mode (i.e. C1>NAS2). The conventional group responds very strongly to the structure of the
audit process and being compliant with a layout of the materiality and risk assessments is unable
to enlarge the judgmental scope of the client's environment. The sub-group of the 'big-pictured'-
versatile auditors transcends the structure of 'risk-based' auditing and sees beyond the traditional
format of the risk and materiality issues, i.e. sees further particulars in the client's milieu. The two
sub-groups of the auditors-switchers enlarge their judgement orientation (to fraud recognition or
NAS recognition), but only in the second year of treatment, after having some experience and
knowledge of the client. The statistical analysis was used to ascertain whether these different
groups of auditors perform differently. Chapter 6 demonstrates statistically significant differences
in consistencies in the auditors' judgmental performance.
In this study, statistical analysis is based on non-parametric tests and seeks to obtain supportable
and useful insights from the questionnaire data as to the impact of the structure of audit process
on individual audit judgement, in particular with regard to the recognition of potential fraud
and/or NAS opportunity.
Non-parametric tests are uniquely suited to the data of the behavioural studies (here of judgement
and decision making). They are based on a model that specifies only very general conditions and
none regarding the specific form of distribution from which the sample was drawn such as for
example a normally distributed population6. These tests may be applied appropriately to data
measured in nominal, categorical or ordinal scales (in ranks and/or in seemingly numerical scores
with the strength of ranks). An important advantage of non-parametric tests is their usefulness
with small samples. In addition their interpretations are often more direct than the interpretations
of parametric tests7 (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, pp. 34-36).
6 Certain assumptions are associated with most non-parametric tests, namely that the observations are
independent, sometimes that the variables under study have underlying continuity, but these assumptions
are fewer and weaker than those associated with parametric tests (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, p. 3).
7 An objection to non-parametric statistics is that they are not systematic in comparison with parametric
tests. However, examination of these tests reveals common themes - the tests for categorical data are
systematic and many of the tests applied to ordered data. The differences are on the surface, i.e. the
formulas sometimes obscure the underlying relations between tests (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, p. 36).
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In the present study, the following non-parametric statistics were used to examine the impact of
the structure of audit process and NAS opportunism on individual audit judgement, in particular
with regard to the recognition of potential fraud and/or potential management services: (1) Chi-
test for independence of samples for nominal scale data, (2) Spearman rank-order correlation
coefficient as a measure of association for ordered data, and (3) Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis
of variance for independent samples for ordinal scale data.
5.7.1 Chi-test
In the examination of differences between groups, the question of whether these groups are
independent or related must be determined. The usual parametric technique for analysing data
from two independent samples is to apply a T test to the means of the two groups. T test assumes
that the scores (means) in the samples are independent observations from normally distributed
populations with usually equal variances. When the data consist of frequencies in discrete
categories, the Chi-square test may be used to determine the significance of differences between
two independent groups. The hypothesis being tested is that two groups differ with respect to
some characteristics, and, therefore, with respect to the relative frequency with which group
members fall in several categories. The focus of the Chi-test is on whether the differences in
proportions (observed) exceed those expected as chance or random deviations from
proportionality (Cochran, 1952).
The Chi-test is applicable if the expected frequencies are sufficient in size, i.e. 5 and more for a
sample size of between 20 and 40. When the Ch-test is used there is usually no clear alternative
and thus, the exact power of this test is difficult to determine (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, p. 124).
This study is concerned with the auditor's ability to recognise potential fraud or NAS opportunity
reflecting tensions between independent judgement and the structure of the audit task. Whether
the auditor can not see beyond a conventional audit approach (the group of conventional auditors)
or is capable of spotting a fraud flag and/or NAS opportunity in the K pic's case by interpreting
the material over a broader scope (the group of 'big-pictured' auditors). Thus, the null and
alternative hypotheses were tested: These hypotheses are as follows:
HO: The auditors adopt a standard (conventional) approach to audit across cases irrespective of
the client's situation.
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HI: There are differences in the approach to audit among the auditors across cases.
These hypotheses were tested by examining the conventionality of the audit approach across
cases; that is, the actual proportion of 'big-pictured' and conventional auditors. Chi-test checked
for the independence of samples of 'big-pictured' and conventional auditors across the pairs of
cases.
Further, a degree of conformity with the routine of 'risk-based' auditing (same direction applied
with regard to estimations of risk and hours for audit testing from year 1 to year 2 of treatment)
determines the structure consistency of judgement. A conformity with the structure of the audit
task were examined across the four different groups of auditors previously identified (C1>C2,
NAS1>F2, C1>F2 and C1>NAS2) by the following hypotheses:
HO: There are no differences in consistency with regard to estimations of risk and hours for audit
testing from year 1 to year 2 of treatment among auditors ('big-pictured'-early NAS recognisers
(NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional
auditors (C1>C2)).
HI: There are differences in consistency with regard to estimations of risk and hours for audit
testing from year 1 to year 2 of treatment among auditors ('big-pictured'-early NAS recognisers
(NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional
auditors (C1>C2)).
These hypotheses were tested by examining the actual differences in structure consistency of
'risk-based' auditing; that is differences in directions with regard to estimation of risk and hours
for audit testing from year 1 to year 2 of treatment among the auditors. Chi-test checked for
independence of samples of those who were consistent with the structure and those inconsistent
with the structure across the pairs of the auditors ('big-pictured'-early NAS recognisers
(NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional
auditors (C1>C2)).
5.7.2 Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient Rs
In the judgement and decision making literature whether two sets of scores are related, and if so
what is the degree of their relation, is often sought (i.e. establishing a correlation). In the
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parametric case, the usual measure of correlation is the Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient. This statistic measures the degree to which there is a linear functional relation
between variables. If the data is ranked (based on ranks), the Spearman rank-order correlation
coefficient may apply (i.e. simplifying formula for the Pearson statistic when the data comprises
of ranks). It is a measure of association between two variables which requires that both variables
are measured in at least an ordinal scale so that the objects or individuals under study may be
ranked in two ordered series (Chatfield, 1988). Occasionally some subjects receive the same
score on the same variable. When tied scores occur, each of them is assigned the average of the
ranks (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, pp. 235-237).
Using MINITAB the correlations were sought between the level of risk and number of hours
prescribed for audit testing. Because the subjects of the study were drawn randomly from the
population of the audit managers and audit seniors, ranked scores may be used to determine
consistency with regard to the assessment of audit risk (risk consistency). The question is whether
the judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours assigned for audit testing are
associated (in year 1 and in year 2 of treatment). Thus, the following hypotheses may be tested in
year 1:
HO: Judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours for audit testing are not
positively correlated among the auditors in year 1 of treatment (the groups of auditors include
'big-pictured'-early NAS recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud
recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional auditors (C1>C2)).
HI: There is a positive correlation between these judgements among the auditors in year 1 of
treatment ('big pictured'-early NAS recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2),
fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional auditors (C1>C2)).
In the second year these hypotheses were restated:
HO: Judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours for audit testing are not
positively correlated among the auditors in year 2 of treatment (the groups of auditors include
'big-pictured'-early NAS recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud
recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional auditors (C1>C2)).
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HI: There is a positive correlation between these judgements among the auditors in year 2 of
treatment ('big pictured'-early NAS recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2),
fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional auditors (C1>C2)).
The Spearman rank-order test examines correlations between the level of risk and the number of
audit hours assessed in year 1 and year 2 of treatment between groups of recognisers of NAS
opportunity or/and of potential fraud and conventional auditors.
Further, structure consistency with regard to risk (i.e. between the level of risk and the number of
audit hours assessed in year 2 of treatment) can be checked across the three cases (A, B, C).
Hence, the following hypotheses with regard to risk consistency (association between judgements
regarding the level of risk and number of hours assigned for audit testing) across cases are tested
for year 1 of treatment:
HO: Judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours for audit testing are not
positively correlated among the auditors across cases in year of treatment.
HI: There is a positive correlation between these judgements among the auditors across cases in
year 1 of treatment.
In the second year these hypotheses were restated:
HO: Judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours for audit testing are not
positively correlated among the auditors across cases in year 2 of treatment.
HI: There is a positive correlation between these judgements among the auditors across cases in
year 2 of treatment.
When sample sizes are larger, that is about 20 to 25, the significance of the Spearman rank-
ordered correlations is approximately normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
The efficiency of the Spearman rank-ordered correlation coefficient when compared with the
Pearson statistic is about 91% (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, p. 244).
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5.7.3 Kruskal-Wallis test: Risk assessment across the groups
ANOVA is a general technique for partitioning the overall variability in a set of observations into
components due to specified influences and to random error (Chatfield, 1988). The ANOVA
technique was introduced to the audit literature by Ashton (1974). The model measures the
significance and percentage of variance accounted for by main effects and interactions. ANOVA
designs have been used in audit judgement studies concerning internal controls evaluation and
audit planning (Ashton, 1974; Mock and Turner, 1981), materiality (Messier, 1983), evaluation of
internal auditing (Abdel-khalik et al., 1983), uncertainty disclosures decisions (Libby, 1979),
inherent risk (Colbert, 1988), and analytical review judgements (Brown and Solomon, 1991).
One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) between the groups of non-recognisers (conventional
auditors), fraud recognisers and the NAS focused, allows closer examination of the risk
assessments in both periods of treatment between the three groups (A, B, C). Any differences
attributable to the different exposures in respect of the client's management response embody a
different management service opportunity. Thus, the experiment is designed to assess both
awareness of, and sensitivity to, those factors which are addressed in the experiment. A
significant main effect across treatments implies that the auditor' s judgements (i.e. median
performance of risk assessment) varied systematically with changes in the particular cue8.
Kruskal - Wallis (hereafter KW) is a non-parametric version of one-way analysis of variance by
ranks allowing testing for independence among the samples in the entire population. (Siegel and
Castellan, 1989, p. 206-207). The null hypothesis is that the groups of non-recognisers
(conventional auditors), fraud recognisers, and NAS focused come from the same population with
the same median of risk assessment. The alternative hypothesis implies that the groups of auditors
differ in the median performance with regard to risk assessments.
8 The percentage of variance accounted for by both individual cues and interactions of various cues can be
measured by the omega squared statistic. The individual omega squared can be interpreted as being
analogous to the squared product moment correlation in that it measures the percentage of variation
explained. The sum of the omega squared is interpreted in a similar manner to linear predictability (R
squared) (Trotman, 1997).
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Thus, in year 1 of treatment the following hypotheses were formulated:
HO: There is no difference in the median of risk assessments between the group of conventional
auditors (CI), fraud recognisers (Fl) and NAS focused (NASI) in year 1 of treatment.
HI: These groups of auditors differ in the median with regard to risk assessments in year 1 of
treatment.
In year 2 of the treatment the following null and alternative hypotheses were formulated:
HO: There is no difference in the median of risk assessments between the groups of conventional
auditors (C2), fraud recognisers (F2), and NAS focused (NAS2) in year 2 of treatment.
HI: These groups of auditors differ in the median performance with regard to risk assessments in
year 2 of treatment.
When the obtained value of KW is significant, it indicates that at least one of the groups is
different, but it does not tell which one. If HO is rejected, the method of multiple comparisons
may be used to determine which differences are significant.
The Kruskal-Wallis test has asymptotic efficiency of 95.5 %. This test is more efficient than the
extension of the median test because it utilises more of the information in the observations,
converting the scores into ranks rather than simply dichotomising them as above or below the
median (Siegel and Castellan, 1989, p. 215).
5.8 Limitations of the study
The limitations of the study are related, in particular, to subject variation, partiality of
interpretations and specify of context, all of which affect external validity.
Firstly, the partiality of representations is related to subject selection and variation. It is important
to recognise that there is subject variation in the responses based upon subjects' personal traits (in
particular related to attitudes to judgement and structure metaphors and to learning styles) and
their experience of situations similar to the scenario reflected in the case study's construct. The
number of subjects allocated to the controlled groups (here A, B, C) needs to be sufficient in
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order to ensure that the mix of personal traits and experiences in each group are representative of
the population of auditors as a whole (Trotman, 1997). Senior auditors and audit managers drawn
from the Big Five audit firms in the UK represented the selection of the group of auditors in this
study. Such a selection was made in order to match the requirement of the task embedded in the
case study with suitable experience of respondents. The audit staff at senior level (with at least
2/3 years of audit experience) normally perform tasks similar to the one included in the case
study. Hence, the results of the study cannot be generalised beyond these two groups of senior
auditors and audit managers. The findings need to be limited to those two populations. In
addition, the sample of auditors was not entirely random. In some cases, reliance was placed on
the individual audit firms to supply a complete list of the appropriate persons.
Secondly, the partiality of representations relates to the partiality of interpretations. At this point
it is important to emphasis the partiality of interpretations of the auditors' narratives in both
stages of the research. The research design, whilst articulating general principles of audit practice,
was conceived through the unique engagement of the author with the individual auditors and
particular material cases and hence inevitably resulted in a specific frame of reference and
enclosure of text. Similar limitations are present in the particularity of the interpretative work of
those subjects involved in the experiment.
Thirdly, the unique construct of this study, i.e. the case of audit judgement within the structured
audit format, predetermines the context and boundaries of the research and hence defines the
extent to which findings can be generalised in different settings. Although the research is
designed on the basis of a real-life construct, the risk embedded in the case study is theoretical;
that is, it does not have a real impact on the audit firm. In this type of the research design, there is
always the question whether the instrument properly captures subjects' approach to audit. Hence,
it has to be addressed as a limitation of research design. In addition, other elements of the audit
milieu, not captured by the statistical sampling 'shadow' the auditors' assessments of risk and
subsequently the estimation of audit hours in the case study.
Derived meanings from the auditors' story seem fluid and contextual, not fixed and universal.
Hence, the world of text represents reality, i.e. the realm of the real in audit practice, selectively.
Given the premise of an interpretive approach, the understanding of human practice through
reflection on the synthesis of anticipated frames of references could only be partial.
Consequently, the findings in the form of narratives construct a 'meaningful totality from
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scattered events' (Ricoeur, 1981), not being constituted by a succession of episodes. Hence, the
meaning of the text needs to be constructed as a whole whilst possessing an inherent plurivocality
that allows it to be constructed and interpreted in multiple ways. It is the ontological conditions
of the individual experience that fuels narrative construct. Thus, these narrative forms shared
auditors' temporal belonging in the audit judgement milieu (the conditions of 'being in time')
expressing the dynamics of individual audit practice both cognitively, and relating to intuition.
5.9 Summary
This chapter discussed the stages involved in the design and administration of the research. First,
a brief discussion on qualitative and quantitative approaches was presented. As both approaches
have their strengths and weaknesses, a combination of methods was used in this study. The
concept of triangulation was explored, in particular with regard to the development, refinement,
and administration of research methods. The implemented research strategy was twofold. Firstly,
a case study experiment based on mail questionnaires was conducted. This method allowed
capturing a phenomenon under investigation on a larger scale. Secondly, the interviews were
conducted, in semi-structured format, in order not to direct the discourse of respondents.
Interviews allowed the enrichment of the questionnaire findings. Further, the process tracing
exercise confirmed and validated the correctness of auditors' categorisation (auditors' responses
in the audit planning memorandum).
The study involved the use of a population of audit seniors and audit mangers from the Big Five
auditing firms based in the UK. The response rate (i.e. 40 %) was very satisfactory.
In short, the collection of research data employed a combination of mail questionnaires and
interviews. This increased the likelihood that the picture emerging from this research represents a
reasonable cross-section of insights into judgement strategies and opinions held by senior auditors
and audit managers as to independent audit judgement and the structure of the audit process, as
well as to the recognition of fraud and/or NAS opportunities. Four different patterns of the audit
judgement processes emerged, consistent with there being different behavioural performance; that
is (1) a conventional mode, (2) a 'big-picture' mode sub-divided between a 'big-pictured'-
versatile mode and 'big-pictured'-switcher to fraud recognition mode or to NAS opportunism
mode. Chapter 6 reports on the statistical analysis and ascertains whether the proportion of these
different groups of auditors varies across cases and whether these groups deploy different levels
of judgement consistency with regard to the structure of the audit task.
145
CHAPTER 6
Research findings: Experimental results
6.1 Introduction
The results from mail questionnaires, a copy of which is presented in Appendix 1, are explored in
this chapter. The results were analysed using Excel and MINITAB. The research sample
comprised of 185 individuals and included audit seniors and audit managers from the Big Five
auditing firms based in the UK, as outlined in chapter 5. This chapter presents the profile of the
respondents and provides insights into their judgement processes associated with recognition of
material misstatements and their decisions with regard to the need for audit testing; that is, risk
assessments and estimations of a budget of audit hours for testing. It reports on the general
approaches held by respondents in relation to independence of their judgements, whilst the audit
environment is obfuscated by NAS opportunism and a 'risk-based' audit approach is promoted.
The main part of this chapter reports on the effects of client's management representations, NAS
opportunism and the structured audit on independent audit judgement and decision making at the
planing stage of the audit process. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly,
the profile of respondents is presented. The following section analyses the auditors' scope in
judgement processes within the structured audit approach. Next, the anchorage of the auditors'
concerns is presented. Finally, the incidence of auditors' consistency with regard to the structure of
'risk based' auditing is discussed. Two aspects of the incidence of auditors' consistency are
examined. Firstly, consistency with regard to the direction of risk and the audit testing applied in
year 1 and year 2 of treatment across the groups identified by the incidence of anchorage of
individual judgements. Secondly, consistency with regard to values of the assessed risk across the
groups identified by the incidence of anchorage and across the cases.
6.2 Profile of respondents
Fully completed questionnaires were received from 74 individuals (a response rate of 40 %).
Demographic characteristics which relate to questionnaires' respondents are presented in Tables
6.1 and 6.2.
The majority of respondents were young, 44.6 % of the subjects falls into age group between 31-
35 years whilst only 8.2 % of the subjects were 40 years old and over. 62 % of respondents held
senior positions and almost 38 % of respondents held managerial positions in the audit firms they
worked for. Only 15 subjects were female (20.3 % of the population) implying that the auditing
profession is still male-dominated (Table 6.1).
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Table 6.1
Questionnaires' respondents: Demographic characteristics
Demographics Number of responses Response rate % of
overall responses
Position in the firm
Audit Senior 46 62.2













Questionnaires' respondents: Work experience
Work experience Number of responses Response rate % of
overall responses
Length of audit experience
Up to 3 years 25 33.8
4-5 years 26 35.1
6-7 years 15 20.3
8+ years 8 10.8
Overall 74 100
Career plans
Remain in audit dep. Within the firm 37 50
Move to another dep. Within the firm 13 17.5
Move to industry or commerce 17 22.9
Other* 2 2.9
Not sure 5 6.7
Overall 74 100
* The category 'Other' represents those individuals who consider to change entirely their career.
147
Table 6.2 presents respondents' work experience and demonstrates that the majority (69 %) of
respondents had between 3 and 5 years of experience in audit. For the purpose of this study, the
experience requirement for all participants was a minimum of 2 years in the audit division. A
majority (67.5 %) of respondents expressed the wish to pursue their career within the audit firm
they work for either in the audit department or in another division. 23 % of the subjects expressed
the will to move either to commerce or to industry. 3 % of the subjects considered that they wished
to change their career paths entirely.
Due to the anonymity of respondents it was not possible to analyse the firm effect; that is, the
distribution of responses across firms, or whether there were any significant differences between
firms, in particular in their operational methodological approaches to audit.
6.3 Incidence of recognition of a potential fraud flag and/or NAS opportunity within the
structured audit approach
Concerns over the auditor's ability to recognise a fraud flag and/or NAS opportunity reflect the
tensions between independent judgement and the structure of the audit task. The incidence of
auditors' recognition of a fraud flag and/or NAS opportunity is based upon the audit planning
memorandums individually composed by the subjects. The question is whether auditors can see
beyond the conventional audit practice of 'risk-based' auditing and are capable of spotting a fraud
flag and/or NAS opportunity in the K pic case by interpreting the given material on K pic's
performance and overall environment over a broader scope of judgement.
In the study, those subjects who recognised a fraud flag and/or NAS opportunity in either year of
treatment were perceived as 'big picture' practitioners. The term 'big-picture' relates to
practitioners who apply freer, more holistic scope in judgement processes, and are able to look
'outside the square' (Percy, 1999). The subjects unable to see either a fraud flag or NAS
opportunity in the K pic case were perceived as more conventional practitioners; this often relates
to the practice of 'ticking the right boxes' with 'black box' oriented judgements. In this study the
auditors were expected to change scope in their judgements according to the circumstances of K
pic (the characteristics of K pic vary substantially across the three cases A, B, C) (sections 5.3 of
chapter 5 presented case study design).
Thus, the null and alternative hypotheses were tested ocsO.051:
HO: The auditors adopt a standard (conventional) approach to audit across cases irrespective of the
client's situation.
1 The choice of °==0.05 is a commonly accepted level of significance; although this has been questioned as
an arbitrary figure (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).
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HI: There are differences in the approach to audit among the auditors across cases.
These hypotheses were tested by examining the conventionality of the audit approach across cases;
that is, the actual proportion of 'big-pictured' and conventional auditors. Chi-test checked for
independence of samples of 'big-pictured' and conventional auditors across the pairs of cases. If
there was no statistically significant difference in the proportion of auditors adopting conventional
as opposed to 'big-pictured' judgmental approaches with regard to the K pic 's audit across cases
(across pairs of cases A and B, B and C, C and A), the null hypothesis would not be rejected. If the
pairs of cases differed significantly in proportion of auditors adopting conventional, as opposed to
'big-picture' judgement scopes with regard to the K pic's audit (cases A and B, B and C, C and A),
the null hypothesis would be rejected and alternative hypothesis accepted.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present a summary of the results associated with the incidence of the
recognition effect in year 2 of the treatment. In year 2, in addition to the presence of NAS
opportunity, fraud flags were introduced in each case.
Table 6.3
Recognition effect across cases - year 2 of treatment for oc=0.05
Case A B C Overall
Group
'Big-pictured' 9 32% 16 73% 19 78% 44 59.5 %
'Conventional' 19 68% 6 27% 5 21% 30 40.5%
Overall 28 22 24 74 100%
CHITEST 0.0008648 (statistical significance 99.91 %)
Table 6.4
Recognition effect across pairs of cases - year 2 of treatment for oc=0.05
CASES CHITES\f STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE
A AND B 0.004385 99.56 %
A AND C 0.000706 99.92 %
B AND C 0.628181 37.18 %
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Out of all the subjects in the treatment, 59.5 % (hereafter 'big-pictured') recognised either a fraud
signal or NAS opportunity. The remainder, i.e. 40.5 % of subjects (hereafter 'conventional'
practitioners) did not see beyond the standard audit practice of risk/materiality assessment (Table
6.3).
Hence, the judgmental processes of 40 % of the entire population were embedded in a somewhat
narrower scope judgements in which boundaries were determined by the structure of the audit
process. The proportion of 'big-pictured' differs across cases (statistically significant: 99.91 %).
These differences are statistically significant between case A and case B, and between case A and
case C (Tables 6.4). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the auditors adopt a standard
(conventional) approach to audit across cases irrespective of the client's situation is rejected for the
pair of cases A and B, and for the pair of cases A and C. Thus, the alternative hypothesis regarding
the existence of different approaches to audit in these two pairs of cases (A and B, A and C) is
accepted. A statistically significant conclusion with regard to the differences in the applied audit
approaches cannot be reached with regard to cases B and C. These results are not surprising since
the existence of fraud flags is evident in both cases B and C. Case A, however, involves the least
obvious fraud flag, encouraging conventional audit behaviour (subsequent minority of 'big-
pictured', that is 32 % of the subjects). In cases B and C, with more obvious fraud flags, there is
still 27 % (case B) and 21 % (case C) of the subjects functioning in a conventional mode.
It could be speculated that the degree of recognition does not depend on a size of 'big-picture' (i.e.
the extent of 'big-picture' capacities). This can also indicate that there is a level of materiality
threshold at which some auditors are able to switch their judgmental orientation from conventional
mode to 'big-picture' mode, i.e. the versatile group. In addition, it could be argued that there may
be a sub-group of the auditors who despite of the existence of the fraud flags, stay within the
'black-box' orientation judgements (either unable or unwilling to label the problem of fraud).
On the whole, it was expected that auditors would recognise the fraud flag and/or the NAS
opportunity at a higher rate across these cases given the characteristics of the K pic's environment
and associated riskiness.
In addition to the analysis of the recognition effect across cases, the individual comments cited in
the memorandum were examined. In the narrative part of the memorandum, where the auditors had
to list the most important points with regard to the economic reality ofK pic for the audit planning
purposes, the subjects made on average 3.3 comments in year 1 and subsequently 3.1 in year 2.
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Out of all cited comments in the audit memorandum, 93 % (in year 1 of treatment) and 79 % (in
year 2 of treatment) did not refer to either NAS opportunity or material misstatements (i.e. fraud)
and thus, these comments fall into the category of 'Conventional audit practice' (Table 6.5). It can
be argued that the auditors' individual interpretations of the overall situation at K pic reflect a
rather narrow scope ofjudgements.
Table 6.5
The auditors' discourse in the audit planing memorandum: Frequency of comments
Year 1 2
Memorandum comments
Frequency % Frequency % A%
1. Conventional audit practice 226 93.0 184 79.0 -0.15
2. Potential fraud recognition 4 1.6 35 15.0 8.37
3. Recognition of NAS 13 5.4 14 6.0 0.11
Overall 243 100 233 100 -
The obduracy of K pic's problem (i.e. an error in the sales system carried over from year 1 to year
2 of treatment) as well as the more evident presence of the fraud flags in year 2, reinforced the
auditors' concerns with regard to potential fraud. The frequency of auditors concerns over fraud
increased to 8.3 % in year 2 (Table 6.5).
It can be argued that auditors find it difficult to transcend the structure of 'risk-based' auditing.
Does it mean that structurisation of the audit process 'bands' a 'big picture' orientation in the audit
judgement?
6.4 Incidence of the auditors' anchorage
This section presents the incidence of the auditors' anchorage. Most of the early NAS recognisers
in year 1 of treatment (NASI) switched the 'anchor' of their concerns in year 2 and recognised a
fraud flag (F2). Out of all early NAS recognisers2 (NASI) 93 % became recognisers of fraud in
period 2 (F2). Out of all non-recognisers from year 1 (CI) 30.6 % became recognisers of fraud in
year 2 (F2) (Table 6.6).
2 In year 1 of treatment only one subject mentioned potential existence of fraud and even then not explicitly.




'Switch effect' - recognition of fraud
NASI* F2 NAS2 C2
Yes 15 14 93 % 1 7%
No 59 18 30.6 % 11 18.6% 30 50.8%
Overall 74 32 43.2 % 12 16.3% 30 40.5%
* Includes F1 (1 subject)
Hence, early NAS recognisers (NASI) tend to switch to fraud recognition, but initial recognition is
affected since late NAS recognisers (NAS2) seem to be deflected from recognition of fraud. In the
latter group there is the risk of apparent independence threat: those subjects may use the
conventional structure of audit in order to avoid engagement with fraud problem regardless of their
awareness of evident fraud clues. The dynamics of NAS opportunism, deflecting the probability of
fraud recognition, could be an area addressed in further research, in particular issues of apparent
organisational independence. Further, it could be argued that the structure in audit somewhat
'bands' the 'big picture' judgmental orientation of the auditor in the sense of delaying fraud
recognition.
It could be argued that the recognition of fraud and of the NAS opportunity are mutually exclusive
since auditors do not consider NAS opportunities and fraud signals simultaneously in the same
period of treatment. In other words, there is tentative evidence of the reluctance of both early and
late NAS recognisers (NAS 1 and NAS2) to recognise a fraud signal and an NAS opportunity in the
same period of treatment. Such evidence may suggest the ability of some practitioners to switch
their attention to adapt to a new situation: when the underlying circumstances are evident of fraud
and/or NAS opportunity some auditors are prepared to see the client in a wider scope and are
capable of versatile judgements. Such auditors are treated as operating within a 'big-pictured'-
versatile mode of judgement.
6.5 Incidence of auditors' consistency with regard to the structure of the audit determined by
the directions of assessed risk and estimated hours for audit testing
Consistency with regard to the direction of risk and the audit testing applied in year 1 and year 2 of
treatment across the groups identified by the incidence of anchorage of individual judgements, i.e.
NASI and CI for year 1 and NAS2, F2, C2 for year 2 is examined by Chi-test (section 6.4).
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The degree of conformity with the routine of risk assessment and audit hours estimations
determines the structure consistency of judgement in 'risk-based' auditing. Those auditors who
applied changes in the estimation of audit risk and the budget for audit testing from year 1 to year
2 in the same direction and applied either same, higher, or lower estimates for risk and audit hours
were perceived as consistent with regard to the structure of the audit approach (i.e. SS, HH, LL).
Those who applied those changes in different directions were perceived as inconsistent with regard
to the structure of the audit approach (i.e. HS, HL, SH, SL, LS, LH).
Conformity with the structure of the audit task were examined across the four different groups of
auditors (C1>C2, NAS1>F2, C1>F2 and C1>NAS2) previously identified by the following
hypotheses for cc=0.05:
HO: There are no differences in consistency with regard to estimations of risk and hours for audit
testing from year 1 to year 2 of treatment among auditors ('big-pictured'-early NAS recognisers
(NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional
auditors (C1>C2)).
HI: There are differences in consistency with regard to estimations of risk and hours for audit
testing from year 1 to year 2 of treatment among auditors ('big-pictured'-early NAS recognisers
(NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional
auditors (C1>C2)).
These hypotheses were tested by examining the actual differences in structure consistency of 'risk-
based' auditing; that is, differences in directions with regard to estimation of risk and hours for
audit testing from year 1 to year 2 of treatment among the auditors. Chi-test checked for the
independence of samples of those individuals who were consistent with the structure and those
inconsistent with the structure across the pairs of the auditors ('big-pictured'-early NAS
recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and
conventional auditors (C1>C2)). If there were no statistically significant difference in the
proportion of consistent auditors, as opposed to inconsistent auditors, among the pairs of the
auditors, the null hypothesis would not be rejected. If there were a statistically significant
difference in this proportion among the pairs of the auditors, the null hypothesis would be rejected
and the alternative hypothesis accepted.
Conformity with the structure of the audit task across the groups of auditors (determined by the
anchorage of their judgements in section 6.4) is presented in Tables 6.7 and 6.8.
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Table 6.7
Structure consistency between the groups of auditors - recognition effect for oc=0.05
Direction
(risk/audit testing)
NASI>F2 CI >F2 CI >NAS2 CI >C2 ALL
HH, SS, LL











Overall 14 19 % 18 24% 11 16 % 30 41 % 73 100 %
CHITEST 0.00704 (Statistical significance: 99.29 %)
Early NAS recognisers, who switch to fraud recognition (NAS1>F2), were less consistent with the
structure of the audit process (57 %) in comparison with the entire sample (66 %) (significance
level: 99.3 %). Early conventional auditors (CI) split their judgmental scope towards fraud (F2) or
NAS recognition (NAS2), or remained as the conventional group (C2). Out of all the subjects,
24 % were able to spot fraud flags, of which 89 % were following the demands of logic of 'risk
based' auditing (C1>F2). A further 16 % of all the subjects did not 'see' fraud but spotted the NAS
opportunity in the second year (C1>NAS2) while being inconsistent with regard to the structure
of audit process (73 %); that is, in most cases these auditors increased the risk but not hours for
testing, or even decreased the hours (Table 6.7). It seems that NAS opportunism deflected those
auditors from the recognition of fraud (whether this was deliberate or reflected the structured,
mechanistic learning in the profession may be an area addressed in further research).
Table 6.8




NAS1>F2 AND C1>F2 0.003965 99.60 %
C1>F2 AND C1>NAS2 0.000722 99.92 %
C1>F2 AND C1>C2 0.119528 88.04 %
NAS1>F2 AND C1>C2 0.412903 58.70 %
NAS1>F2 AND C1>NAS2 0.135305 86.46 %
C1>C2 AND C1>NAS2 0.001384 99.86 %
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A significant proportion of auditors (41 %) did not recognise fraud despite the existence of fraud
signals in K pic's case material (C1>C2). Those auditors, however, were very consistent (70 %) in
comparison with all the subjects (66 %), most versatile group (NAS1>F2) (57%) or late NAS
recognisers (27 %). It seems that the 'big-pictured' - NAS recognisers did not conform to structure
as much as conventional auditors and the group of fraud recognisers. Further, the group of
versatile 'big-pictured' (NAS1>F2) was less consistent (57 %) in comparison with late fraud
recognisers (89%), but more consistent in comparison with late NAS recognisers (27%) (Table
6.7).
The statistically significant differences in auditors' structure consistency are evident between the
groups of (1) fraud recognisers (C1>F2) and late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2) (significance level
99.92 %), (2) conventional auditors (C1>C2) and late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2) (significance
level 99.86 %), and (3) 'big-pictured'-versatile (NAS1>F2) and fraud recognisers (C1>F2)
(significance level 99.60 %) (Table 6.8). In these three cases, the null hypothesis regarding no
differences in the auditors' structure consistency is rejected and the alternative hypothesis
accepted. The differences in auditors' structure consistency in the groups of fraud recognisers and
late NAS recognisers, and in the groups of conventional auditors and late NAS recognisers
indicate an apparent independence threat; that is, the group of late NAS is less consistent with
regard to the structure of 'risk-based' auditing since the auditors tend to remain or even decrease
the number of hours for audit testing despite an increase of the risk in K pic.
It seems that in the groups of 'big-pictured'-versatile and fraud recognisers the majority of auditors
is risk averse. That is, the characteristics of K pic in the first year of treatment did not explicitly
point towards fraud. Further, an NAS opportunity was not a motivational driver for an increase of
the overall risk. Thus, only the second year with obvious fraud indicators triggered an increase of
the risk among auditors. This is inconclusive and would require further investigation as to the
attitudes to risk among auditors, in particular with regard to risk aversion.
We cannot arrive at the statistically significant conclusion about the differences in auditors'
structure consistency (1) between the groups of fraud recognisers (C1>F2) and conventional
auditors (C1>C2), (2) between the groups of 'big-pictured' versatile auditors (NAS1>F2) and late
NAS focused (C1>NAS2), and (3) between the groups of 'big-pictured'-versatile (NAS1>F2) and
conventional auditors (C1>C2). Thus, in these three cases we can not either reject the null
hypothesis nor accept the alternative hypothesis (Table 6.8). The incidence of early NAS
recognisers staying with NAS recognition in year 2 was minimal (only one subject in the
treatment), therefore it is impossible to check this group for structure consistency. The
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combination of early NAS recognisers becoming conventional in year 2 of treatment (NAS1>C2)
did not occur in the study.
6.6 Auditors' consistency with regard to the structure of the audit determined by the levels of
estimated risk and a number of budgeted audit hours for audit procedures.
Consistency with regard to values of the assessment of risk across the groups identified by the
incidence of anchorage and across the cases is examined by Spearman Rank-Ordered Correlations
and analysis of variance by ranks, that is the Kruskal-Wallis test. The values of the assessed risk
were determined through the use of a 7-point Likert scale where 1 represented negligible risk, 7
extremely high risk, and the median of 4 represented moderate risk.
The question is whether the judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours assigned
for audit testing are associated (in year 1 and in year 2 of treatment). Thus, the following
hypotheses may be tested in year 1 for cc=0.05:
HO: Judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours for audit testing are not positively
correlated among the auditors in year 1 of treatment (the groups of auditors include 'big-pictured'-
early NAS recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud recognisers (C1>F2),
and conventional auditors (C1>C2)).
HI: There is a positive correlation between these judgements among the auditors in year 1 of
treatment ('big pictured'-early NAS recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2),
fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional auditors (C1>C2)).
In the second year these hypotheses were restated for cc=0.05:
HO: Judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours for audit testing are not positively
correlated among the auditors in year 2 of treatment (the groups of auditors include 'big-pictured'-
early NAS recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), fraud recognisers (C1>F2),
and conventional auditors (C1>C2)).
HI: There is a positive correlation between these judgements among the auditors in year 2 of
treatment ('big pictured'-early NAS recognisers (NAS1>F2), late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2),
fraud recognisers (C1>F2), and conventional auditors (C1>C2)).
The Spearman rank-order test examines correlations between the level of risk and the number of
audit hours assessed in year 1 and year 2 of treatment between groups of recognisers of NAS
opportunity or/and of potential fraud and conventional auditors (Table 6.9).
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Table 6.9
Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient Rs - recognition effect
Group NAS1>F2 C1>F2 C1>NAS2 C1>C2
Year
1 0.039 0.450 0.020 0.403
2 0.355 0.504 0.320 0.511
We can observe stronger correlations between the assessment of risk and the number of hours of
more conventional auditors (C1>C2) in comparison with the group of 'big-pictured' versatile
(NAS1>F2) and late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2). Further, late fraud recognisers (C1>F2) have
similar correlations to conventional auditors (C1>C2). It seems that late NAS recognisers and 'big-
pictured' versatile have a higher propensity to be less consistent with regard to the structure of the
audit task. The results of this test are indicative but not conclusive. Further research is required to
substantiate these results.
Structure consistency with regard to risk (i.e. between the level of risk and the number of audit
hours assessed in year 2 of treatment) can be checked across the three cases (A, B, C). Hence, the
following hypotheses with regard to risk consistency (association between judgements regarding
the level of risk and number of hours assigned for audit testing) across cases are tested for year 1
and 2 of treatment:
HO: Judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours for audit testing are not positively
correlated among the auditors across cases in year 1 of treatment.
HI: There is a positive correlation between these judgements among the auditors across cases in
year 1 of treatment.
In the second year these hypotheses were restated:
HO: Judgements regarding the level of risk and number of hours for audit testing are not positively
correlated among the auditors across cases in year 2 of treatment.
HI: There is a positive correlation between these judgements among the auditors across cases in
year 2 of treatment.
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We observe rather weak correlations between the assessment of risk and audit hours across cases
(Table 6.10). The strongest correlation between risk and hours can be observed in case B
incorporating the strongest fraud flag.
Table 6.10
Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient Rs - case effect
Case A B C All
Year
1 0.289 0.537 0.194 0.289
2 0.375 0.604 0.238 0.450
Overall these correlations illustrate the relatively weak association of risk and hours assessments
implying (1) the problem with auditors' consistency in judgement processes and (2) the effects of
the other elements of the audit milieu on independent judgement, unexplained by the statistical
testing. These hidden elements relate to structural conditions, social institutions, power relations,
etc.
One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) between the groups of non-recognisers (conventional
auditors), fraud recognisers and the NAS focused, allows closer examination of the risk
assessments in both periods of treatment between the groups of auditors determined by anchorage
of their judgements (section 6.4). Any differences attributable to the different exposures in respect
of the client's management response embody the different management service opportunity. Thus,
the experiment is designed to assess both awareness of, and sensitivity to, those factors which are
addressed in the experiment. A significant main effect across the groups implies that the auditors'
judgements varied systematically (i.e. median performance of risk assessment). The null
hypothesis is that the groups of non-recognisers (conventional auditors), fraud recognisers, and
NAS focused come from the same population with the same median performance of risk
assessment. The alternative hypothesis implies that the groups of auditors differ in the median
performance with regard to risk assessments. Thus, in year 1 of treatment the following hypotheses
were formulated for oc =0.05:
HO: There is no difference in the median of risk assessments between the group of conventional
auditors (CI), fraud recognisers (Fl) and NAS focused (NASI) in year 1 of treatment.
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HI: These groups of auditors differ in the median with regard to risk assessments in year 1 of
treatment.
Similarly, in year 2 of the treatment the following null and alternative hypotheses were formulated
for oc =0.05:
HO: There is no difference in the median of risk assessments between the groups of conventional
auditors (C2), fraud recognisers (F2), and NAS focused (NAS2) in year 2 of treatment.
HI: These groups of auditors differ in the median performance with regard to risk assessments in
year 2 of treatment.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test, a non-parametric version of one-way analysis of
variance, for the risk assessments are presented in Table 6.11.
Table 6.11
Risk assessments across the recognition effect for oc=0.05
KW (P) Statistical
Year significance
1 0.0045 99.55 %
2 0.0987 90.13 %
Table 6.11 demonstrates that in year 1 of treatment we can reject HO at the probability 99.55 %.
The groups of early conventional auditors (CI), fraud recognisers (Fl) and NAS focused (NASI)
assessed the risk in a different manner. In addition, the means of risk performance were calculated.
The means of risk assessments were M=4.0 for conventional auditors and M=4.99 for 'big-
pictured' (in year 1 fraud recognition is minimal, therefore the group of 'big-pictured' was
analysed as one). These suggest that the group of 'big-pictured' assessed a higher rate risk of 1
point.
In year 2 of the treatment we cannot reject HO as there is no difference in the median performance
of risk assessment between fraud recognisers (F2), NAS recognisers (NAS2) and conventional
auditors (C2). Table 6.11 implies that these groups assessed the risk in a similar manner in year 2
of the treatment. Similarly, the means of risk performance were estimated. M=4.41 for
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conventional auditors and M=4.31 for the group of 'big-pictured' (subsequently M=4.28 for NAS
focused and M=4.44 for fraud focused).
It could be speculated that auditors on the whole are risk averse. It indicates that the auditors
regard the risk as somewhat less in instances when they can understand it and control it. Thus,
since the fraud flags are evident in year 2 of treatment, risk aversion did not allow for significant
differences in the median performance of risk assessment between fraud recognisers, NAS
recognisers and conventional auditors.
On the whole the Kruskal-Wallis test does not allow to see into individual thought processes
associated with independent audit judgement. Risk perception is thus a simplistic surrogate for
such insights. The following chapter (chapter 7) on the basis of narrative analysis reports on
individual thought processes in audit judgement.
Analysing the incidence of the auditors' consistency with regard to the structure of the audit
process and the risk values (Tables 6.6 - 6.10), it could be argued that the majority of conventional
practitioners (C1>C2) were more compliant with the structure while the group of versatile 'big-
pictured' (NAS1>F2) and late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2) had a higher propensity to transcend
the structure of the audit process. Alternatively, the independence from the client may have been
threatened, in particular in the group of NAS recognisers: they seem to be operationally
independent but apparent independence is at risk. It could be argue that these auditors may use
conventional structure of the audit process as a mask in order to avoid engagement with the fraud
problem despite their awareness of fraud clues. In addition, other effects of the audit judgement
milieu, unexplained by the statistical analysis 'shadow' the assessments of risk and audit hours.
6.7 Summary
This chapter presented the results of the statistical analysis of the questionnaire data. The
examination of the anchorage of the auditor's judgements made in the audit planning
memorandum allowed the determination of two different groups of auditors consistent with there
being different attitudes to structure and judgement metaphors: (1) conventional auditors focused
predominantly on risk and materiality assessments, and (2) 'big-pictured' - sub-divided between
(i) versatile including those auditors who were able to switch their 'big-picture' scope of
judgement over the two years of treatment, and (ii) switchers from a conventional mode in year 1
to 'big-picture' mode in a second year of treatment. Into the 'big-pictured' category fall those
auditors who recognised either an NAS opportunity or a fraud flag (in either year of treatment);
that is, 'NAS focused' and 'fraud focused'. Those auditors who switch their judgements from NAS
recognition in year 1 of the treatment to fraud recognition in the second year of the treatment
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(NAS1> F2) represent the sub-group of versatile-'big-pictured' learners. This group demonstrated
a wider scope of judgement.
From the analysis of the auditors' consistency with regard to the structure of the audit approach
embedded in 'risk-based' auditing, it could be argued that the majority of conventional auditors
(70 %) were more compliant with the structure of the audit task in comparison with the group of
'big-pictured' (in particular in the sub-group of versatile-'big-pictured' (NAS1>F2) (57 %) and
late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2) (27 %). An alternative explanation for these differences in
structure consistency could be associated with an apparent independence threat, in particular in the
group of late NAS recognisers. Despite awareness of fraud signals and subsequently of the higher
risk, 73 % of those auditors tended not increase (adjust) the budget of hours for audit testing. They
seemed to be 'deflected' from fraud recognition.
In short, what emerges from the study is evidence that auditors respond to the (changing)
circumstances of the K pic client's environment in different ways, consistent with their attitudes to
structure of the audit process: transcending and non-transcending. The former being less
constrained by the structured audit approach represents a 'big-picture' perspective ('big-picture'-
versatile, i.e. NAS1>F2, and switchers to 'big-picture' mode, i.e. C1>F2 and C1>NAS2). In the
latter group of more conventional auditors, structure 'bands' the 'big-picture' judgement
orientation; hence, these auditors tend to take to codification more readily following risk and
materiality steps, and that results in 'black box' oriented judgements.
On the whole, 40 % of the subjects did not see either a fraud flag or an NAS opportunity in K pic
despite the characteristics of the case; that is, they did not 'see' beyond risk and materiality
concerns. On the whole, the group of conventional auditors by conforming to the format of 'risk-
based' audit methodologies was unable to 'see' the client through the wider lenses. These auditors
may prone to operational independence threat. It could be argued that some auditors were
unwilling to see a 'big-picture' scope judgements and despite the awareness of fraud clues chose
not to engage with fraud problem following 'blindly' the format of materiality and risk
assessments. These auditors prone to an apparent independence threat which is 'masked' by an
operational independence threat. In other words, those subjects may have used the conventional
structure of audit in order to avoid involvement with fraud regardless of their knowledge of fraud
flags. Thus, the evidence reveals that a structured approach is overused in audit and forms an
obstacle to the recognition ofmaterial fraud.
Further, the mutual exclusivity of fraud and NAS recognition was found since auditors did not
consider a fraud flag and a NAS opportunity simultaneously in the same year of treatment. Such
evidence suggests the ability of some practitioners to switch their attention to adapt to a new
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situation and their capacity for versatile judgements. 'Big-pictured'- versatile practitioners
(NAS1>F2) and switchers-versatile practitioners (C1>NAS2 and C1>F2) fall into the category of
'big-picture' auditors.
This chapter reported on statistical analysis with regard to independence of judgement within the
structured audit approach. The results provide limited insight as to the individual thought processes
associated with audit judgement. Although non-parametric analysis offers a number of tests, their
somewhat limited power is unable to grapple in depths with the sophistication of individual
auditors' thinking and interpretations. The following chapter (chapter 7) on the basis of narrative
analysis reports on the more ambiguous aspects of the individual auditor's thought processes,
unveiled by the statistical analysis and embedded in dynamics of the audit judgement milieu (see
section 3.5 in chapter 3).
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CHAPTER 7
The realm of the real in audit practice
7.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the ways in which professionals perceive themselves both as the
members of a distinct profession and as the members of a particular audit firms and seeks to
reveal whether they value the independence of their judgements. Interviews were designed to
draw upon and enter into dialogue with auditors' individual discourses concerning their
perceptions and attitudes of on-the-job performance. In particular, narrative analysis set out to
clarify how selected participants perceive themselves as dealing with the tensions between
structure and judgement metaphors and how they relate these perceptions to their personality
and background. Hence, the more ambiguous aspects of audit judgement processes, which had
remained opaque in the statistical analysis are brought to light. Insights from interviews'
narratives confirmed the existence of different attitudes to tensions between judgement and
structure in the audit process; that is, the two distinct groups of transcending (with a 'big-
picture' scope) and non-transcending (with a conventional scope) practitioners emerged.
To find out whether audit independence is compromised in the organisational context, in
particular in its operational sense, there was a need to investigate individual perceptions and
awareness of the capacity for provision of the audit services, and how this awareness manifests
itself in patterns of judgement and decision-making. Further, as audit firms encourage certain
ways of being, that is certain behaviours on audit, the question of whether the firms promote
awareness for additional services, that is NAS opportunism was raised. In addition, the
dynamics between the organisational culture towards judgement styles and individual
interpretations is examined. In this sense, an identification of who the auditors are and what they
are may form the basis of an understanding of their position in particular social situations within
the audit firm. It can be argued that all knowledge is subjective; that is, what we know is shaped
by how we know it and who we are. Hence, this chapter provides insights into individual
experiences of the dynamics between audit judgement and the structure of the audit process
within the audit firm in the form of stories and events related by the auditors themselves.
This chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, the demographic characteristics of interviewees are
presented. The next section is devoted to the presentation of the story of the 'realm of the real'
in operational audit practice formulated through the auditors' discourses themselves. Within that
story, the auditors present their experiences of socialisation processes within the firm, i.e. the
role of the audit firms in the formation of auditors' awareness (the predisposition to audit). The
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story is told with the application of symbolic language where the dynamics between judgement
and structure metaphors are revealed in the hermeneutic context of the practice. What emerges
from the story is the unfolding of organisational change and associated concerns related to the
introduction of the new audit methodologies. The following section discusses the personality of
the auditor and how individual traits influence particular responses to judgement processes and
to the structure of operational approaches. Finally, the 'realm of the real' in operational audit
approaches is compared with the wished for and imagined state; that is, the auditors share how
they perceive directions for further change with regard to the improvement of audit quality.
7.2 Profile of interviewees
Out of the 74 participants of the questionnaire survey, 10 individuals were selected to be invited
for an interview (5 audit seniors and 5 audit managers); that is, 13.5 % of all participants of the
questionnaire survey. All 10 agreed to participate,. The interviewees were chosen from two Big
Five auditing firms - PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Arthur Andersen. There was a relatively
even distribution of interviewees across the three cases A, B, C. Table 7.1 presents the across-
case distribution.
Table 7.1
Interviews' respondents: Across-case distribution
Case A B C
Position in the firm
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Audit Senior 1 1 1
Audit manager 1 1
Arthur Andersen
Audit Senior 1 1
Audit manager 1 1 1
Overall 4 4 2
The demographic characteristics of the interviewees and their experience in the auditing
profession are summarised in Table 7.2. This table demonstrates a representative distribution of
age groups, audit experience within the firms and gender of the interviewees.
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Table 7.2
Interviews' respondents: Demographic characteristics and work experience
Experience in audit (yrs) Up to 3 4-5 6-7 8+
Gender F M F M F M F M
Age
20-30 1
31-40 1 1 1 1
41-50 2 1 1
50+ 1
Overall 1 1 3 1 2 2
F - Female, M - Male
7.3 The story of the 'realm of the real' in audit practice
In this study, the auditing practice is perceived as a hermeneutic practice; that is, the auditor on
the job strives to understand and interpret the economic text behind the client's operations and
financial statements in the wider contexts of social institutions, power relations and structural
conditions. The auditor's engagement with clients is also shaped by where the auditor is coming
from, which can be understood as originating from the dynamic fusion of individual traits and
immersion in specific professional and organisational cultures. With a focus on each auditor's
own description of on-the-job experiences, this section seeks to illuminate the multiplicity of
interpretive dimensions and multifaceted nature of the 'realm of the real' in audit practice. As
part of the story of professional formation, the auditor is required to complete socialisation
process within the audit firm, during which understandings of its internal culture and politics are
absorbed. The story is composed of its own symbolic language, rich in professional jargon and
often linked to emotional and intuitive aspects of experience. The story requires an overview of
the context; that is, embeddedness in the dynamics between judgement and structure metaphors.
Tensions that exist between the auditor and the role of the firm in predisposing to audit are
discussed through individuals relating their ways of navigating and adopting to organisational
change, i.e. the introduction of new audit methodologies. Hence, the story of the 'realm of the
real' records different accounts and different viewpoints of operational reality, and then,
constructs what appears to be the (perceived) best in its text to be shared.
7.3.1 Socialisation processes
Organisational age; that is, the number of years the individual has been employed by or
associated with an organisation, influences the perceptions of this individual, in particular with
regard to structural conditions and power relations within the organisation. Within audit firms,
the process of socialisation is tacitly understood as an informal but utterly necessary rite of
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passage in which, through a series of learning experiences, trials and tests, the individual
demonstrates that he/she has absorbed particular norms and procedures, and can bring these to
effect in an appropriate manner. Hence, the time the auditor has spent in the audit firm (i.e.
organisational age), and in particular in the audit division, has an effect on his/her perceptions of
the underlying reality of that firm and brings particular insights into how audit is done. The
auditors argued that it takes generally up to three years for an individual to become socialised
into the internal culture. That is, during the first two or three years of employment the auditor
learns the ways, norms, procedures and perspectives. It is also during this period of the first
years that newcomers are more questioning of these organisational ways of 'how things are
done'. After the socialisation process is completed or nearly completed, organisational routines
and procedures are taken for granted and inscribed in tacit ways in daily operations. There is a
danger that structure will become inscribed into individual decision processes if the auditor's
self-awareness and tenacity to his/her capacities for creative and critical reasoning is somewhat
obfuscated by procedural concerns. All interviewees had at least two or three years of audit
experience in the current firm, and had therefore all more or less completed the initial
socialisation processes with this firm. Andrew (one of the interviewees) explained that when
this initial process is undergone, individual thinking processes are identified very much with the
'thinking' of the organisation.
'Your thinking becomes very much the case of the firm's view rather than of your own. It has to
do with the whole culture of the firm. Auditors feel as being a part of the firm. We [auditors] are
encouraged to take responsibility for the firm's culture and consult on things. It is a part of this
profession, you find a consensus on how to manage the risks' (Andrew).
Ernie pointed out the importance of broader individual creativeness, especially in these first
three years of job experience.
'When you join the audit firm, the first three or four years are very much task-driven, you are
focusing on individual tasks each year. But you need to somehow broaden your creative thinking
at all levels, you need to gain business awareness' (Ernie).
Ernie pointed out that during these first years in the audit firm the auditor learns the 'craft' of
auditing; that is, the auditor becomes predisposed to audit.
'You start to look at things in one way at the university. You leam to look at things in a
particular way. You then feed it to the auditing processes and you start to look at things in more
analytical manner to start with. And then, you have to try to broaden your thinking. That is very
important. It is like a learning process' (Emie).
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Incentives for changes in auditing careers are very much self-driven and self-defined. For the
majority of interviewees a personal conviction was a motivational driver in the process of
choosing the audit firm for auditing training. Motivation factors for good audit performance
whilst within the firm were associated with possession of specialised knowledge inaccessible to
others (i.e. exclusive professional knowledge), status, salary, and inclusive social culture (in
particular acknowledgement of colleagues). Possession of status (related to prestige in society)
and of professional knowledge (expertise) were highly regarded by the majority of interviewees
in the assessment of their job satisfaction. Some auditors mentioned primacy of financial reward
as a determinant of job satisfaction. For example Stephen stressed the importance of his salary
as motivational factor to perform well in the audit practice.
'Audit is quite an interesting and rewarding discipline, by the end of the month I am satisfied
with my pay slip' (Stephen).
Social aspects of work were also perceived as important for the interviewees' job satisfaction.
On the whole, in both firms, auditors are perceived to engage themselves on the basis of the
specific task at hand. Auditors often co-operate with one another in teams in order to achieve
timely goals; that is, a successfully completed audit. Sarah stressed that she values a friendly
atmosphere at her work place.
'I appreciate working in the firm, we have a friendly team-building atmosphere, this defines
what we are and how we work' (Sarah).
The interviewees perceived that, on the whole, auditors at senior/managerial levels enjoy what
they do in audit because of their intrinsic interest in the task. They argued that those so-called
simple procedures of ticking and trial balancing belong to the responsibilities of junior members
of the audit teams. Often junior members of the audit team are patronised with regard to their
critical skills, which somewhat contradicts the concept of a socialisation process within which
auditors viewed themselves as being critical of internal culture. John argued from the
perspective of the team manager.
'You have to have a lot of understanding about the level and the stage of each member of the
team...and as they [junior staff] progress you would hope that their structured thinking would
become less rigid, and that they should be able to think for themselves, to think problems
through themselves' (John).
Ann and Russell gave examples of the progression process within the audit firm.
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'In the first year you do photocopies and adding up, in the second year you do a bit more, you do
trial balances, and in the third year you get many more responsibilities. This is how you
progress, how it all works in the auditing environment' (Ann).
'At higher levels [managerial levels] in the firm you are encouraged to be more of a 'big-
pictured' thinker, your role is more focused on whether the client's accounts show a hue and fair
view. Although, when you are in the first years of auditing away, you have to focus on firstly,
whether this or that adds up, and secondly on checking whether the particular system is working'
(Russell).
These basic tasks (e.g. trial balancing) do not require a great deal of critical reasoning in
judgement and decision making processes and are generally disliked by the auditors. Ann
shared her attitudes towards the audit process-related 'complications' experienced at the junior
level.
'I think that intelligent human beings do not want to tick boxes and you do not want to be told to
do, for example, twenty pages of the audit programme...you may not have even seen certain
sections before, e.g. foreign currencies. 1 personally hate audit work for its long spells, but I
suppose it is not fair' (Ann).
In short, the auditor in the first years of employment goes through the learning processes in the
audit firm, gradually assuming greater responsibilities in terms of the level of complexity of
information to be processed and interpreted. This process simultaneously involves incremental
stages in status and satisfaction.
7.3.2 The use of symbolic language
The usage of appropriate language has many meanings in the 'realm of the real' of the audit
practice. Language is understood as deeply constitutive of reality, not simply as a technical
device for establishing the meanings of practice. Language brings understanding of the
'making' of the work in the interpretations of it (Riessman, 1993, p. 4). The auditor on the job
allows for an affect in the language to describe the rationale of decision making processes. This
signals an important layer ofmeaning that the auditor attaches to his/her work. The interviewees
often referred to the process of 'getting a feel for the numbers' implying the need for their
subjective and critical reasoning in judgements related to the client's operations. For example,
Ann referred to such a process, describing the revision of standard hours for the audit testing in
the audit programme.
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'Every client is different, with different systems and records, so the audit requirements are
different for each client. The idea is not rigid, nothing like 'you do this and that, so if you got
this and that, then you have do that as well'. Instead, you have to be there in understanding the
client and to get a feeling for the numbers.. .then you know how to approach the audit
programme, and whether to increase the standard' (Ann).
Pentland (1993) related the use of emotional language to a discourse of 'getting comfortable
with the numbers' implying that objectively unaudited statements may be risky or uncertain, but
subjectively, they make the auditor feel uncomfortable. Some auditors stressed the importance
of comfort in the completion of the audit process. For those individuals a questioning process
was linked to the ways in which the audit work was accomplished; e.g. 'do you have adequate
coverage in the sales to be comfortable?'. Sarah relied on a feeling of comfort on the job.
'When you actually get into the details of the task, you are relying on them out of the comfort of
your own understanding. If you understand the client properly, in particular its businesses,
systems and approaches to management control, hopefully you will get most answers out of your
planning and review work...And you should not walk away from anything you feel
uncomfortable about' (Sarah).
From the perspective of audit judgement and decision making the use of affect in language
raises the question of what is the role of emotion in the formation of the interpretations about
the client and in arriving at the final conclusions on audit; that is, in forming an opinion. The
language of affect suggests that the audit process is more descriptive of a 'gut feeling' than of a
rational thought. Andrew explained the need for affective judgements in understanding of the
client, he referred to the expression of 'gut feeling'.
'Whilst dealing with the client and reviewing the material you have to get business
understanding, you can then feel for places, what is going on...you are aware of a 'gut feeling'.
This is valuable in audit. From time to time you can get a cosy feeling that it [the client's] is very
well run business and then you get to places and find things you are uncomfortable with'
(Andrew).
The primacy of a 'gut feeling' for the auditor over the rationale of formal procedures in the
audit planning process was found in Flumphrey et al. (1993). Pentland (1993) found the
importance of 'gut feeling' throughout the entire audit process. Flence, the prevalence of
emotional language in the context of audit work seems to confirm the primacy of intuition over
the usage of rational procedures. It could be argued that particularly in the group of 'big-
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pictured', auditors tend to trust the affective side of their judgements linked to intuition and the
attitude of professional scepticism.
Czarniawska-Joerges (1993) argues that individuals construct organisational life linguistically
through the use of symbolic language illustrated by the application of labels, metaphors and
platitudes (p. 19). These assist in creating a reality of belonging; that is, of being in the
profession. Labels assist auditors with classifications of what things are, e.g. 'risk management'.
Neil explained judgement in the context of new audit methodologies where the label of 'risk
management' becomes a part of a symbolic jargon.
'We have new audit methodologies. Risk management is now a prime focus determining our
[audit] work and is constant in our professional judgement' (Neil).
Metaphors create images and compress concepts in audit practice. The interviewees referred for
instance to 'spray and pray audit testing' to describe risk-based audit methodologies or to 'mind
set as against tool set' to emphasise the importance of independent thinking. Platitudes explain
conventions of what is normal in audit, for instance the auditor's 'feel of comfort'. Sarah
explained that in the environment where 'everybody relies on somebody's else work' auditors
more compliant with structures (with structured methodologies) gain 'comfort' from regulation
through legitimation processes of the liability status of the auditor. The prevalence of symbolic
language, rich in a professional jargon, in the language of auditors lends the appearance of
infallibility in terms of a professional ideology of structure and demonstrates auditors'
belonging to the exclusive group; that is, to the auditing profession.
The concept dependence of social phenomenon associated with employees' emotions on the job
implies that what it constitutes in the work place depends on what it means to practitioners
(Winch, 1958). The role of affect in audit judgement and the use of emotional language implies
that what affect is in the audit process depends on how auditors perceive and interpret it and
what it means to them. In turn, what affect in judgement means to auditors is played out in their
practical knowledge of constitutive rules and procedures; this specialised knowledge governs
how this affective side is gained or realised in judgement processes. What affect in judgement
means to the auditors could be illustrated by the dynamics of judgement and structure
metaphors. The auditing practice conceptualised in the dynamics of hermeneutics allows the
depiction of interactions and tensions between these metaphors.
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7.3.3 Hermeneutic context: Dynamics between judgement and structure metaphors
Auditing practice in this study is approached in terms of the hermeneutics of action; that is, the
auditor on the job interprets the evidence of the client's operations embedded in the wider socio-
organisational context. By doing so, the auditor produces assurance to the public that these
interpretations provide a 'true and fair view' of the client's affairs, that is they reflect the truth
about the company and its underlying reality. In that way, by communicating the company's
reality, the auditor constructs 'reality' to the public. The auditors' hermeneutic performance can
be illustrated by their overall interpretations of the K pic case. On the whole, the interviewees
had different ideas associated with the client's case material and the purpose of the research
design.
Some auditors thought the case study was about conventional audit practice; that is, the study
about the assessment of the risk and materiality. This can be illustrated by Russell and
Stephen's examples.
'I suppose that the K's case is about assessing the risk associated with the audit testing, trying to
work out a chance of material error and subsequently to determine what kind of work we should
be doing.. .and what an impact the identified problem area has on the rest of the audit' (Russell).
'I think it [the study] is about an impact of the identified risk on thought processes with the view
of this particular client [K pic]. The perceptions that the case creates is that the client is dodgy. It
may not be dodgy, it may be just a one particular area highlighted' (Stephen).
Andrew believed that the case study was designed to assess an overall performance of the audit
staff.
'I suppose the case is about trying to understand or determine how different levels of the staff
would approach the problems and consider its various pieces and actually to deal with them'
(Andrew).
Similarly, Sarah thought that the case was about an assessment of the auditors' performance,
however she perceived the performance being embedded within a particular context of
structural and organisational change.
'The main thing is probably associated with an approach to the audit in a period of change - with
regard to the system and an introduction of new auditors' (Sarah).
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Ernie and Ann interpreted the design of the case in a very specific context of the apparent
independence issue.
'I guess the study is about how the auditor would react to circumstances that potentially create
the conflict between the level of the audit risk he/she is willing to take and the level of fees.. .and
whether or not to hold on to the K pic client (Ernie).
'I thought the case is about how you as a professional manage to do an audit and yet trying to get
some more work for the firm. I thought immediately about the commercial awareness' (Ann).
Justin understood the case study through the prism of the assessment of the auditor's thought
processes.
'I thought the case is about trying to understand thought processes that we as auditors go through
in an acceptance of the client, at the planning stages of the audit, and then, in reactions to the
circumstances that happened once you have taken on the client...in a modification of your
approach and your responses towards it' (Justin).
Hence, majority of auditors recognised that the case was about the assessment of their
judgmental performance on audit, however, they had different interpretations and
understandings with regard to the context of the case study.
The client's accounts, apart from reporting the facts of economic activity, are the product of
institutional dynamics and political interests, that is somewhat based on arbitrary classifications
within the framework of national law (Hopwood and Miller, 1996). This process relates to the
notion of operational independence. The operational side of independence is associated with the
auditor's freedom and capacity to understand and interpret the 'economic text' narrated in the
client's financial statements, enabling independent judgement and activating understanding of
the client's context. The auditor needs to be aware of himself/herself, especially the capacity for
critical and subjective reasoning in the context of operational audit approaches.
'You have to know when to sit back and to value your personal judgement, because you may
take it for granted, because it is a part of you and you use judgement in so many ways all the
time' (Sarah).
The auditors recognised the role of their personal understanding and intuition beyond technical
parameters, as providing real guidance throughout the audit process.
172
'I tend to rely on my own intuition once I get the client, I decide how much work I need to do.
You obviously have your technical guidance for a base on whichever methodology you are
operating under...and you need to fulfil those, but you also need to maintain a degree of
awareness on an on-going basis to be able to adopt the audit approach accordingly. Whether you
formally modify the approach or whether your instincts are telling you that you need to do a bit
more work here or there, we [auditors] need to actually understand what is going on. I think the
real guidance in risk assessment through the audit is to always understand what has happened'
(Justin).
'I think that audit is not about structure. As long as the work gets done and as long as at the end
of the day we [auditors] are happy with the figures that sit in the accounts and understand them,
how you get there is not terribly important. Understanding is good to help you to see details.
I had to learn to step back' (Stephan).
Ann stressed the importance of client's appreciation and understanding of its business risks. She
favoured the conceptual approach to audit which requires an understanding of the client's
strategies, in other words she recognised a primacy of the conceptual approach over the 'spray
and pray' audit testing (i.e. long spells of work in the context of 'risk-based' auditing).
'I have an assessment in my own mind about the company itself and numbers. I think there is an
element of creativeness there of how it all would fit together' (Ann).
Similarly, Andrew emphasised the importance of individual thinking and a definition of
alternative approaches in the process of revising prior year audit material.
'I am comfortable with different types of tasks which require thinking, like how to get from A to
B; that is, how to manage a particular process and looking at the operations afresh rather than
thinking 'I have to do twenty tasks to get there'. I prefer to do things that are challenging and
from different perspectives, rather than just looking at all sorts of things we did in the previous
year. I like challenge, not following what had been done before and accepting it. A good thing is
to be open' (Andrew).
Ernie pointed out that identification of the client's key risks and their levels are already
judgmental and subjective processes themselves despite the fact that standard parameters for the
level of reasonableness are provided by the audit firm. There is a need to assure that risk has
been reduced by audit work to a 'reasonable level'. He mentioned fraud as an example.
'You know we [auditors] are not tasked with finding fraud. But obviously when there is a fraud
which materially affects financial statements, then that makes us look bad. That is within our
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remit that we have to be aware of fraud. It is not within our responsibilities to play systems to
detect those frauds, you know, but at the same time you have to be aware that there is such risk
and we have to mitigate such risk' (Ernie).
The processes of interpretations of the client's operations are recognised as being linked to a
notion of professional scepticism.
'Understanding the client must be related to professional scepticism; the ability to actually step
back from the work and to think about things...I think personally that this is really where my
awareness comes from, through common sense and use of my brain...Professional scepticism is
very much trying to work out what kind of people are there, what kind of explanations you were
given. You may reflect upon those and you may then decide that it was not right after all. I think,
it is a process of trying to use your own knowledge, trying to work out whether things are
feasible' (Russell).
Neil pointed out that more subjective judgement aided by cumulative knowledge and experience
implies in practice more efficient reviews and more appropriate selection of areas of focus on
the audit. He pointed out the need for balance between judgement and operational audit
methodologies.
'If you focus really on audit methodology, you are missing something of why you are there and
what to do. It is all about the client. All about it. You have to be aware of each issue or error
which comes up in the context of the layout. Whereas theory (i.e. procedures) will tell you how
to deal with that, it is important that you focus on the actual set of accounts and make decisions
on that basis. Methodology is there to guide you, but not exactly to explain how you should be
doing it' (Neil).
Justin was aware of the need for existence of structure balanced by intuitive thinking. He argued
that structure is present in audit because the auditor has to be covered with regard to the
auditor's duties and responsibilities; in such ways the legitimacy processes work in the
profession. Similarly, Justin pointed out that structure should be treated as guidance on the
audit.
'There has been a lot of literature recently about what types of master techniques there are, how
they tie with a certain materiality threshold, and what really auditors should be doing (i.e. to go
through the various checklists to make sure that one can cover himself/herself). People's
instincts prompt you to hold on to something and to be guided throughout the audit process.
Having a checklist you can go through, a test that is very clear about what steps you have to
undertake - this is what people tend to prefer. My personal preference is to be able to stand back
174
and understand what risks are and adopt approaches accordingly. But whilst relying on your
judgements you can get things wrong. That is where you need the professional risk management
structure to which you can refer to make sure that you have gone through the right hoops. I think
that the trick is to teach the staff to use the structure as a guideline to make sure that one is not
going away too far off the track. At the same time, it is important to develop intuition, to
challenge auditors to use their brains, rather than just going through 'I have done this and that,
then it must be right' logic. The auditor has to accept the need to be able to understand the whole
picture. And in the end we [auditors] have to have these structures, because you can not rely on
having a team of individuals with such a fine judgement that work in every situation, 365 days a
year, when you are tired or something is distracting you. You can easily miss things. You have
to have certain structure to revert back to, to guide you, but it does have drawbacks. In terms of
experience, I realised the need to have structure in place and realised both its strengths and
limitations. So I know when I can take in a situation and devise an intelligent approach, more
than just saying what of standards and audit techniques we can apply...and also you need to
make sure that you are covered' (Justin).
Andrew argued that the structure, if properly understood, exists for the benefit of the auditor.
'There is the fraud risk assessment tool and we use that through the audit. It consists of number
of lengthy questions. That helps to point out factors that would indicate higher risks. I mentioned
this fraud tool, because I know that it helps people with less understanding or experience'
(Andrew).
Neil expanded on the role of structure (importance of working papers) in the legitimacy
processes regarding liability status in auditing.
'What is important is to make sure that from the management point of view you are not exposing
the firm. What is important then is the audit file; if you exercise audit judgement the file has to
contain the reasons of 'this is why and what I have done'. Before the report is signed off,
somebody can review that; it takes the weight away from you by the process of checking and
approving the decisions you were taking' (Neil).
Russell was aware of the existence of both structure and critical reasoning on the job. He argued
that these are built into daily audit work.
'You tend to be busy, you need to make sure that you do work, that you do not step back. But on
the whole what you do is trying to get explanations for things. I think, therefore, that scepticism
is somewhat built into day to day operations. I do not think that people spend half a day auditing
and the other half being subjective. I think, it is all part of the same work. You need to have
structure though to make sure that you do all necessary work, because if you are completely
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unstructured you may miss something, some areas of work. I think, you have to have flexibility
and you need to use your own judgement. It is good to have a mix' (Russell).
Sarah argued that despite the methodology used on the audit there is always scope for use of
individual judgement.
'I think that there is still scope within the structured methodologies to use judgement. Whether
there is enough judgement depends on the individual. If you have an individual who just wants
the job to be done, he/she may use a structured approach as an excuse for not using individual
judgement. You can use your judgement but get things wrong...there must be a scope to use
sufficient judgement' (Sarah).
Neil pointed at the difficulties with regard to the operationalisation of balance between structure
and individual judgement within the dynamics of the audit team. From the position of a team
manager he stressed a need to trust in people, so as to facilitate such balance.
'I do not think you can ever teach people how to deal with the individual client's situation. You
have to have laid down a set of rules, a standard situation of how to deal with xyz. Also you have
to make sure that if certain steps are mandatory, you give freedom to people who are taking
decisions to be able to let them to do that. You have to very much trust your people as long as
they are sensible, that is as far as methodology has to be taken into account' (Neil).
In short, the auditors were aware of existing tensions between judgement and structure
metaphors at different stages of the audit process. Insights from the auditors' stories confirmed
the existence of different attitudes to these tensions in the audit process corresponding with
patterns in the case study experiment. The interviewees valued their judgement, as a personal
asset enabling creative thinking, intuition and professional scepticism; that is, the hermeneutic
dimension of the auditor on-the-job has been confirmed. On the whole, structure was regarded
as existing for the benefit of legitimation processes within the auditing profession; the
interviewees often related to turbulent environments, expectations of the public and referred to
recent court cases when the firms were sued. Further, Neil and Justin emphasised that the
existence of structure needs to be complemented by an understanding of its role as no more than
a guideline on audit. Some auditors recognised the need for the presence of both structure and
judgement in the operational internal procedures. Hence, it could be argued that there is a
hidden agenda within the audit firm regarding the balance of these metaphors. The auditor needs
to learn the 'craft' to apply both, so as to enable seeing the 'big-picture' orientation of the
client's affairs within structured inquiry of operational approaches.
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The internal culture within the firm was in general perceived as facilitative and promoting the
standard behaviour and application of professional jargon which auditors often linked to
emotions in judgement and decision making processes. The story of the 'realm of the real'
pointed towards the role of the firm in the processes of predisposing individuals to the audit
work and confirmed that audit judgement processes are impeded by the structure of the
operational audit approaches.
7.3.4 Predisposition to audit: the role of the firm
One of the important ways to gain an understanding of organisational change is to investigate its
learning processes. Literature on organisational learning argues that organisational routines act
as the memory of the organisation, i.e. the auditing firm. In other words, the ways of doing
things in an organisation, successful patterns of behaviour and standard operating procedures
are stored in the memory of the organisation in the form of these organisational routines
(Winter, 1986), i.e. benchmark behaviours and recognised performance are expressed through
evaluation processes ofmentoring and internal counselling sessions.
Structures create incentives and mediate the auditor's awareness to act and behave in particular
ways. Individual awareness on the other hand assists in the (re)creating of practices and
accordingly structures. Understanding how the personal identity and values of the audit staff
have been constructed is therefore vital in unveiling what the auditing firm says about itself and
about the profession. The dynamics of individual awareness and learning processes within the
audit firm can be illustrated in form of the personal traits - incentives diagram(Diagram 7.1).
Individuals bring a personal dimension to the workplace that affects practices and structures.
Structures and procedures, in turn, create incentives affecting individuals and predispose them
to audit.
This individual awareness of the auditor is embedded in wider social contexts. The audit firm is
an integral part of wider systems interacting with its environment and shaping the learning
processes that produce action; that is, audit services.
'There are professional constraints, sort of wider reality constraints that are always upon you;
there is time pressure from the firm to get something issued, there is pressure from the public to
announce the results' (Justin).
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Exhibit 7.1
Individual awareness in the audit firm: Personal traits and values versus incentives
To understand how the processes of predisposition to audit function, it is important to find out
how the auditing firms' institutional structures and internal procedures are represented and
operated. Self-assessment questionnaires and formal monitoring systems are now common tools
to involve staff in analysing their performance in the context of the existing structural processes
at the formal staff evaluation meetings.
Neil recognised the need for awareness of benchmark behaviour in the firm and the ways the
auditor is trained to think. He emphasised the role of the performance appraisal system as his
reference for objective behaviour. He saw the role of award (recognition), visible in such a
system, as an incentive for the auditor to behave in a certain way.
'The evaluation process is a two-way process: my self-assessment combined with my appraiser's
assessment and followed by a joint discussion. The rules governing my behaviour are shaped by
the culture of the firm and this performance appraisal system. I learnt what behaviour is
rewarded' (Neil).
In a similar way, Sarah understood the need for knowledge acquired in the firm about the 'rules'
governing her behaviour. She could gain insights to such rules from independence rules issued
to all staff. Ann stressed that she learnt how important it is to be seen in the firm to be
performing effectively.
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'The evaluation is vital in gauging how my performance is perceived. I mean, comparing my
self-assessment to an objective view of the firm [benchmark behaviour]. It makes me aware of
the need to be seen to be performing an effective audit' (Ann).
Evaluating process is regarded as a comparative exercise of self-assessment with myth
categories of 'ideal of service' propagated by the firm, i.e. an objective view of what
performance should be according to audit manual. John argued that in a sense, the firm shapes
its staff, as the individual discerns how he/she should perform on audit to remain in the firm,
and subsequently to remain in the practice.
'People are different, but we [auditors] are thought to think in a similar way in the firm and even
the members of the institute are thought similar...If something happens there are certain facts you
must go through and certain things to do. We are thought in terms of the end of the product, and
that is risk' (John).
Ernie envisaged the evaluation process as a 'box-ticking' exercise. He did not value this process
in general, unless the evaluator was willing to help him.
'The evaluations are almost a box ticking exercises. You know within yourself how good and
how bad your performance has been. Some partners use it as a motivational tool. I personally
value the meeting only if I can feel that the evaluator is listening and interested in helping me to
develop, instead of filling the right form again' (Ernie).
Ernie further shared his experience with bureaucratic controls in the firm.
'A certain set of authority limits a close day to day involvement with the partners. You want to
learn but you meet obstacles...I gained my knowledge at times by trial and error due to my
personality, i.e. 'do first and consult later" (Ernie).
In general, auditors are evaluated after each assignment; that is, on average six times a year at
the senior/managerial levels. Ann and Ernie, however, pointed out that their evaluation happens
formally twice a year and after any significant engagement. In addition, the auditors have
formally an annual counselling session. The evaluation process is largely based on the Staff
Evaluation Form (SEF). The sections under which the auditor is evaluated in order of
appearance in the SEF include: 'Exceeding client's expectations', 'Developing our people',
'Ensuring effectiveness', 'Managing risk', 'Using technology effectively', 'Communicating
continuously' and 'Evaluating performance'. Within each section the auditor is assessed twice -
by the evaluator and by the auditor himself/herself - with regard to objectives and targets, that is
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whether they were met, exceeded expectations or not realised at all. On that basis the
capabilities needed to meet unrealised objectives and actions required to achieve those are
identified. In the last section of the SEF the auditor is assessed in a narrative form with regard to
an overview of recent performance and the directions for development on future engagements
with clients are identified.
Closer examination of the auditors' perceptions regarding the sections of a Staff Evaluation
Forms reveals that, on the whole, individuality is promoted in the firm culture, in particular its
behavioural aspects. The assessment form is very much client orientated; that is, awareness of
the client's needs seem to be prioritised in the individual performance. Further, both audit firms
encourage NAS opportunities' awareness.
'It seems to be in the public interest our tendering for the work. We may be less harsh on the
audit since we benefit from knowledge spillovers. We have to make sure that audit is done
correctly, but if there is additional work that it is fair enough - we will be able to tender for it'
(Stephen).
'I think it becomes a common scenario for a multidisciplinary firm that you have a certain
division to integrate non-audit services. As you progress within the firm, your focus becomes
more skewed towards that. There is a specific training to enable you to be more alert to other
services opportunities. It is a reflection on the state ofmy career. In the UK the sensitivity area is
the level of non-audit fees disclosed in the firm's financial statements, but it has to be something
striking to be a real independence issue' (Justin).
The auditors argued that, on the whole, they are encouraged to seek for other opportunities, i.e.
for consulting, but they still have to concentrate on the audit job. Stephen linked NAS
awareness to financial incentives.
'As you look at NAS in a certain way, that is one firm is maximising income, it is not necessarily
by asking the client for £ lk extra for audit, if it can get much more from the consulting.
Auditing has its own goals and to throw away money to another department within the firm and
get fee under the table — it is hard to take for lots of people. But it does not bother me, all I worry
is to be paid by the end of the week' (Stephen).
Hence, in terms of value for money, the client is perceived as not gaining much value from the
audit and being at the same time obliged to pay for it. Regarding management consulting, the
benefits from their provisions occur in more tangible ways. Stephan argued that this is why the
client is always willing to pay more for consultancy. Sarah stressed that judgement is valued
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more with regard to behaviour in terms of dealing with the client, i.e. wining new tenders (i.e.
NAS orientation).
'You bring another asset in terms of the client mix and its industries, you are encouraged to
judge what the fees are likely to be in terms of the recovery of risks and whether you can do it
profitably or not' (Sarah).
The interviewees recognised tensions associated with the provisions of non-audit services.
'There can be tensions because there is a possibility that the audit becomes narrower.. .because
of the existing expectation gap whilst the consultants focus on different areas. The client expects
that while using the same firm that you know all about other services whereas the consultants
will be covering other areas. That can create tensions of areas of interest between the firm and
the client, also between the consultants and auditors. It is important that consultants do the job
well if the client is significant for audit. There is obviously a triangle of tensions' (Neil).
Auditors shared the view that personal professional attributes are often highlighted in their
assessments, such as communication skills, attitudes of energy and leadership, thinking in terms
of 'watch your mindset not your tool set'. With regard to job-oriented attributes the auditors
emphasised job management and people development, i.e. organisation and project
management, as frequently quoted in their assessment forms.
The sources of auditors' knowledge revealed some insights into the learning processes within
the organisation and in the auditing profession. Most of the interviewees identified personal
individual experience as the key source of knowledge before any courses, workshops or
technical materials. They emphasised the importance of the experience gained from particular
engagements (Ernie, John), learning from peers (Ann, Stephen, Russell), from errors and fraud
cases (Sarah, Justin) and from embeddedness with their clients (i.e. accumulated client's
knowledge) (Neil, Andrew). Ernie shared how his personal experience with a fraudulent client
tightened his awareness of fraud.
'I have been involved in an audit where there was a fraud, it tightens your awareness. You have
to be aware of the pressures on management, the pressures on the individual when this kind of
thing happens. There is obviously awareness of the need to maintain earnings, the companies
with aggressive management will potentially look to that. So you have to be more vigilant'
(Emie).
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Russell shared how he learns while engaging with the clients.
'You learn through working with the clients all year round, with different industries. Clients'
relations...once I know them well, I am less sceptical, because I have seen things and I know
people, I know individuals. With those clients who are new to me I am more sceptical because I
am trying to work out and judge in my own mind how well-run they are, how honest they are...It
is like trying to use your knowledge of whether things are feasible. If you have a judgmental
issue, you can look back at your cumulative knowledge and work out things from your past
experiences' (Russell).
Stephen, Sarah and Andrew pointed at the importance of embeddedness with the clients.
'I have my old clients, so I know them well, audit becomes more of a confirmation exercise and
it is easier to see the 'big-picture' and the context of things. There is a lot of background
knowledge about the client within the audit team, and if you can use it then the client will
appreciate it. You can brief the client for thirty minutes or so and provide them with your basic
knowledge...it will impress the client' (Stephen).
'To understand your client means regular contacts with the client, meetings, revision of the
information they produce for their internal purposes, public information, i.e. chairman statements
and management accounts, information they are producing, kinds of indicators they are using for
the business. I mean, you really get to know them. In the 80s and 90s audit firms went through a
competitive arena which discounted audit and started to devalue it. We brought these pressures
to ourselves as a profession, and now, we have to live with the consequences. I think that when
the firm has a good audit relationship, the client sees it as more than just a statutory audit. You
are treated as a key person, as a consultant' (Sarah).
'Lots of NAS assignments are actually initiated by the client who comes to us, because of our
skill set and our understanding of their businesses, and they would value our services from
previous years' (Andrew).
The majority of interviewees regarded continuous self-assessment as a very important source of
knowledge. Other sources of knowledge mentioned included technical training (i.e. internal and
external courses) and self-training (i.e. electronic research material, technical material including
standards and journals, accounting databases). Auditors, on the whole, were aware that they are
expected to act as high status professionals. They acquire such tacit knowledge during the
socialisation processes (i.e. the structured training programme, periodical reviews, seminars
etc). Regarding the uniformity of performance, they learn a hidden agenda of how to be a
professional within the framework of the firm and the profession. This agenda includes the role
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of language, i.e. professional jargon, clothing and in situ behaviour. These are means in which
the audit firm expresses its position and strength. Jargon is believed to unify members of the
profession as an exclusive group of professionals at the macro scale as well as a co-ordinated
audit team at the micro scale. Further, language differentiates the profession from other
professions. A suitable and smart 'outlook' somewhat reflects upon the credibility of the tasks
of the individual auditor enabling him/her to 'be seen as professional'. Further, the look
provides certain assurance to the public with regard to the expertise of the auditor. Overall,
learnt behaviour confirms professional unity and legitimacy regarding the liability status of the
auditor in the wider social context.
In summary, structure creates incentives so as to enable the predisposition to audit work. On the
other hand, the auditors' identity, i.e. personal traits and beliefs affect their operational
awareness, and thus, affect the ways in which they respond to the structures within the firm, and
accordingly how structures develop.
7.3.5 Organisational change: From old to new audit methodologies
The perceptions on the dynamics of the learning processes within the audit firm allowed access
to the auditors' concerns associated with structural and organisational change, in particular, the
introduction of new audit methodologies. Sarah provided some insights into this organisational
change associated with the merging process and the introduction of the new methodologies.
'We have had an incredibly structured approach. We, as a firm, are now taking a very different
approach. If we take it to full extreme, it would mean being already involved with the client fully
at the early stages of our audit process. That would involve understanding of what clients are
doing and working with them, not necessarily at the year-end looking at all stored data. I think, it
will be a period of time before we get an ideal position between the two methodologies. If it is
done well [the merging process], the two methodologies will be married together [from two
merging firms] and will evolve towards more thought processes' (Sarah).
Justin shared his experience with old methodologies and with the introduction of the new
approaches.
'When I started training in London with the firm, we had a very substantive approach. I did a law
degree and did not really follow the statistical approach of ' number of items' or 'within the
population of balance sheet... therefore if we test sixty items and if we are going to tick them
with the invoice then we have covered our backs'. This is what we were taught, that approach
was very much based on the fact that you had to make sure that your working papers were
sufficient, and that you were able to justify what you have done and what you have not done.
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And the most frustrating thing was to reveal the working papers because people questioned what
you had done. For instance, there were tests for analytical review purposes where people lined up
two sets of numbers subtracting the difference, and if it was below a certain amount you did not
have to look at, rather than to understand what it should be below a certain amount and above it.
I think we moved towards this approach in a way of saying 'well, lets understand what the risks
are within the business, lets understand the controls placed over those risks and lets make sure
that we capture all those controls and that they are efficiently operating to mitigate the risk'.
With regard to change in our methodology, that was revealed in our firm over the last eighteen
months, we have to strive towards understanding of what the businesses are about, to understand
the risks that businesses face, and one of key things that you would be asked to do is to
understand what fraud risks are within that business' (Justin).
The firms are currently in the process of introducing the new strategic approaches to audit. The
steps of these new methodologies include: (1) assessment of risks facing the entity and its
operational environment, (2) identification and testing of controls over those risks, (3) the
assessments of residual audit risk based on steps (1) and (2), and (4) a risk reduction plan in
conjunction with the client (where necessary). Here are the narratives of how the auditors
perceived the nature of these new methodologies.
'Our new audit methodology focuses on the identification and mitigation of key business risks.
Audit risk is focused on testing the client risk controls and detailed analytical review. Aims [of
these methodologies] are to reduce litigation risk and increase client's value added' (John).
'Methodology is continually changing. The current one has been heavily shaped by risk
management and the drive to increase/maintain recoveries in the face of fee pressure, i.e.
minimum documentation, and work reviewed only once, and by discussion, use of specialists at
every possibility' (Neil).
'New methodology characterises basically a minimum documentation on the audit file. The work
documented must allow re-performance. Reviews are done by interviews' (Sarah).
Most interviewees perceived the need to focus on business risks' areas rather than simply on
financial statements risk as the most important difference in new approaches in comparison to
the old operational methodologies. The auditors emphasised the need for the use of specialists in
order to manage the key risks and to improve client's services, continuous debriefing (i.e.
continuous assessment, more time spent with an audit team), and a minimum documentation on
a file (e.g. client's ledgers) as the characteristics of the new operational approaches.
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'The new methodology focuses on understanding the specific risks within each client rather than
'spray and pray' audit testing. The approach - when I have started in the firm - was related to the
numbers and checking whether they were OK. We tended to over audit, we did a lot of
purposeless testing. For instance, we did not take for credit that a number was a computer-
generated number' (Ann).
'The differences include more control testing work pre year end, less post year end substantive
audit work and more focus on value added' (Ernie).
The auditors in particular perceived the differences between old and new methodologies in the
area of execution of judgement. They argued that judgement used to be applied on financial
reporting issues, accounting estimates and in ensuring the adequate scope of the substantive
testing, in the context of 'risk-based' methodologies.
'Judgement in previous methodologies was limited to the adequacy of statistical sampling,
materiality issues, financial reporting, and the application of the local GAAP' (Ann).
There were a few auditors, however, who argued that judgement did not change in the context
of the audit process, framed by the new methods. Sarah, for instance, argued that professional
judgement is always present in audit, despite the operational approaches in use. She argued that
nowadays individuals are more risk aware, and consequently to use their judgements more.
Judgement within the framework of the new methodologies was perceived on the whole as
broader. The auditors argued that they are encouraged to see a 'bigger picture' within the
framework of the new methodologies. For instance, the fraud evaluation questionnaire recently
became a mandatory tool in audit.
'In our audit approach to complete the fraud evaluation questionnaire is mandatory, it was not
previously. Normally, the procurement cycle is a classic example of fraud and we have
developed specific procedures to look at fraud, at those areas of the companies' accounts related
to long term contracts and subcontracts. I think that the firm is aware of where potential litigation
emerges from, and fraud is obviously one of the key areas in that respect that we have to be
aware of. It is probably at the very beginning of the engagement that we consider fraud risks, i.e.
potential transactions, motives of the management, opportunities. If we identify fraud risk then
we know how to focus our work, so as to cover and mitigate that risk' (John).
It is, however, arguable whether fraud awareness will not become another form of structure
prescribed on audit or a means of legitimation of litigation mediating genuine understanding of
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the client's specific problems. Further, regardless of the methodology in operation, the auditors
perceived the existence of the expectation gap as unjust.
'It is obviously not fair to hold the auditor to be responsible for finding and reporting fraud, in
particular if you have an engagement collusion. Further, it is unfair to hold the auditor to be
responsible for the full extent of the loss, which in most cases is unrelated to audit fee, and to all
the work involved' (Sarah).
'As the auditor you do not have to think about fraud straight away, because it is not what is right
for us to do, to go out and look for fraud. I think if you went out looking for material intentional
misstatements you would wipe out at the beginning few clients. However, if there are indications
of fraud, you have to take more care' (Ann).
Due to the expectation gap auditors became aware of the need to respond in the audit more
attentively to fraud risks.
'I think there is a changing perception within the business community and in society in general,
of what auditors do and what their roles are. There is a perception in a wider world that auditors
should pick up on fraud whereas from within the profession there is a very defensive attitude that
we are 'watchdogs' not 'bloodhounds' to which auditors cling. It is important for auditors to
protect themselves, to limit their liability in terms of what they promise to be able to find. If you
ask the auditor, he/she will say 'we can not be responsible to pick up on everything', and/or 'we
would hope to pick up on most material fraud'. It is obviously a conflict of interests. I think we
auditors have to strive towards understanding of fraud risks within the client's business, and to
make sure that audit work is designed in such a way to target those risks' (Justin).
'Although there is no legal responsibility for fraud, the auditor must be aware of it. If fraud
happens, the auditor will be asked a lot of questions. If you are signing the work, people expect
that there is no fraud in it in one hundred percent, but it is not a truth. From the risk management
point of view, you must be sure that there are no holes in work you have done' (Neil).
Independent judgement is required to assess whether risk associated with the key business risks
has been reduced by audit work to an acceptable level. The processes of identification of key
business risks are also regarded as judgmental. Judgement, on the whole, is regarded as being
focused on the client's appreciation and management of risks (including fraud risk). Auditors
agreed that judgement is more subjective in its nature while operationalised within the
framework of the new methodologies.
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'Judgement is more subjective, there are fewer standard parameters in establishing a 'reasonable
level' and less statistical sampling' (Justin).
'The nature of judgement is subjective because it depends upon your assessment of which risks
are significant to a business, and on your understanding of the client's strategy. There is more
efficient review and selection of areas of focus (although both are aided by your cumulative
knowledge and experience)' (Neil).
The interviewees expressed some anxiety associated with these organisational and structural
changes. They perceived the need to adapt to new approaches; that is, they need to be retrained
to think in new ways, and they need to regain the confidence of comfort while operationalising
an audit. Sarah shared some insights associated with the administrative problem, and argued that
new methodologies in operation are improved and tailored versions of the old ones.
'All of us [auditors] were put to courses in July and August last year, and we are trying very hard
with these changes. It was one of the biggest training courses running anywhere in the world for
a professional services firm, it involved over forty thousand people in three months fed through
this training on the individual audit programme. After six months it was interesting to see
whether actually anything changed and in fact what we were doing was just tailoring to the
system and to paper world (Sarah).
The auditors shared some uncertainty with regard to change, and on the whole they perceived
themselves as vulnerable in the context of a structural transition. In particular, the auditors
expressed uncertainty associated with legitimacy processes while adopting their subjective
judgements in the new context. Emie argued that increased subjectivity of judgement requires
greater consultation with others and with specialists to keep up with business sophistication.
The interviewees pointed out that within wider scope judgements, they need to be more alert
during the audit, and they emphasised an increase in the client's sophistication.
In short, an operational independence threat seems to be less prominent in the context of the
new audit methodologies. That is, a compliance dilemma between the internal policies and
procedures of the firm's conduct and the auditor's subjective judgements is less evident in this
new context since the auditor is more aware of his/her capacity for critique and subjective
reasoning. Hence, the proposition of structure 'binding' auditors' judgements (i.e. judgement
being driven out by compliance mentality) seem less prominent in the context of the new audit
methodologies. However, the problems associated with the new methodologies are related to
legitimacy processes regarding the liability status of the auditor (i.e. the new audit
methodologies are characterised by less working papers, more verbal evidence embedded in the
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context of increasing sophistication of clients). The concern is now more to do with the process
being too judgmental for the audit reliance being placed upon it (Hatherly, 1999). Further, there
is some indication that new methodologies become a tailored version of old methodologies; that
is, 're-packed' and 're-jargoned' in the structure of step by step audit operational approaches.
Whether the regulator will conduce the new methodologies back to the rule-form, and/or
whether the new methodologies will become 'prescribed' in the 'risk-based' format, will
become clear in time.
7.4 Learning styles of the auditor and judgement
The auditor's characteristics influence the exercise of judgement in response to the structure of
the audit approaches (APB, 1996). The auditor's advance skills and inherited ways of being
translate 'book learning' into effective execution on the job , i.e. the ability to apply the existing
rules and frameworks to complex client's problems with more or less subjectivity. Each
individual person has a particular way of perceiving the world and being in the world, hence, the
learning processes of predisposition to audit and to the existing structures are adjusted according
to personal beliefs and values. The attitude of subjectivity permits moving beyond the execution
of task to solve the client's specific problems with the innate ability to anticipate unintended
consequences and realities. The personality of the auditor and his/her expertise and experience
are intertwined and interrelated in on-the-job judgement strategies.
What emerged from the questionnaire findings is the evidence that auditors respond to the
particular circumstances of the client (K pic) in different ways parallel with their different
responses to the structure of operational audit approaches; that is, conventional and 'big-
pictured' auditors. The first group was not capable of seeing the reality of the client beyond the
layout of risk-based auditing, and is non-transcending of the prescribed structure. The latter,
was able to see the bigger picture of the client's affairs presented in the case material, and those
auditors were able to transcend the structure of operational approaches in their judgement
processes. This section expands on this categorisation, and presents how the interviewees
perceived their personalities, and how this links with their judgement strategies and the
treatment of structure in the audit process.
On the whole, the interviewees were open to talk about their personalities describing both the
strengths and weaknesses of their personal traits and the influence of those traits on the practice
of auditing. The majority of the interviewees perceived themselves as mostly analytical and
structured thinkers.
188
'Some people are more aggressive than others, some people are more comfortable with the set of
rules, playing things by the book. I am somebody who operates by the book and I tend to be
governed by rules and timetables, so there are always laid down procedures. It is more like
applying rules to the client. If there is a problem, I think in structured ways of how did it arise,
did it affect something else and what is its impact. So, unconsciously I am governed by a set of
existing procedures. It happens at different stages; you are following the book to make sure that
your planning is done properly, your team is briefed, set-up, then you can delegate details to the
members of the team and you can focus on the results of the work they perform and on the client
as well. In the end, you have to see what you are signing off - what is important is a client's
delivery, it is very much a risk management exercise...I am structured too, because I tend to be
logical and mostly governed by rules' (Neil).
'I suppose I am analytical person, but I would like to think that I have some creative flair as well.
I am number conscious, but there is an element of creativeness there. I am systematic but not
rigid. I think that auditing on the whole is an analytical discipline, very hard thinking' (Ann).
'I think that in terms of approaching an audit I am structured, in terms of planning the audit in
particular. You have to identify risks. If you pick up on something, you want to know what are
the implications. For me, auditing is a quite rewarding discipline despite the image it has as
being dull' (Stephan).
Andrew and Stephan related their structured thinking to the ways the things are done in the firm.
'I think, I am fairly structured. I tend to go through things in a logical maimer and break things I
am trying to do into pieces, and then deal with those. I think I am loyal to the firm - it is very
much firm's view, not my own, it is a part of this profession' (Andrew).
'I believe that I am analytical person.. .In the firm I have leamt to follow structures' (Stephan).
Ernie and John perceived themselves as analytical thinkers and within the reality of the
socialisation processes in the audit firm. They recognised the need to expand their ways of
being.
'I think that my natural inclination is to be more of an analytical thinker, but as you progress in
the firm you have to be more creative, you have to see the angles. If you are not able to look at
the 'big picture', the chances are that you are missing something or that you would get
something in the wrong perspective. So it is almost that you teach yourself to be more creative. I
had to do that. I still do that' (Ernie).
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'My experience led to a turning point when I realised a need to broaden thinking at all levels;
that is, detail time on a structured basis and more time giving assistance to seniors, trying to get
from them that particular awareness' (John).
Russell perceived himself as unstructured within the structured work, compliant on the whole
with the layout of the audit process and within that framework aware of his judgmental
qualities.
'The work that we do is quite structured but we [auditors] are encouraged to use our own
interpretations, our own mind as we work. I think I am unstructured. You need the structure
though to make sure that you do all required jobs, you have to follow it. As a manager, I review
others' work from the field in terms of follow up; that is, whether it is a major issue to discuss
with the partner or is it a minor issue, and can be dealt with at lower levels. Here, I rely on my
judgement' (Russell).
Out of all interviewees, Justin and Sarah perceived themselves as creative and unstructured,
'big-pictured' thinkers.
'It is important for the auditor not to just accept everything he/she is told without thinking, as it
would actually not make any sense. But it is also very easy for the client to convince the auditor
that there is nothing unacceptable, and you have to have a strong questioning personality to go
back and to say 'excuse me, I do not understand that, can you take me through it again'. You
have to be sure. If you do not understand something, you have to make sure that you do. If you
come up with misleading information then you have to inquire further. Understanding is good to
help me to see details in the client's environment' (Sarah).
They both argued that they can be compliant with the structure on audit but only to a certain
level.
'I find a balance between the structure of the audit process and my judgement as long as it seems
like second nature. I think, I am naturally inquisitive. I am able to be structured, though
reasonably because, if I like to know how to get from A to B, I sometimes go to C, depending on
my thought processes at the time' (Sarah).
Justin expressed tolerance with structure and his willingness to be adaptive as long as he can
balance his 'creative side'.
'I see myself as a creative thinker. In the audit practice, which is not the most creative of
professions, I can be very creative. But if something comes up that requires step by step analysis,
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then I am able to go through each of these steps and make sure that they are conformant and to
analyse each individual element, then all the ingredients, and finally you make a judgement as to
whether and what size effects audit pulls out. I think, I balance on the creative side and see
widely' (Justin).
Sarah expanded on her attitudes towards the structure on audit.
'I feel constrained by the structure. I think if I was given a blank paper on audit I would be able
to write more (possibly)' (Sarah).
Hence, the auditors perceived themselves differently with regard to operational audit
methodologies, with the group of auditors compliant with the structure of operational
approaches (i.e. who perceived themselves as structured and analytical thinkers) being
predominant.
What further emerges from the auditors' discourses is the unconscious link made between ways
of being on audit and their personal background and education. The majority of analytical
thinkers (to the level they perceive themselves), those compliant with structure, did accountancy
and statistics degrees at the university.
'I did an accountancy degree. I think, it is a rewarding discipline. So ten years of accounting
after the university. I wish I did a different degree because in the firm there is a lot of us
[auditors] who do not come from the accounting background' (John).
'I went to St Andrews to do statistics and some economics' (Ann).
'I did statistics in London. It was hard' (Stephan).
Andrew perceived his accountancy degree pragmatically, he believed it equipped him with
specific skills and knowledge.
'I started off doing accountancy and business law, then just accountancy. I was not sure what I
wanted to do at first, but I was always good with numbers, comfortable with numbers. I think it
was quite a useful degree to do. I thought then that more general types of degrees, such as arts
are not focused enough, and in the end you do not get a particularly specific skill set' (Andrew).
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'Bigger-pictured' auditors came from various educational backgrounds. Russell who perceived
himself as an unstructured thinker but compliant with structure did a law degree. Sarah and
Justin did combined degrees.
'I did a degree in German and accountancy. I thought it was reasonable combination of maths
and economics with practical implications, and literature helped too. Then I went to practice and
did professional exams in London' (Sarah).
'There are certain interesting facts through tracks ofmy education. I came to Edinburgh to do an
English degree. I think you probably cannot find an analytical approach basically through
reading books. Then I switched to do a French degree, I wanted to leam another language. When
you are learning a language, you approach it in an analytical way, but I did not have the self-
discipline to sit down and go through the whole of grammar, and understand what it was all
about. Then I went to France to leam to speak. Now, I am able to communicate very well in
French, but I am aware of grammatical mistakes - it does not bother me. And I am still able to
study literature in my free time - again my creative base...I went then to do two years LLB,
where you change; it was a much more analytical process. I think that law can be very creative,
but personally, for somebody who is an outsider in a discipline, the first thing to do was to
understand the systems and that developed thought in an analytical form. If I put these two
strands of my education, I can understand how I am operating in the professional terms. I am
mostly creative in my thinking, but not systematic' (Justin).
Sarah and Justin (both 'big-pictured') shared the importance of professional experience in the
formation of the ways they are on audit; that is, acquiring a sense of questioning and an attitude
of professional scepticism.
'I believe, I am very assertive and intelligent on audit (and in private too). If I do not understand
something, it does not worry me. I have been doing this for at least thirteen years, which makes a
difference in comparison with those doing audit for two or three years. Some of the best training
is learning from other people by 'did you consider this or that', a form of the apprenticeship in
work practices' (Sarah).
'I remember one thing they used to say when I first joined the firm, it was a need to exercise
professional cynicism. I do not think that I necessarily wanted it to came out in ways that it
sometimes does; that is, too cynical. I try to balance between understanding the constraints
within the client I am operating with, and telling myself a cynical attitude with regard to whether
I understand what they are doing there, and I think, it does not do any harm. I am naturally a
cynical person.' (Justin).
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Further, Sarah and Justin perceived themselves as naturally inquisitive and self-confident
individuals. Russell shared that he learned in the profession to be sceptical and how to control
the level of scepticism.
'I can be sceptical. When you are planning to be a chartered accountant you are thought to be
sceptical...I did an accountancy degree before. I leamt to be calculating too with regard to our
[auditors'] responsibilities. Ultimately I have twenty clients, if I was to lose some of those
clients, it would not be bad for me or for the firm. If we were to lose those clients, because we
would be too sceptical or not trustworthy enough, it would not affect the firm or the profession
so much. But if I had two clients... that case would be very different. There is a line, though,
when you can not put more pressure on fees and work, because you have to do a certain amount
of work and check whether the accounts are OK. You need to be aware of those things'
(Russell).
Neil, Ernie and Russell argued that their sense of professional scepticism is very much related to
family background as well as education.
'I think my family life influenced me as well as my education (I did accountancy and ICAS
exams), definitely these two factors influenced how I behave and think. I believe my mother and
my father are very much followers of rules and they never break any rules. So I tend to do the
same. My mother is a teacher and my father a bank manager, we had to move often and be
adaptive...I am not easy going and I do not trust immediately. I think it is partly because I have
moved schools so often. When I made good friends, I had to go away and not to see them again.
So, I had to learn to focus on myself first and then take other people as they come' (Neil).
'I come from a fairly working class background and potentially my attitude to risks - in
particular with relation to fraud - is slightly fearful. I leamt to think that people were doing
something illegal and making themselves richer out of this. I have not gone to that at the
conscious level to analyse my motives, it is more unconscious thinking' (Emie).
'My background thought me to be adaptive. I had to change schools, primary and secondary
schools. We [the family] used to travel a lot. I leamt to be sceptical with new people, with new
friends' (Russell).
Similarly, John and Andrew argued that their background influenced their thinking.
'As the profession, people feel they are being ethical. I think, I am friendly and outgoing, even
open, but at the same time, I am sceptical. I do not trust people blindly, it may seem terrible, but
I always question people. You leam it somehow, it is not easy' (John).
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Ann shared that she found it difficult to acquire an attitude of professional scepticism.
'I am a very trusting person, so I tend to believe people in what they are saying to me. If I see
things on the contrary...well I still believe that everybody is honest until it comes literally
obvious that they are not. I do not tend to go out and to question people. I do not tend to be at all
cynical. You need to be sceptical though in this profession. I am not sure whether I am though'
(Ann).
An interesting interrelation between the pattern of auditors' responses in the questionnaire case
study and the ways they perceived themselves on the job (interviews' data) emerged. That is,
those auditors who perceived themselves in the interviews as structured thinkers were classified
after an analysis of the questionnaire data as 'conventional practitioners'. That is, they complied
well with the structure of 'risk-based' auditing, but they did not make a broader scope diagnosis
on the client K pic. On the other hand, two individuals in the interviews perceived themselves as
unstructured thinkers (Sarah and Justin). They were categorised after an analysis of the
questionnaire data as 'big-pictured' since they were able to recognise in the particular
characteristics of the K pic the case of NAS opportunities and fraud recognition (see chapter 6).
Sarah recognised both, that is, she switched her attention from NAS opportunity in the first year
to fraud recognition in the second year of the case study. Justin recognised fraud in the second
year of the case study. Of the interviewees, Sarah and Justin were least comfortable with the
structure of audit process. There were few exceptions in these findings. Russell who perceived
himself as an unstructured thinker but compliant with the structure did not recognise either NAS
opportunity or fraud flags in the case study, and thus, was classified under the category of
'conventional practitioners'. Ann who perceived herself as a structured thinker recognised fraud
flags in the second year of treatment. Ernie who perceived himself as a structured thinker,
recognised a need to see the 'big-picture' and switched from NAS recognition in the first year of
treatment to fraud recognition in the second year of treatment in the case study. Ann, John,
Andrew, Neil, Ernie and Stephen (perceived structured thinkers) were compliant and consistent
with the structure of the 'risk-based' auditing in the case study while Stephan and Russell were
not consistent with that structure. In the group of 'big-pictured' practitioners, Sarah was
consistent with the structure of the case study while Justin was inconsistent. Table 7.3 presents




Auditors' perceptions related to actual audit performance:




Self Judgement performance Background factors
Andrew • Fairly structured
• Logical thinker
• Importance of 'gut-
feeling'
• Individual thinking
• Structure as benefit














Ernie • Inclined to analytical
thinking
• 'Big-picture' to learn
• Need for creativeness




John • Naturally analytical
• Sceptical (learnt)
• Awareness of step-by-
step format on audit






• Reliance on intuition
• Methodology as
guidance
• Importance of being
attentive to fraud
• Need to adapt




Neil • Operating by the book




• Need to balance
judgement with
structure
• Structure as guidance
• Role of structure in
legitimacy
• Accountancy degree
• 'Rule following' and
conservative family




















Stephan • Analytical • Importance of
understanding (need
to 'step back')
• Structure to follow
• Statistics degree
Stephen • Structured on audit • Importance of
enrbeddedness with
clients





• CA training as
learning process
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These findings of two prominent groups of thinkers with their different attitudes towards
structure point towards the research tradition of individual cognitive styles. It is argued, that the
individual organises and processes information by relating his/her judgements to modes of
cognitive styles and that predetermines to some extent how the individual reads evidence in the
context of promoted methodologies (Sadler-Smith and Badger, 1998). Prior auditing literature
recognised the importance of cognitive styles in audit judgement and decision making (e.g.
Bernardi, 1994; Pincus, 1990).
What tentatively emerges from the case study and interviews data is the fact that those auditors
who are more structured and analytical in their thinking (as far as their perceptions allowed)
take to codification more readily maintaining high accuracy over long spells of detailed work.
This group characterises the precision, discipline and conformity with the structure of a logical
method. The other group of auditors, those who are more unstructured, typify undisciplined
thinking and tangential approaches to audit tasks. They seem to transcend the structure of audit
methodologies, and read evidence well beyond the conventional practice of materiality and risk
assessments and compliance with standards. With regard to their preferred ways of judgement
and decision taking strategies, these auditors find work with structure difficult. Those auditors
who were capable of deployment of both strategies, depending on the underlying circumstances,
in particular, those who were able to switch their judgement scope from one year of treatment to
the next were sub-classified as versatile thinkers (e.g. Sarah and Ernie). These categorisations
imply that auditors have different ways of being (responding) with regard to audit judgement
and decision making processes. These findings parallel Riding and Cheema's (1991)
categorisation of individual strategies for judgement and decision taking; they distinguished two
prominent groups, that is (w)holists and analysts (see chapter 3). In short, what emerges from
the study is the fact that auditors envisaged as structured thinkers adopt more convergent
strategies to idea production in judgement and decision taking whereas 'big-pictured' thinkers
adopt divergent strategies to an idea initiation in the audit judgement strategies. The former
deploy non-transcending structure strategies while the latter transcending. There were few
exceptions from this categorisation above implying the impact of other unveiled elements of the
audit milieu for judgement and decision making strategies.
It seems, that on the whole, the ways the auditors' judgmental strategies are formed is affected
by their family background and education. These personally inherited values and behaviours
(related to both affective and cognitive behaviours) are then reformed and deformed by
professional experience in auditing practice. Some auditors find these processes of formation
and socialisation easier than others.
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7.5 The real story and the 'dream' in audit practice
The story of the 'realm of the real' in audit practice discussed the organisational and
administrative change, which has come about as a result of the introduction of the new audit
methodologies for strategic auditing. There were associated with concomitant structural
problems and the auditors' concerns, in particular regarding the use of their subjective
judgements in the context of legitimation concerns over auditor's liability.
What emerged from Neil's discourse were the counterposed parts, which attested to an essential
issue of what actually happens in the firm and, what would be a possible practice in the firm,
that is the real state and the wished for. With regard to the structure and judgement metaphors
embedded in a social and organisational context, the evident tensions are unveiled by the juxta-
positioning of the real and the 'dream' (i.e. a state counterposed to the real). In particular, Neil
being aware of changes in business, i.e. internalisation of commerce, sophistication of the
clients, advances in technology, etc., proposed an intermediary institution between the audit and
consultancy divisions to eliminate tensions between structural reality and judgmental strategies
in the firm.
'I think the best way to deal with the tension between judgement and structure in the context of
the methodologies is to set up an intermediary in the firm side. So the consultants would have
their channel to the partner and perhaps to managers as well, and the same with the audit
division. So you would have one figure head in the firm responsible for a service, in charge of all
aspects of the service and every dealing would go through that. That would help from the client's
point of view because everything would come from one person. But again, it could be very
frustrating to come through this administrative route, especially from the consulting side, which
would normally deal with the client personally. I am afraid it would not always work, because
the consultant goes straight to the client. It would be ideal though if they could be educated to go
through this intermediary. Saying that, from the start you would impress the client, build up the
relationship by providing the client's management with the background knowledge we have on
them - all from databases, it is available. You would have to educate your clients as well' (Neil).
Neil explained that he would envisage mixed teams on audit - combined of consultants and
auditors - to diminish tensions and the pressures of seeking additional services (i.e. non-audit
services) and to balance judgements.
'With regard to the knowledge on the client, it would disseminate in the best ways by having
joint teams. Something like the design of a new system...it would be very difficult, because all
members would have to be specialised within the audit firm. The training programmes would
need to be redesigned and improved. Generally, the team would have a good knowledge of
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systems, but not good enough to design and implement. Quite often you would find that there
will be a system specialist as part of the audit team who reviews the systems as a part of the audit
process. By using these specialists, it would almost bridge the gap between the consultants and
the auditors, and would help a growing together in the audit firm. I think the aim here should be
one big team. Certain people would do the audit and certain people design and implementations.
It would give more space for judgements too. It would be easier for everyone. They would all be
one part of working together, and more importantly it would be easier not to expose the firm'
(Neil).
Neil's perceptions tie well with the study's findings; that is, with the emergence of the two
different groups of thinkers among auditors deploying different strategies with regard to audit
judgement and decision making within the structure of audit approaches (in the old and new
contexts), namely 'conventional' and 'big-pictured' practitioners. Neil proposed the
introduction of mixed teams on audit, combined of both auditors and consultants. The role of
'big-pictured' auditors would be to see the client's evidence beyond the layout of the audit
process and to recognise the specific threats and/or opportunities in the client's environment for
the audit firm. These threats (i.e. risks) and opportunities (i.e. for another services) would be
recognised and assessed within the same team, and thus, would not cause any tensions, and/or
would not deteriorate the quality of the service. There would be more areas for applying
subjective judgements where a team-building spirit would provide more confidence for the
legitimisation of each individual's work. Since conventional auditors are very good in following
the structure of operational audit approaches, they could translate the 'big-picture' context of the
client into the structured inquiry, and in that sense, they would justify the legitimatisation of
subjective judgements even further. The use of consultants and auditors in one team would
provide the benefits for the firm in the form of a wider combined knowledge of the client, i.e.
the client would benefit from knowledge spillovers flowing from within the audit firm.
7.6 Summary
The interpretation of auditing as a hermeneutic practice draws attention to the social context of
the audit work, the underlying processes of that work, the meanings that auditors attach to their
work, and to the affective aspects of those meanings. These interpretations have important
implications for the ways in which audit judgement can be understood, and thus discerned.
Insights from the auditors' stories confirmed the existence of different attitudes to tensions
between judgement and structure categories in the audit process; that is transcending and non-
transcending of structure practitioners.
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What emerged from interviews is evidence that auditors' judgement strategies are affected by
standardisation in audit practice; that is, formed and reformed by socialisation processes withm
the audit firm and through professional training. Hence, it seems that the auditors' judgement
strategies are impeded by the structure of the operational audit approaches ('risk-based'
auditing). Auditors' personality traits, family background and individual experiences seem to
affect the extent of the structural impediment of audit judgement. These personal characteristics
affect the ways in which the auditor applies existing rules and frameworks to complex client's
problems (i.e. the level of subjectivity and criticism applied in the processes of interpreting the
client).
What can be discerned from the auditors' story are recommendations for mixed audit teams
combined of transcending (with a 'big-pictured' mode) and non-transcending (with a
conventional mode) of structure of the audit process practitioners. The mixed audit teams are
perceived as more judgmental in nature, but backed up by the capacity for focused inquiry of
the conventional practitioners. The role of 'big-pictured' auditors would be to see the client's
evidence beyond the layout of the audit process and to recognise specific threats and/or
opportunities in the client's environment. Since conventional auditors are good in following the
structure of operational approaches, they would be able to translate the 'big-picture' into
structured inquiry. These mixed teams would have the capacity to diminish tensions between
judgement and structure metaphors, and to mediate between the demand for high quality in the
audit services (fraud recognition) and pressures to be attentive for non-audit services'
opportunities.
Further, what was revealed from the auditors' story of the 'realm of the real' is the impact of
organisational change; that is, the introduction of the new operational audit methodologies of
strategic auditing and the associated issues. The problems related to these new methodologies
are linked to existing legitimacy processes, as the auditor is expected to execute more subjective
judgements on a wider scale which is 'backed up' with less working papers on the audit file. On
the other hand, there are some indications that these new audit methodologies of strategic
auditing are essentially adapted versions of previous approaches, not genuinely different ones.
In that sense, they are expected to be more or less tailored from the basis of the old ones i.e.
'risk-based' auditing.
Audit judgement research has conceptualised auditing primarily as a cognitive process
(Trotman, 1997). Within this paradigm, there is no way to account for the significance of
subjectivity (i.e. 'gut feeling') in the formation of the audit decisions. The essential point
emerging from the auditors' story is the fact that the auditors need to achieve an emotional state
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with respect to their work, not just a cognitive one; there is affect as well as a cognition, both of
which are critical to the understanding of audit judgement. Pentland (1993) argued that any
attempt to construct a purely rational explanation of auditor's behaviour fails. This is due to the
insufficiency of rule-following as an explanation of a social order in the auditing milieu which
consists ofmany complex and unquantifiable elements (see chapter 3).
'For any given rule, one must decide when to apply it, which requires more rules, each of which
requires even more rules' (Pentland, 1993, p. 619).
To reach the conclusions, in the absence of the rules or in the context of their ambiguity, the
auditor relies on the emotional resources generated by 'gut feeling'. The interviewees perceived
their subjective and independent judgement as an inherited quality, as second nature. In order to
activate critical awareness and independent and subjective reasoning in audit judgement
processes, holistic approaches to auditors' education should be promoted. Within such an
approach to education, the auditor would be able to embrace rather than simplify the complexity
inherent in the economic reality of the client's text and its environment.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and implications for further research
8.1 Introduction
This study set out to provide insights into auditors' individual judgement and decision making
processes. In particular, the study describes general approaches held by auditors at the planning
stage of audit in relation to the 'micro-structure' of independence of judgements in circumstances
when the audit environment is obfuscated by NAS opportunism and 'risk-based' audit
methodologies are promoted within the audit firm.
Through both engaging with auditors' frames of references and undertaking critical reflection of
particular micro-processes at the level of the individual auditor embedded in a wider environment,
the study sought to enhance the understanding of audit praxis. The findings refer, in particular, to
the scope of auditors' judgements. What emerges is evidence that auditors respond to the changing
circumstances of the client's environment in varying ways consistent with their different attitudes
to the dynamics between judgement and structure. These differences were used to categorise
auditors into two classes: transcending and non-transcending practitioners.
The conclusions of the study are drawn from the two-stage process of the research design; that is,
discussed in the context of both experiment and interview findings. At the first stage of the
research, the questionnaire-based experiment incorporating a real-life construct was conducted. In
the questionnaires, the subjects (i.e. the population of senior auditors and audit managers from the
Big Five auditing firms) were asked to compose an audit planning memorandum and subsequently
to assess the audit risk and to estimate a budget of hours for audit testing. The second stage of the
research involved interviews incorporating a process-tracing exercise. The process tracing allowed
the examination of judgement formulations over the case material (i.e. the composition of the audit
planning memorandum) and provided further evidence for the categorisation of the questionnaire
respondents. Interviews also enabled location of the study in a wider socio-organisational context
and provided insights into operational judgement strategies relating in particular to auditors'
background and experiences. Research methods were discussed in chapter 5.
This final chapter presents the conclusions of the study and discusses areas for further research.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, the dynamics between judgement
and structure categories in audit are discussed, addressing the issue of audit independence. In the
subsequent section, the incidence of auditors' anchorage is explained; that is, the incidence of the
mutual exclusivity of a fraud flag and an NAS opportunity recognition. The results of an
201
examination of the relevance of different learning styles in the recognition of fraud embedded in a
structured audit environment are presented in the following section. The results offer indicative
evidence with regard to the implications of different cognitive strategies in the audit judgement
processes being consistent with different attitudes to judgement and structure. The dynamics
between judgement and structure categories are then discussed in the light of organisational
change; that is, in the context of implementation of new audit methodologies for strategic auditing.
Finally, implications for further research are discussed.
8.2 Insights into operational and apparent independence: Dynamics between judgement and
structure categories in the audit process
The experiment findings, which can be found in chapter 6, provide insights into auditors'
judgement processes with regard to fraud recognition and their decisions regarding the estimation
of a budget of audit hours for audit testing at the planning stage of the audit, in a particular micro-
context ofK pic's environment. Two categories of auditors emerged: (1) transcending and (2) non-
transcending practitioners. Differences in auditors' attitudes with regard to judgement and
structure impact on the independence of their audit performance. In the group of non-transcending
auditors, structure of operational audit approaches delimits and pre-empts the auditor's ability and
freedom to determine the scope and criteria of judgement, that is, structure restrictions affect
auditors' operational independence. In the group of transcending auditors, the threat of loss of
independence seem to be associated more with judgement restrictions with regard to the amount of
work assigned for audit testing (i.e. despite awareness of higher risk, these auditors tended not to
increase, or in same cases decreased the budget of hours for audit testing); that is, with apparent
independence. On the whole, the evidence indicates that a semi-structured approach is overused in
audit (in the context of 'risk-based' auditing) and forms an obstacle to performance in fraud
recognition. Hence, audit judgement strategies seem affected by standardisation in audit practice.
The findings disclosed the differences in auditors' attitudes towards the dynamics between
judgement and structure. In the group of non-transcending practitioners, the auditors tended to
apply a more conventional mode to audit determined by the framework of 'risk-based' audit
methodologies. These auditors took to the codification more readily; thus, codification then
translates into frequently exercised 'black-box' oriented judgements (i.e. such judgements indicate
'orthodoxy' of risk and materiality assessments). They tended to read the case of K pic in terms of
audit (non fraud) risk and materiality, without addressing either fraud or non audit services. In
other words, they may recognise the possibility of fraud whilst not being able to label it. This
group is characterised by highly structured thinking which is manifested by treating the audit more
as a technical activity than a conceptual process. It could be argued that such an approach to audit
delimits and pre-empts the scope of judgement and, as a result, the 'big-picture' orientation in
audit is constrained. Hence, structure restrictions seem to affect non-transcending auditors'
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operational independence; that is, the auditor's ability and freedom to determine the scope and
criteria of judgement.
The group of transcending practitioners, being less constrained by the structured audit approach,
represent a 'big-picture' perspective. These auditors are able to go beyond the structure of
operational approaches so as to penetrate the particular micro-context of the client's environment.
Into this category fall those auditors who recognised fraud or NAS opportunity in either of the two
years of treatment. Hence, the group of transcending practitioners is further divided between two
sub-categories: 'big-pictured'-versatile and versatile-switchers. The 'big-pictured'-versatile are
those who changed the anchor of the 'big-picture' from NAS focus in year 1 of treatment to fraud
recognition in the second year. When the underlying circumstances of the client were evident of
fraud and/or NAS opportunity those auditors were prepared to see the client in a wider scope and
thus demonstrated their capacity for versatile judgements (NAS1>F2). The switchers-versatile
represent those auditors who changed the orientation of their judgements from a conventional
mode in year 1 to a 'big-picture' mode in the second year, i.e. either to fraud recognition (C1>F2)
or to NAS recognition (C1>NAS2). On the whole, for transcending auditors, the threat of loss of
operational independence seems insignificant since they are capable of, depending on
circumstances, transcending structure restrictions determined by the format of 'risk-based'
auditing.
In short, different patterns of judgement performance emerged; that is, (1) conventional (i.e. non-
transcending of structure practitioners) and (2) 'big-pictured' orientations subdivided between
'big-pictured'-versatile and versatile-switchers (i.e. transcending of structure practitioners). The
statistical testing explored to what extent these different groups of auditors perform differently in
the context of 'risk-based' auditing at the planning stage of the audit process. From the analysis of
the auditors' consistency with regard to the structure of the 'risk-based' audit approach it could be
argued that the majority of conventional auditors (70 %) were more compliant with the structure of
the audit task in comparison with the group of 'big-pictured' practitioners. In particular, 57 % of
subjects in the group of 'big-pictured'-versatile (NAS1>F2) were compliant with structure whilst
in the group of late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), 27 % of subjects were compliant with structure.
Thus, it could be argued that differences in structure consistency are associated with the auditors'
different approaches to balancing structure and judgement categories. An alternative explanation
for these differences could be associated with an apparent independence threat, in particular in the
group of late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2). A significant proportion of auditors in this group did
not increase (or change) the budget for audit testing, being 'deflected' from the fraud problem
despite an awareness and estimation of high risk in K pic. Hence, for the 'big-pictured' auditors,
the threat of loss of independence may be associated with the judgement restrictions with regard to
the amount of work assigned for audit testing; that is, with apparent independence.
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A significant proportion of the auditors (40 % of subjects) did not see either fraud or NAS
opportunity in K pic despite the characteristics of the case evident of fraud risk and weak internal
controls (i.e. a need for consulting service). This indicates that some auditors, by conforming to the
format of 'risk-based' audit methodologies were unable to 'see' the client through the wider lenses
of judgement. These auditors, that is, the group of conventional auditors, are consequently prone to
the operational independence threat. It could be argued, however, that some auditors were
unwilling to see 'big-picture' scope judgements, and despite the awareness of fraud clues, chose
not to engage with fraud problem, 'following' the format of materiality and risk assessments. In
such instances, the apparent independence threat seems to be masked by an operational
independence threat. In other words, those auditors may have used the conventional structure of
audit in order to avoid involvement with fraud despite possessing knowledge of fraud flags. Thus,
the tentative conclusion is that a formal structured approach to auditing becomes a potential threat
to fraud discovery (i.e. operational independence threat). This is an enduring concern since fraud
experience is not easily codified to facilitate structured inquiry. In other words, the concept of
fraud is not easily codified as audit knowledge within a structured audit framework. It requires
auditors' creative and critical thinking within a highly diffused and holistic environment.
Statistical analysis offers indicative insights as to the individual decision making processes
associated with independence of audit judgement. However, since the power of non-parametric
tests is somewhat limited with regard to sophisticated judgement and decision making processes,
further research, both qualitative and quantitative, needs to be addressed to substantiate the results
as to whether NAS opportunism affects auditors' structure consistency in judgement processes.
Narrative analysis (the second stage of the research) sought to explore the deeper aspects of
auditors' performance in judgement processes; dimensions which may have been opaque in the
statistical analysis. In particular, the interviews set out to clarify how selected participants
perceived themselves as dealing with the tensions between judgement and structure categories and
how they related these perceptions to their personality and background factors. Insights from the
auditors' stories confirmed the existence of different attitudes to tensions between judgement and
structure in the audit process; that is, the two distinct groups of transcending and non-transcending
practitioners emerged (corresponding with patterns in the case study experiment). The
interviewees perceived their performance in audit differently. The group of auditors compliant
with the structure of operational approaches was predominant. These auditors perceived
themselves as structured and analytical thinkers. At the first stage of the research they too were
categorised as non-transcending practitioners. At the interview stage, two interviewees described
themselves as 'big-picture' orientated practitioners. They had been categorised as such at the first
stage of the research. These interviewees expressed their overall reliance on emotional resources
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and intuition in audit judgement processes generated by 'gut feeling' and perceived their
subjective and independent judgements as an inherited quality. They perceived such thinking as
being of second nature to the auditor and enabling of critical thinking and maintenance of a
sceptical attitude. Hence, what emerged from the interviews is evidence that audit judgement
strategies are affected by standardisation in audit practice.
The interviews confirmed that audit judgement processes are impeded by the structure of the
operational audit approaches promoted by the audit firm (an operational independence threat).
Some auditors believed that the balance between judgement and structure metaphors needs to be
achieved in order to enhance quality in audit, and subsequently to increase an incidence of fraud
recognition. Further, some auditors regarded the presence of structure as existing for the benefit of
the practitioner. In their view, structured audits legitimated liability status of the auditor. Hence, it
could be argued that there is a hidden agenda within the audit firms regarding the balance between
judgement and structure categories. Judgement strategies are formed and reformed by socialisation
processes within the audit firm and shaped by the professional training ('risk-based' auditing
training). The auditor needs to learn the 'craft' of auditing to apply both judgement and structure
so as to enable the 'big-picture' orientation of the client's affairs within the structured inquiry.
8.3 Insights into anchorage in audit judgement
In the process of constructing the audit planning memorandum (i.e. at the experiment stage),
auditors did not consider fraud flags and an NAS opportunity simultaneously in the same year of
treatment. Thus, what emerged from the study is evidence of the mutual exclusivity of fraud and
NAS recognition. Such incidence confirms the ability of 'big-pictured' practitioners to adapt their
judgmental orientation to new, unknown situations and validates the existence of two sub¬
categories of 'big-pictured' practitioners; that is, the 'big-pictured'-versatile and the switchers-
versatile.
The findings suggest that early NAS recognisers were also fraud recognisers (in the second year of
treatment). The majority of early NAS recognisers (93 %) were able to switch their judgement
focus from NAS opportunism to fraud recognition in the second year (NAS1>F2). Those auditors
were capable of responding to both NAS and fraud dimensions depending on the circumstances of
the client. Further, nearly a half of the conventional group in the first year of treatment (49.2 %)
became 'big-pictured' in the second year of treatment (C1>NAS2 and C1>F2). Hence, early NAS
recognisers (NASI) tended to switch to fraud recognition (F2) in the second year, but initial
recognition was affected since late NAS recognisers (NAS2) seemed to be deflected from
awareness of the fraud problem. In the group of late NAS recognisers (C1>NAS2), there is an
evident risk of the apparent independence threat, since those auditors may have used a
conventional structure of audit in order to avoid engagement with the fraud problem despite their
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awareness of fraud clues. Further, these auditors did not increase a budget for audit testing despite
an awareness of the higher risk. Whilst one aspect of the study has its origins in concerns that the
existence of NAS opportunism diverts attention from fraud recognition, the results reveal only
limited evidence to support these concerns. The dynamics of NAS opportunism deflecting the
probability of fraud recognition needs to be addressed as an area for further research, in particular
in relation to issues of apparent organisational independence. Further, it could be argued that the
structure of 'risk-based' auditing 'bands' the 'big-picture' judgements in the sense of delaying
fraud recognition. Further research would need to be carried out to substantiate this argument.
The auditor needs to learn to balance judgement and structure on audit so as to enable the 'big-
picture' of each client within the structured environment. The auditors seem to respond differently
to these learning processes.
8.4 Insights into learning styles in judgement processes: Towards the convergence of
judgement scope
The findings of two predominant groups of auditors with their different attitudes towards the
dynamics between judgement and structure (transcending and non-transcending practitioners)
point towards the research tradition of cognitive learning styles. Prior auditing literature
recognised the importance of cognitive styles in audit judgement and decision making (e.g.
Bernardi, 1994; Pincus, 1990).
What emerges from the case study and interview data is evidence that those auditors who are more
structured and analytical in their thinking take to codification more readily, maintaining high
accuracy over long spells of detailed work. This group characterises the precision, discipline and
conformity with the structure of a logical method (i.e. 'risk-based' auditing). They represent the
category of non-transcending practitioners. The other groups of auditors (those who are more
unstructured), typify undisciplined thinking and tangential approaches to audit tasks. They seem to
transcend the structure of audit methodologies and read the client's case beyond the conventional
practice of materiality and risk assessments and compliance with standards. With regard to their
preferred ways of judgement and decision taking strategies, these auditors find work with structure
problematic, and sometimes impossible to conform to. These auditors represent the category of
transcending practitioners. The findings of this study correspond with Riding and Cheema's (1991)
categorisation of individual strategies for judgement and decision taking. They distinguished two
prominent groups of individuals in organisations; that is, (w)holists and analysts (see chapter 3).
In short, what emerges from the study is the fact that auditors envisaged as structured thinkers
adopt more convergent strategies to ideas' production in judgement and decision taking whereas
'big-pictured' thinkers adopt divergent strategies to ideas' initiation in the audit judgement
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strategies. Hence, the former deploys non-transcending structure strategies while the latter are
transcending of structure. There were a few exceptions from this categorisation implying the
impact of other unveiled elements of audit milieu on judgement and decision making strategies.
The auditors' discourses demonstrated a partially unconscious link between their ways of thinking
'on audit' and their personal background and experience. The majority of analytical thinkers; that
is, those compliant with structure did numeracy oriented degrees at the university (i.e. accountancy
or statistics) while interviewees who perceived themselves as 'big-pictured' auditors did combined
degrees. The big-pictured' further perceived themselves as naturally inquisitive, critical and self-
confident individuals whereas some conventional auditors found the attitude of professional
scepticism difficult to acquire and subsequently to deal with. As the education processes enable
particular forms of learning, it could be argued that the accountancy degree in the UK is too
narrowly focused on issues of knowledge transfers in the context of stable systems and thus,
inadequately prepares auditors for the job in a changing and turbulent environment.
Personality traits, family background and individual experiences seem to affect the extent of the
structural impediment of audit judgement. In other words, these personal characteristics enable the
auditor's ability to apply existing rules and frameworks to complex client's problems so as he/she
applies more or less subjectivity and criticism in the processes of interpreting the client. It could be
argued that in order to activate critical awareness and independent reasoning in the audit
judgement processes and to broaden individual thinking capacities within underlying frameworks,
holistic approaches to education should be promoted. A more holistic approach could be
introduced into audit training curriculum. Professional judgement in audit should be grounded in a
comprehensive understanding of the business, the way it generates value and creates the
sustainability of its competitive advantage. In the absence of such comprehensive decision frames,
there is no way of knowing when and the extent to which judgements in audit are misguided or
obfuscated. With more holistic approaches to education, the auditor would be able to embrace
rather than simplify the complexity inherent in the economic web of interrelations within the
client's business and the client's business environment.
Since evidence reveals that auditors tend to respond differently to the changing circumstances of
the client environment consistent with their different attitudes to structure affecting their
judgement performance, mixed teams could be built in audit in order to increase fraud recognition.
That is, the audit teams should consist of those auditors who see the 'big-picture' and those who
are able to operate within structured audit formats. The role of 'big-pictured' auditors would be to
see the client's evidence beyond the layout of the audit process and to recognise the specific
threats and/or opportunities in the client's environment. Since conventional auditors are good in
following the structure of operational audit approaches, they could translate the 'big-picture'
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context of the client into the structured inquiry, and in that sense they would justify the
legitimasation of subjective judgements.
The introduction of teams in audit, combining both auditors and consultants may also be
advantageous. There are more areas for execution of subjective judgements when the distinction
between audit and consulting becomes blurred. In redesigned audit processes a team-building spirit
would provide more confidence for the legitimisation of each individual's work.
There are on-going efforts in practice to improve the quality of audit whilst simultaneously
creating value added from audit services. Hence the use of consultants ('para-auditors') and
auditors in one team would provide benefits for the firm in the form of combined knowledge
regarding the client, i.e. the client would benefit from knowledge spillovers flowing from within
the audit firm. Threats (i.e. risks) and opportunities (i.e. for other services, e.g. NAS) would be
recognised through knowledge transfers and assessed within the same team, not causing tensions
with regard to priorities of individual team members. The quality of audit, in particular in respect
of fraud recognition, would be enhanced, simultaneously maintaining commercial awareness of the
service.
8.5 Insights into dynamics between judgement and structure embedded in organisational
change: The nature of new audit methodologies
The interviewees' perceptions with regard to judgement and structure categories allowed access to
the auditors' concerns associated with current structural and organisational changes in audit
practice regarding the introduction and implementation of the new audit methodologies. The new
approaches are regarded as more strategic in comparison with 'risk-based' methodologies
addressing key business risk areas rather than financial statements risk. In other words, whilst
'risk-based' audit focuses the auditor's assessment of risk in a way that ensures that financial
statements assertions are not materially misstated, strategic audit focuses the auditor's assessment
on key business risks of the client placing the client at the core of a broader socio-economic
system (Bell et al., 1997).
The on-going organisational change focuses on the need to develop expectations at the entity level;
that is, expectations which are not influenced significantly by the assertions being audited and that
relate to the client's organisational fit within its broader socio-economic system. In the context of
new methodologies, once the auditor gains an understanding of management regarding: (1) process
for identifying and controlling business risks, and (2) perceptions and assumptions about those
risks, he/she can assess the business risk implications both for the client's business and for the
audit approach (Bell et al., 1997).
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To characterise the new operational approaches, the auditors pointed out the necessity for the use
of specialists in order to manage the key business risks and to improve client's services. They also
suggested a requirement for continuous debriefing (i.e. continuous assessment with more time
spent in an audit team), since documentation on a file decreased to a minimum with an
introduction of new methodologies. The auditors perceived the major differences between old and
new methodologies with regard to the execution of judgement. They argued that, in the context of
'risk-based' methodologies, judgement used to be applied on financial reporting issues, accounting
estimates and in ensuring an adequate scope of the substantive testing. Within the framework of
the new audit methodologies judgement was perceived as broader and more subjective in nature.
On the whole, the interviewees believed that the new audit methodologies enable the grounding of
judgements in a more holistic and critical understanding of the client and its business environment
and the interpretation of the role of significant transactions for this business knowledge frame.
This broader context was perceived as assisting the infusion of meanings into the key business
risks areas. There were a few auditors however, who argued that judgement did not change in the
context of the audit process framed by the new methods for strategic auditing. One respondent, for
example, argued that professional judgement is always present in audit, despite the operational
approaches in use. This conclusion followed from the perception that nowadays individuals are
more risk aware, so as they tend to use their judgements more extensively. Some auditors
perceived the organisational change as no more than a re-packaging and re-jargoning process. The
interviewees emphasised that the new approaches still embrace the audit risk model allocating
audit effort on the basis of risk assessments and performing procedures similar to conventional
audits (i.e. 'risk-based' approaches). Hence, there is some indication that new methodologies will
become a tailored version of old methodologies; that is, 'prescribed' in the structure of 'step by
step' audit operational approaches. It could be argued that integrated risk management overseen by
the auditor may represent the best opportunity to align policy. To facilitate the operationalisation
of strategic audit approaches, a regulatory system needs to put more emphasis on the self-
monitoring of the auditor including the compliance element as a form of legitimacy. Whether the
regulator will guide the new methodologies back to the rule-based form and whether the new audit
methodologies will become a tailored version of 'risk-based' approach will become evident in
practice, probably within a year or two.
It could be argued that the operational independence threat (concerned with the auditors' ability to
apply subjective judgement) seems to be less prominent in the context of the new audit
methodologies. That is, a compliance dilemma between the internal policies and procedures of the
firm's conduct and the auditor's subjective judgements is less evident in this new context, since the
auditors are more aware of the requirement for critique and subjective reasoning. Further, strategic
audit methodologies appear beneficial in the sense of enhancement of organisational learning
processes resulting in epistemological dualism between auditing and consulting. However, the
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problems associated with the new methodologies are related to legitimacy processes, regarding the
liability status of the auditor (i.e. the new methodologies are characterised by less working papers,
more verbal evidence, and in the context where clients continue to develop greater sophistication).
'No longer is the concern that judgement is driven out by process and a compliance mentality, but
rather the concern is the exact opposite, i.e. that the analysis of business risk and its relationship to
audit risk is too judgmental for the audit reliance being placed upon it' (Hatherly, 1999, p. 59,
emphasis added).
The auditors shared some uncertainty with regard to organisational change and on the whole they
perceived themselves as vulnerable in the context of the on-going structural transition. In
particular, they expressed uncertainty over the legitimacy processes regarding their liability whilst
adopting subjective judgements. It could be argued that the use of more subjective judgements in
the context of new methodologies needs to be recognised within strategic decision processes by
judgement management at all levels of audit staff in the firm. The audit environment should be one
in which auditing can be sustained as a professional judgement. Hence, with the introduction of the
new audit methodologies, the whole internal culture of the audit firm needs to be reconstructed and
holistic approaches to education and internal training promoted.
8.6 Implications for further research
What emerged from the study is evidence that audit judgement strategies are affected by
standardisation in audit practice. Within the context of 'risk-based' auditing, the profession
successfully presented behind the label of 'professional judgement' a sense of elusiveness over the
scope of operational audit practice. Hence, it could be argued that the structure of 'risk-based'
auditing delimits the 'big-picture' judgements in the sense of delaying fraud recognition (i.e. an
operational independence threat). A similar case study based experiment on audit judgement and
decision taking in a context of the operationalisation of the strategic auditing approaches would be
valuable to examine the extent to which new audit methodologies mediate operational sense of
independent judgement. In addition, field research and ethnographic study of the Big Five firms'
culture in this new setting would be of value.
Whilst one aspect of the study had its origins in concerns that the existence of NAS opportunism
diverts attention from fraud recognition, the results revealed only limited evidence to support these
concerns. It could be argued that pressure from the audit firm on the auditor to recognise and to
pursue NAS opportunities has a limited impact on auditors' behaviour in judgement processes. The
dynamics of NAS opportunism deflecting the probability of fraud recognition needs to be




The preoccupation with apparent independence somewhat precludes the academic debate
regarding operational independence, i.e. the capacity of the auditor to freely decide the scope of
audit and to assign audit procedures accordingly. More research on operational independence
needs to be conducted in order to understand the environmental and behavioural aspects of
independent judgement performance. Research into the motivational and environmental factors in
audit judgement and decision-making have recently emerged (Trotman, 1997). Auditing research
should not underestimate the significance of a network of elements within the audit milieu where
independent judgement is embodied in the wider context of social institutions and structural,
organisational conditions. Theoretical approaches attempting the explication of this wider context
should encompass the dynamics between action (judgement) and structure categories.
Interest in the independence of audit judgement will continue, and alternative ways of thinking
about audit judgement will be sought since new situations emerging in the turbulent reality of the
audit milieu may bring new threats to the meaning of independent audit judgement. A continuing
interchange between the profession and society around the issues of independence and
responsibilities of auditing suggests that the legitimacy processes in the audit milieu and
corresponding systems of abstract knowledge are social in nature and thus, destined to be
continually contested, redefined and modified as social interpretations. This study attempted to
contribute to those issues through the examination of independent audit judgement processes
embedded in the 'orthodoxy' of its practice.
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The questionnaire consists of three short sections A, B, C to be completed on an individual
basis. Section A asks for background information. Sections B and C include a concise case
study, split into a year 1 scenario and a year 2 scenario, each followed by a short series of
questions.
Section A Please answer the demographic questions numbered from 1 to 5. Turn to
section B after completion.
Section B Please read the year 1 scenario and answer the questions from 6 to 10.
Proceed to section C. Do not read section C before completing section B.
Section C Please read the year 2 scenario and answer the questions from 11 to 15.
Please use a ball point pen. Thank you for your assistance.
SECTION A
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Please state your age
years
2. Please indicate your sex
male/female
3. Please state the number of years you have been working in the audit function
years
4. Please, tick ( V) the box indicating your position in the firm:
(a) audit assistant □
(b) audit senior □
(c) audit supervisor □
(d) junior manager □
(e) senior manager □
5. Please, tick ( V) the box indicating your plans for career development. Do you wish to:
(a) remain in the audit department within the firm, e.g. become an audit partner □
(b) move to another department within the firm, e.g. consulting □
(c) move into industry or commerce □
(d) other, please specify □
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SECTION B
CASE STUDY YEAR 1 - CASE A
Your firm has recently acquired a new audit client (K pic) as a result of a competitive tender. K pic is a
small listed company which assembles and installs sophisticated laboratory equipment for several
hundred customers internationally in both the private and public sectors. In some cases European
Union grants are available to K's customers on the purchase of research equipment. K pic has a
reputation as a successful and well run company. For purposes of the tender it had not been possible
to carry out a detailed appraisal of K pic's systems but on the basis of the company's business, its
reputation and discussions with K's directors, the prospective client had been assessed as a low
engagement risk. Its most recently available financial statements show turnover of £200m, after tax
profit of £1 Om and capital employed of £180m. The audit fee specified in the winning bid is £60,000.
You have been given the responsibility of conducting the initial audit visit to K pic. The client's financial
year still has a short while to run. You performed this visit to K pic earlier today and have just returned
to the office. During the visit you had a conversation with the Finance Director. He advised you that
recently there were difficulties with the sales record-keeping system.
K pic has an old computerised system for dealing with sales. In recent years new types of sales
contracts have been introduced and some cannot be dealt with by the existing computer system. For
these, therefore, invoicing is done manually and the details are entered into the sales ledger by journal
entry. You are advised that the recent problems have arisen when inadequately experienced staff had
conducted the manual preparation of invoices and journals and that errors resulted.
However, K's management have assured you that suitable staffing is now allocated to the sales record¬
keeping and that although processing errors have occurred, an exercise is well underway to identify
and correct them. A necessarily quick review of the journal indicates that the value of the invoices
processed manually is around 10 % of total sales.
Other systems are reported to you as working satisfactorily.
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SECTION B
CASE STUDY YEAR 1 - CASE B
Your firm has recently acquired a new audit client (K pic) as a result of a competitive tender. K pic is a
small listed company which assembles and installs sophisticated laboratory equipment for several
hundred customers internationally in both the private and public sectors. In some cases European
Union grants are available to K's customers on the purchase of research equipment. K pic has a
reputation as a successful and well run company. For purposes of the tender it had not been possible
to carry out a detailed appraisal of K pic's systems but on the basis of the company's business, its
reputation and discussions with K's directors, the prospective client had been assessed as a low
engagement risk. Its most recently available financial statements show turnover of £200m, after tax
profit of £10m and capital employed of £180m. The audit fee specified in the winning bid is £60,000.
You have been given the responsibility of conducting the initial audit visit to K pic. The client's financial
year still has a short while to run. You performed this visit to K pic earlier today and have just returned
to the office. During the visit you had a conversation with the Finance Director. He advised you that
recently there were difficulties with the sales record-keeping system.
K pic has an old computerised system for dealing with sales. In recent years new types of sales
contracts have been introduced and some cannot be dealt with by the existing computer system. For
these, therefore, invoicing is done manually and the details are entered into the sales ledger by journal
entry. You are advised that the recent problems have arisen when inadequately experienced staff had
conducted the manual preparation of invoices and journals and that errors resulted.
However, K's management have assured you that suitable staffing is now allocated to the sales record¬
keeping and that although processing errors have occurred, an exercise is well underway to identify
and correct them. A necessarily quick review of the journal indicates that the value of the invoices
processed manually is around 10 % of total sales.
Other systems are reported to you as working satisfactorily.
K's management acknowledge the need to design and implement a new sales invoicing and recording




CASE STUDY YEAR 1 - CASE C
Your firm has recently acquired a new audit client (K pic) as a result of a competitive tender. K pic is a
small listed company which assembles and installs sophisticated laboratory equipment for several
hundred customers internationally in both the private and public sectors. In some cases European
Union grants are available to K's customers on the purchase of research equipment. K pic has a
reputation as a successful and well run company. For purposes of the tender it had not been possible
to carry out a detailed appraisal of K pic's systems but on the basis of the company's business, its
reputation and discussions with K's directors, the prospective client had been assessed as a low
engagement risk. Its most recently available financial statements show turnover of £200m, after tax
profit of £10m and capital employed of £180m. The audit fee specified in the winning bid is £60,000.
You have been given the responsibility of conducting the initial audit visit to K pic. The client's financial
year still has a short while to run. You performed this visit to K pic earlier today and have just returned
to the office. During the visit you had a conversation with the Finance Director. He advised you that
recently there were difficulties with the sales record-keeping system.
K pic has an old computerised system for dealing with sales. In recent years new types of sales
contracts have been introduced and some cannot be dealt with by the existing computer system. For
these, therefore, invoicing is done manually and the details are entered into the sales ledger by journal
entry. You are advised that the recent problems have arisen when inadequately experienced staff had
conducted the manual preparation of invoices and journals and that errors resulted.
However, K's management have assured you that suitable staffing is now allocated to the sales record¬
keeping and that although processing errors have occurred, an exercise is well underway to identify
and correct them. A necessarily quick review of the journal indicates that the value of the invoices
processed manually is around 10 % of total sales.
Other systems are reported to you as working satisfactorily.
K's management acknowledge the need to design and implement a new sales invoicing and recording
system. They have placed this assignment with outside consultants unconnected with your audit firm.
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SECTION B CASE STUDY YEAR 1 - QUESTIONS
6. On the basis of your visit and without any further preliminary work you have to write a
memorandum for audit planning purposes. Print (briefly) in the space below the most
important points you would wish to make.
7. Based on the information you have to date and following your visit, please indicate on the
scale below how you would initially assess the risk of K's financial statements containing a
material misstatement, when they are put forward for audit.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Negligible Moderate Extremely High
Risk Risk
8. Assuming the tender bid was based on 35 budgeted hours for the audit of the sales cycle,
would you argue that the budget hours for the sales cycle need to be increased, remain the





9. If you think that the hours budgeted should change, what figure would you argue for as the
new budgeted hours for the audit of the sales cycle?
hours
10. If you seek an increase for the number of hours required to audit the sales cycle would
you recommend that your firm:
Please tick (V)
a) compensate by reducing the number of hours spent on other aspects of the audit
b) seek an increase in the audit fee to cover the extra hours
c) accept that the audit fee will not cover the increase in costs
d) other, please specify
PLEASE DO NOT AMEND THESE ANSWERS AFTER READING SECTION C
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SECTION C
CASE STUDY YEAR 2 - CASE A
At the end of year 1 the auditors (your firm) were satisfied that the internally launched exercise had
identified and corrected the errors in the sales system. Following the audit for year 1 an unqualified
audit report was issued on year Ts financial statements.
During the later stages of year 2 you visit the client and ascertain that last year's efforts to improve the
manual operations within the system have not succeeded and errors are still occurring. K's
management assure you that a similar exercise to that performed last year will be carried out to identify
and correct errors ahead of completing the financial statements for year 2.
K's management acknowledge the need for the detailed design and implementation of a new sales
invoicing and recording system. They advise you that this assignment will be put out to tender and that
your firm will be invited to bid.
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SECTION C
CASE STUDY YEAR 2 - CASE B
At the end of year 1 the auditors (your firm) were satisfied that the internally launched exercise had
identified and corrected the errors in the sales system. Following the audit for year 1 an unqualified
audit report was issued on year Ts financial statements.
Your firm's management consulting group won the tender to design and implement the new system,
which is due to become operational at the beginning of year 3.
During the later stages of year 2 you visit the client and ascertain that last year's efforts to improve the
manual operations within the system have not succeeded and errors are still occurring. K's
management assure you that a similar exercise to that performed last year will be carried out to identify
and correct errors ahead of completing the financial statements for year 2.
At the end of year 2 your firm's consulting division reports to you their concerns that K's management
are insistent upon the sales system incorporating unusual features which, according to the consultants,
would allow K's management to backdate accounting entries with respect to sales, without trace.
239
SECTION C
CASE STUDY YEAR 2 - CASE C
At the end of year 1 the auditors (your firm) were satisfied that the internally launched exercise had
identified and corrected the errors. Following the audit for year 1 an unqualified audit report was issued
on year 1's financial statements.
During the later stages of year 2 you visit the client and ascertain that although the outside consultants
have designed the new sales invoicing and recording system, there are continual delays in
commissioning it. K's management claims that there are design faults and that the consultants are
failing to implement the system properly. There is a dispute between K pic and their outside
consultants.
Last year's efforts to improve the manual operations within the system have not succeeded and errors
are still occurring. K's management assure you that a similar exercise to that performed last year will be
carried out to identify and correct errors ahead of completing the financial statements for year 2.
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SECTION C CASE STUDY YEAR 2 - QUESTIONS
11. On the basis of the information you have to date you have to write a memorandum for
audit planning purposes in respect of the second year's audit. Print (briefly) in the space
below the most important points you would wish to make.
12. Based on all the information you have to date and following your visit, please indicate on
the scale below how you would assess the risk of K's financial statements containing a
material misstatement, when they are presented for audit later this year.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Negligible Moderate Extremely High
Risk Risk Risk
13. Would you argue that the budget hours for the audit of the sales cycle need to increase,






14. If you think that the hours budgeted should change, what figure would you argue for as
the new budgeted hours for the audit of the sales cycle?
hours
15. If you seek an increase for the number of hours required to audit the sales cycle would
you recommend that your firm:
Please tick (V)
a) compensate by reducing the number of hours spent on other aspects of the audit
b) seek an increase in the audit fee to cover the extra hours
c) accept that the audit fee will not cover the increase in costs
d) other, please specify
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Please use this space for any additional comments on the issues addressed by this
questionnaire. If needed, please use back of the page as well.
Would you like to receive a summary of the findings, when available? Please tick ( V)
Yes
No
This survey is confidential and neither your name nor your firm's name will be disclosed. If,
however, you would be willing to participate in a follow-up interview once the results of the
survey have been processed, please tick ( V)
Yes
No
If you have answered 'yes' for at least one of the above questions, please give your name, tel.
no and contact address here:
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
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